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 On paper, graduate school sounds like a miserable process: Read till your vision 
becomes impaired; spend endless hours in libraries and computer labs; come up with an 
original research topic and then write a book. By yourself.  
 My experience, however, has been anything but miserable. The years I have spent 
at Michigan have been some of the most challenging of my life, but they have also been 
some of the most rewarding. The people I thank here are just some of the many who 
made this dissertation possible, and who made graduate school a time to be enjoyed 
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 Foremost among this group are my dissertation committee members, each of 
whom brought a different yet crucial element to the project. Jim Morrow has been my 
advisor from day one, and has provided a great deal of reassurance and encouragement 
during my time at Michigan. His uncanny ability to identify quickly the core elements of 
a theoretical argument and his encyclopedic knowledge of history helped me through 
several rough spots in the dissertation. I am thankful to Paul Huth for providing a stellar 
example of how to approach and carry out empirical political science research, and for 
offering me opportunities to work with him as a co-author on several projects. The 
practical experience I gained from working with Paul and his continued mentorship 
proved invaluable as I began my own research. I am also extremely grateful to Ben 
Valentino for his copious comments on numerous drafts, especially as I worked through 
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earlier versions of theory; for the countless phone conversations over the past three and a 
half years; and for helping me keep my eye on the big question of the dissertation. I am 
very thankful for having had the opportunity to know Ben as both a co-author and an 
advisor. Finally, I am indebted to David Winter of Psychology for graciously serving as 
the outside member and for offering a new, and much appreciated perspective on how 
citizens perceive and evaluate their leaders.  
 Several other faculty members at Michigan warrant special thanks. First, I am 
very much obliged to several members of the American Politics faculty for patiently 
answering my endless questions as I ventured into the realm of survey experiments for 
the first time. Thanks to Ted Brader, Vince Hutchings, Don Kinder and Nick Valentino 
for helping me develop and refine the initial experimental design, and to Skip Lupia for 
encouraging me to apply to TESS. Rob Franseze and John Jackson are entirely 
responsible for my ability to converse in a somewhat intelligent manner about statistics, a 
feat my high school math teachers would have thought impossible. Jake Bowers’ 
enthusiasm for anything and everything related to statistics or political science was an 
absolute joy to be around. I’m very thankful for having had the opportunity to teach with 
him and for his help with the survey experiment. Last but certainly not least is Doug 
Lemke, whose kindness and generosity made my first few years of graduate school 
significantly more enjoyable.  
 Special thanks are also in order for Bear Braumoeller, my undergraduate advisor, 
for inspiring me to pursue a Ph.D. in the first place. Although I began my college career 
as a film major with my heart set on being the next George Lucas or Steven Spielberg, by 
the time I left Illinois all I wanted was to be a political scientist thanks to the classes I 
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took with Bear. I am very grateful to him for talking me out of law school, suggesting I 
go to Michigan and continuing to encourage me throughout graduate school.  
 This dissertation also benefited greatly from comments from people outside of the 
Univeristy of Michigan.  Adam Berinsky, Scott Gartner and Ismail White offered much 
appreciated feedback on the survey experiments, including many suggestions that made 
the experiment presented here and another immeasurably better. I am also very grateful to 
Diana Mutz and Poom Nukulkij for their advice on how to bring the experiments from 
ideas on paper to reality. Thanks are also due to Jennifer Castino, Jessica Doro, Matthew 
Hoover, Shelley Kenyon and several family members mentioned below for their feedback 
on the wording of particular survey questions.  Before the dissertation I never thought 
survey experiments would benefit my research. I have never been so happy to be so 
completely wrong. 
  My research has also improved thanks to comments from participants at the 
Peace Science Society Annual Meetings (especially Scott Bennett, whose outstanding 
discussant comments helped improve the theory chapter substantially); the Journeys in 
World Politics Conference, foremost among them Jackie Demeritt, Kelly Kadera, Ashley 
Leeds, Molly Mellin and Meg Shannon; and the Interdisciplinary Workshop in American 
Politics, with special thanks to Bryce Corrigan, Vince Hutchings, Yanna Krupnikov and 
Adam Levine. I am also grateful to Ben Fordham for some very productive discussions in 
Ann Arbor in the summer of 2007, and to Dani Reiter for his extensive comments on 
Chapter 3. The work presented here also gained from generous feedback from audiences 
at practice job talks at Michigan, the Ohio State University and the University of Illinois 
and at job talk presentations at the University of Maryland, Wesleyan University, Loyola 
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University (Chicago), Harvard University, Duke University, the University of Southern 
California and Columbia University. I am extremely grateful to Joe Kazemi of the Center 
for Statistical Consultation and Research at Michigan for his never-ending patience and 
kindness in working through several research design issues with me.  
 I am also indebted to several Michigan undergraduates who served as research 
assistants over the course of the project: Jessica Enger, Megan Irving, Alexandra 
Schlanger, Rachel Welford and, especially, David Larson.  Their commitment to and 
enthusiasm for the project, even as they slogged through countless pages of musty 
reference books in the graduate library, made building the dataset far more enjoyable and 
far less solitary than it would have been otherwise. Special thanks are due to David for 
helping to gather a large portion of the raw data, tirelessly tracking down information 
about obscure leaders and for growing to share my vexation with the French governments 
of the late 1800s. 
 Members of the front office of the Political Science Department also lent essential 
support during the dissertation writing process and throughout graduate school in general.  
Lili Kivisto and her vast knowledge of the ins and outs of the university made navigating 
the bureaucracy possible. Michelle Spornhauer, as I’m sure many of my fellow graduate 
students would agree, is deserving of sainthood for securing the necessary funding for 
graduate study (and for putting up with the endless demands, questions and problems of 
the recipients of said funding!) Todd Austin, Candy Ellis, Shannon Marshall, Joann 
Nemeth and Marty Snyder also provided much appreciated assistance and answers to 
countless questions over the years. 
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providing financial support for the survey experiment. 
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companionship of several friends and family also played a crucial role. Many friends 
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during long nights in the CAP lab, struggling through problem sets first year or imbibing 
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and Richard Young for making my years in Ann Arbor so memorable and wonderful.  
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Simmons for their friendship and support over the past eight years and for exemplifying 
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In January 2007, as American military forces continued to engage the growing 
insurgency movement in Iraq, President Bush faced a very different yet equally 
intractable battle domestically.  His approval rating, which reached above 90 percent 
when the war began in 2003, had been in the 30s for more than a year and showed no 
signs of improving. The midterm elections of the previous year had also dealt him a 
serious political blow.  For the first time in twelve years a Democratic majority returned 
to both houses of Congress, armed with what some saw as a clear mandate from the 
American people to end the war.  
The December publication of the report from the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan 
effort commissioned by Congress to produce both assessments of the war’s progress and 
recommendations for next steps, also did little to improve the president’s standing 
domestically.  Although the report discussed the potential negative consequences of a 
“precipitate withdrawal,” the overall theme of the report—with its gloomy 
characterization of the “grave and deteriorating” situation in Iraq and repeated calls for 
drastic changes in strategy—was that President Bush’s war was not going well.1 All of 
this gave rise to the realization for many Americans that the probability of “victory” in 
Iraq, however defined, was steadily declining. 
                                                
1 Baker and Hamilton (2006).   
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 Even in this atmosphere of growing dissent, President Bush’s commitment to the 
war remained steadfast. While recognizing public frustration with the lack of progress 
and taking responsibility for mistakes that had been made, Bush continued to stress that 
“failure was not an option” and called on Americans to “find our resolve and turn events 
toward victory.”2  
The debate over the war continued, however, and in the spring of 2007 the 
Democratic Congress attempted to exercise its “power of the purse” by refusing to 
approve a supplemental funding bill for the war. This move prompted President Bush to 
adopt a far less conciliatory tone as he branded the Democratic leadership “irresponsible” 
and their demands for a timetable for withdrawal “unreasonable.”3 After the bill 
eventually passed into law in May, President Bush reemphasized his position, stating 
“when we start drawing down our forces in Iraq, it will be because our military 
commanders say conditions on the ground are right, not because pollsters say it will be 
good politics.”4 
 Such is the current state of American politics; with a government sharply divided 
along partisan lines and what the next steps in Iraq should be, the war continues in an 
atmosphere of domestic political gridlock.  In spite of this rather mundane, “business as 
usual” façade, however, the root cause of the debate should be of interest to political 
scientists for at least two reasons. First, the fact that a war initiated by a democratic state 
in 2003 is even an issue in 2008 is something no existing theory of war termination 
                                                
2 “President’s Address to the Nation” January 10, 2007; “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq” (February, 
2007); “State of the Union Address” January 23, 2007.  
3 “Address to American Legion Post 177” April 10, 2007; “Presidential Address in the East Room” April 
16, 2007.  
4 “Presidential Press Conference” July 12, 2007.  
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would predict—indeed, instances of a democracy prosecuting a protracted war should be 
exceedingly rare.5  
Second, the degree to which President Bush is determined to stay in the war 
despite public disapproval represents another major departure from the predictions of 
extant theory.6  In a political system driven by a mass electorate, conventional wisdom 
would predict the leader’s preferences would move in sync with the citizens’, yet 
President Bush’s position on the war grows increasingly at odds with a larger percentage 
of the American people with each passing day.   
 
1.1 The Puzzle 
 The combination of these two anomalies—a democracy prosecuting a protracted 
war it is unlikely to win and a democratic leader so committed to maintaining current 
policy in the face of widespread public opposition—inspire the puzzle this dissertation 
will address.  Namely, what accounts for the variation we see in war termination 
behavior? Why do some leaders keep their countries in a war until defeat is forced upon 
them while others exhibit a willingness to comply with their adversary’s demands to 
bring the war to a close? Why do some leaders bow to popular opinion by ending costly 
wars while others insist on continuing to fight?  
Until now, existing theory has explained the variation in the types of outcomes 
leaders accept with an expected utility approach—leaders will end wars when the costs of 
fighting outweigh the potential benefits if victory were eventually achieved.7 According 
to this theory, leaders who rush to the negotiating table are those who face a negative 
                                                
5 Reiter and Stam (2002) and Slantchev (2004). 
6 Bennett and Stam (1996 & 1998). 
7 For example, Bueno de Mesquita  (1981) and Wittman (1979). 
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utility for continuing to fight—that is, high costs of fighting and/or low benefits of 
victory—while leaders who stay in the conflict are those whose expected utility for 
fighting has yet to enter the red—low costs of fighting and/or high benefits of victory.   
However, closer inspection of the historical record (or, for that matter, a 
contemporary newspaper) quickly demonstrates that the traditional cost/benefit analysis 
has difficulty explaining several leaders’ decisions to fight for ends that do not seem to 
justify the costs they are willing to pay. To return to the Iraq example, we may be 
tempted to classify Bush’s behavior as stochastic by assuming his intransigence is merely 
a reflection of an idiosyncratic personality trait, such as a penchant for “cowboy 
diplomacy” or a simple tendency for stubbornness.  The fact of the matter, however, is 
that Bush’s behavior is in no way unique. Instead, President Bush is simply the most 
recent in a long line of leaders who willingly stayed in costly, low utility wars despite the 
domestic political hardship that this choice has often entailed.   
For instance, in the Korean War Truman refused to agree to the Communists’ 
terms despite a 23% approval rating for the war and over half the American public 
demanding he drop the bomb and “get it over with.”8  Several British prime ministers 
exhibited a similar intransigent tendency in conflicts with colonies struggling for 
independence.9 But perhaps the most extreme example of political “stubbornness” is the 
French experience with the extremely unpopular war in Algeria between 1954 and 1962. 
In the first four years of fighting alone, the war brought down the governments of six 
different prime ministers, all of whom chose losing office over granting Algeria 
                                                
8 McCullough (1993: 872). 
9 Of the twenty-three British wars fought with colonies since the early 1800s, nearly half killed more than 
three thousand British soldiers and five dragged on for three years or more (source: Correlates of War 
Sarkees 2000). 
 5 
independence.10  These cases clearly suggest that this willingness to fight for limited ends 
in the face of high costs is a definite and distinct phenomenon and not just random error. 
Further examination of current American politics reveals another interesting 
dynamic that is often overlooked in discussions of war termination: namely, the behavior 
of the executive’s party. Although some may explain Bush’s willingness to stay in the 
war by pointing to his “lame duck” status and the fact that he, essentially, has nothing to 
lose by continuing to prosecute the war, this explanation fails to account for the behavior 
of other prominent Republicans. For instance, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell 
is running for re-election in 2008, yet has remained a staunch supporter of the war. 
Indeed, he joined President Bush in rejecting the Democratic calls for a withdrawal 
timetable, vowing that he would never support legislation that amounted to a “surrender 
date.”11 Similarly, Senator John McCain, the presumptive Republican presidential 
nominee for the 2008 election, continues to support the war despite growing dissent, 
stating that “even though politics and popular opinion may be pushing us in one 
direction, to take the easy course, we as elected leaders have a greater responsibility.”12  
If a lack of political vulnerability explains Bush’s behavior, we would expect 
Republicans with vulnerable political positions to try to distance themselves from Bush 
and align themselves more closely with the growing number of conservative voters who 
have become frustrated with the war.  But this is not the case. Although some 
Republicans have begun to break ranks and call for a change in policy, the number of 
members of Congress who continue to stand with Bush despite public dissent suggests 
                                                
10 Source: Sarkees (2000) and Goemans, et al. (2006). 
11 “Press Release from Senator McConnell’s Office” May 18, 2007.  
12 “Press Release from Senator McCain’s Office” July 17, 2007. Emphasis added. 
 6 
that the reasons behind Bush’s commitment to the war may extend to members of his 
party as well. 
 
1.2 The Answer 
The fact that leaders often deviate from the predictions of the existing war 
termination literature and that other domestic political actors seem to adhere to a similar, 
puzzling pattern raises many questions for political scientists. Why do some leaders agree 
to their adversary’s demands while others fight to the bitter end? Why do some leaders 
follow public opinion by ending unpopular wars while others press on in the face of mass 
dissent? My dissertation will address these questions and more with a comprehensive 
theory of war termination that allows for a larger and more active role for domestic 
politics. At the center of this theory are settlement costs, which I define as the political 
cost (usually a loss of office) that a leader will be forced to pay if he terminates the war 
before securing a favorable outcome.  
The fact that not all leaders will face settlement costs creates critical differences 
between leaders that should not be overlooked. As I will argue below, as long as scholars 
continue to think about leaders as undifferentiated representatives of their regime type, 
instead of individual politicians as their constituents do, existing war termination theories 
will continue to miss a crucial element: political pressures to stay in the war that stem 
directly from the leader’s personal culpability for the conflict. Although current practices 
within the literature lead scholars to overlook the large amount of variation that exists in 
the distribution of this settlement cost, later chapters will demonstrate that the role a 
 7 
leader played in his state’s involvement in the conflict is very consequential to explaining 
war termination.  
Briefly stated, my argument is as follows. Leaders whom the public can clearly 
link to the decision to involve the state in the war will feel a greater onus to secure a 
favorable outcome for his or her state because they face a higher likelihood of backlash 
from their supporters13 in the event of a loss.  For the purposes of this dissertation, leaders 
in this position are classified as “culpable” if they either made the decision to involve the 
state in the war or if they share a political connection with or supported the leader who 
did.  
By contrast, a “non-culpable leader”—a leader who was against the war when it 
began or who lacks a political connection with his or her predecessor(s)—will feel far 
less pressure to secure a victory, ceteris paribus. Although some circumstances exist 
under which members of this latter group will be as willing to fight as their more culpable 
counterparts, their political distance from the decision to participate in the war will allow 
them greater flexibility in the war outcomes members of their winning coaltion will 
accept.  
 
1.3 Chapter Outline 
 The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, Section 2 presents a slightly 
longer overview of the theory to provide a better sense of how the interaction of the war 
with domestic politics matters to the war termination process. Section 3 highlights the 
major ways in which the theory presented here improves on the existing literature, and 
how incorporating leader culpability costs will increase our understanding of the war 
                                                
13 For the purposes of this project, “supporters” is synonymous with “selectorate”. 
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termination process and the internal politics of warring states. Finally, Section 4 provides 
an overview of the remaining chapters, with a brief discussion of the research methods 
and results.  
 
2.0 A Settlement Costs Theory of War Termination 
The theory presented in this dissertation proposes several new ideas about how 
individual leaders approach the war termination decision and how citizens view and 
interact with those leaders.  The theory also highlights several dynamics of wartime 
domestic politics that have hitherto been largely unstudied by war termination scholars: 
namely, the fact that leaders can change during the war, that such changes are unlikely to 
be independent of the progress and outcome of war, and that changes in domestic 
leadership may have the potential to affect the state’s behavior in the international 
arena.14 This section briefly explains the theoretical framework of the dissertation to help 
structure the discussion of the interaction between the war and the domestic politics of 
the combatants.  
 As I argue in the next chapter, the key to understanding why some leaders are so 
reluctant to end wars when others would settle lies in the role the leader personally 
played in the country’s participation in the war. If a leader can be clearly linked to the 
decision to enter the war, members of the selectorate will hold him to the original war 
aims and assurances of victory, and will think unfavorably of the leader if he does not 
deliver on these promises. This leads to a heightened probability of being removed from 
office for culpable leaders if the state fares poorly in the war, which provides an 
                                                
14 While there are notable exceptions to this claim (see, in particular, Downs and Rocke 1994 and Smith 
1998), no existing study examines the empirical implications of a change in leadership.  
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additional incentive for them to stay in the war. I argue that this incentive is largely 
independent of the costs of fighting or the issue at stake in the war.  Even if victory is 
uncertain, costs are high and the issue at stake in the conflict is relatively small in value, 
culpable leaders will always have this additional incentive to stay in the war and “gamble 
for resurrection” to avoid political punishment at home. 15  
Leaders acquire this burden of culpability in the eyes of the selectorate in one of 
three ways: being a first leader, sharing a political affiliation with the first leader, or 
supporting the war since initiation. The first scenario, which accounts for the majority of 
culpable leaders, applies to leaders who are in office when the war begins. Importantly, 
these first leaders all will be considered culpable for the purposes of this dissertation, 
regardless of whether their state’s entry to the war was the result of an active choice on 
the part of the leader as an initiator or third-party joiner, or an instance of failed 
deterrence in which the state was attacked.16  
Leaders can also be culpable if they come to power during the war (i.e., are a 
“new leader” in this study’s terms). New leaders can inherit their predecessor’s 
culpability in one of two ways. First, citizens will likely transfer culpability (and the 
associated pressures) for the war to the new leader if the leader is from the same party, 
junta, cabinet or (in the case of a monarchy) family of the first leader. Although these 
political affiliations vary in terms of the closeness they represent from country to country, 
it is reasonable to say that citizens are more likely to see new leaders drawn from these 
groups as more connected than a new leader drawn from outside these groups.  
                                                
15 Downs and Rocke (1994). I expand on the differences between my theory and that of Downs and Rocke 
in Chapter 2.  
16 I relax this assumption in Chapter 3. This assumption stems from an argument put forward Bueno de 
Mesquita and Siverson (1995), wherein citizens of targeted states become angry at their leaders for failing 
to prevent the attack from occurring in the first place.  
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Leaders can also inherit culpability based on actions they took before coming to 
power. If a new leader was publicly supportive of the decision to go to war and remained 
a firm supporter of the war before taking office, he will likely take on the first leader’s 
burden to secure a favorable outcome. The new leader’s previous position on the conflict 
binds him to the first leader’s decision and its consequences, good or bad. 
Not all leaders who come to power during war, however, share a political 
connection with their predecessor. Although the political institutions of many countries 
often contain mechanisms that encourage such connections, such as a pre-established line 
of succession through family ties or a direct political relationship (e.g., a vice president), 
the accession of someone from outside the current leader’s circle of power during times 
of war is not unheard of. A leader in this position has a substantial advantage over her 
more culpable counterparts since she can credibly distance herself from the previous 
leader and the decision to go to war. 17 As Chapter 2 will discuss in greater detail, this 
distance renders a wider range of war outcomes “acceptable” in the eyes of the public, 
and removes any incentive for the new leader to continue fighting. 
   
3.0. Implications for Existing Practices and Future Research 
Before elaborating on the theory further, it is instructive to identify why the 
existing literature continues to overlook the culpability of individual leaders. Doing so 
will highlight the many ways in which the theory presented here advances our collective 
knowledge of war termination. The theory makes two core assertions. The first is that is 
that the leader’s culpability will trigger a divergence in preferences between him and his 
citizens in costly wars, and the second is that culpability creates important differences 
                                                
17 In the interest of clarity, non-culpable leaders will always be referred to as “she”. 
 11 
between leaders, even of the same regime type or from the same state. I argue that three 
specific practices within the existing literatures lead scholars to overlook these two new 
insights: the tendency to focus on warring states instead of warring leaders; the large 
amount of theoretical emphasis placed on differences in the political structures between 
the various regime types; and restricting discussions of leader-specific costs to crisis 
situations. I will now review each of them in turn, while taking care to point out how 
changes suggested by the new theory will lead to a more nuanced understanding of the 
war termination process. 
The first problematic practice is scholars’ tendency to focus on the warring state 
as the unit of observation instead of the warring leader. In many ways this tendency 
should not surprise us. Politicians and historians alike often frame wars as battles 
between two societies, not policies attached to particular leaders.  Similarly, the war aims 
and potential consequences of the conflict are often discussed as though they apply to the 
leader and citizens of the state collectively—for example, “America’s mission in Iraq” or 
“Germany’s loss in World War II.”  
This approach is understandable, but it is inaccurate. Wars are in fact the policy 
choices of individual leaders, and the consequences of these choices affect leaders and 
citizens asymmetrically. Leaders will face the political costs associated with a war, while 
citizens will face the physical costs.18 This distinction is crucial since it underscores the 
fact that the utility functions of leaders and citizens are comprised of different terms. 
Leaders will receive all of the potential political fallout that would accompany a loss 
(settlement costs), but unless they are personally leading the forces into combat, they will 
                                                
18 These costs, of course, are not unrelated; citizens impose political costs on leaders because of the 
physical costs they are made to bear. The implications of fact that settlement costs are both created and 
imposed by citizens will be discussed in greater detail in Section 3.0 of this chapter. 
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not suffer directly for losses sustained on the battlefield. Instead, these costs will be borne 
entirely by the citizen population.  
The costs are also lopsided in terms of when they affect the actors; settlement 
costs can only be paid at the end of the war and only then if the leader fails to accomplish 
his objectives. The physical costs, by contrast, are paid throughout the war, regardless of 
the eventual outcome. These twin asymmetries create a divergence in preferences 
between the leader and his citizen.19 If a non-culpable leader comes to power, settlement 
costs will cease to be an issue and the preferences of the two will realign.  
Using the state as the unit of analysis also draws scholars’ focus away from 
important dynamics that take place inside the warring state, such as leadership changes. 
This trend is reinforced by the second troublesome practice of placing the majority of the 
theoretical emphasis on the differences between regime types. Unlike the practice 
described above, the logic behind this one is not incorrect: The domestic political 
structures that define autocracies, anocracies and democracies create important 
differences between states, and scholars would be remiss to ignore them. The emphasis 
on these differences, however, has robbed scholars of the incentive to look for variation 
within leaders of the same regime type since it focuses on static things, like institutions.  
In democracies, for instance, the presence of the electoral check will certainly 
create incentives for democratic leaders that will set them apart for leaders of non-
democracies, but the set of democratic leaders is not homogenous in terms of the 
incentives they face. Instead, culpability costs will produce important differences among 
them. These differences can even arise in a single state in the same war. Because 
                                                
19 I discuss the limited circumstances under which citizens will share the preferences of a culpable leader in 
Chapter 2. 
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culpability costs can change with leaders over the course of the war, it is not safe to pool 
leaders based on regime type and assume they will behave the same way. As Chapters 2 
and 3 will demonstrate in more detail, the differences between culpable and non-culpable 
leaders of the same regime type are significant and stark. 
The final current practice that leads scholars astray is the tendency to limit 
discussions of leader-specific, political costs to crisis situations. The notion of audience 
costs—that is, that a leader creates the possibility of political punishment by publicly 
setting goals he may not achieve—is a sound one. Indeed, the logic behind audience costs 
informs culpability costs to a large degree since it speaks to a settlement cost that only 
applies to the leader. The problem here is one of execution. The current practice falters 
because it only discusses how the audience costs affect the leader (and the citizens’ 
perceptions of that leader) over the course of the immediate crisis, which will typically 
last for days or, at the most, weeks. The standard argument implicitly and incorrectly 
assumes that leaders will not suffer audience costs once they make the transition from 
crisis to war.  Doing so not only discourages scholars from thinking about how the 
leader’s public promises will continue to affect him as the crisis progresses to a war but 
also leads them to overlook the important differences that can arise between the culpable 
leaders who first made the promises and the non-culpable leaders who may succeed them 
over the course of the war. 
 
4.0 Overview of the Remaining Chapters 
 The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 will elaborate 
on the theoretical framework described above by providing a more detailed discussion of 
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the circumstances that produce culpable leaders, the expected distribution of culpable 
leaders across warring states, and how the effect of culpability varies across regimes. I 
will also explore new insights provided by theory in more detail.  Finally, I will present 
several testable hypotheses derived from the causal propositions suggested by the theory. 
The first set of hypotheses describe the differences between the outcomes the two types 
of leaders are likely to settle for while the second set will test for differences in the 
likelihood of punishment across the two different leader types while holding outcome 
constant. 
 Chapter 3 evaluates the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 using an original 
dataset and an innovative research design.  The dataset consists of every leader who 
participated in an interstate war between 1816 and 1991, including 79 wars, which 
produce 257 warring states and 352 wartime leaders. The dataset also includes several 
new independent variables such as a state’s war aims, the strength of the political 
connections between successive leaders and a measure of how the state was faring in the 
war at any given time. Finally, this chapter will present findings that strongly support the 
theory presented in Chapter 2; non-culpable leaders are more likely to preside over poor 
outcomes and are less likely to be punished for these outcomes than culpable leaders. 
 The research design used in Chapter 3 is well suited for testing hypotheses about 
wartime leaders, but can only provide information about how citizens assess these leaders 
in the aggregate (e.g., whether the electorate punished the leader because of the war). To 
evaluate the causal chain regarding how citizens transfer accountability for a conflict 
from one leader to the next more directly, I conducted a survey experiment on a 
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nationally representative sample of American citizens.20 Respondents were asked to 
evaluate a U.S. Senator based on a statement from him calling for an immediate 
withdrawal of American forces from Iraq. The name of the senator remained the same 
across all treatment groups while the senator’s partisan affiliation and earlier position on 
the war varied from group to group. 
A survey experiment is well suited to this project for two reasons. First, and most 
obviously, the survey provides greater insight about how individual citizens form 
opinions of their leaders by allowing me to compare reactions to two types of 
responsibility: associational and technical. If the causal story presented in Chapter 2 is 
correct, respondents should be most willing to assign responsibility to the experimental 
Senator if they think he is a Republican who always supported the war and least willing 
to assign responsibility to him if they think he is a Democrat who never supported 
military action.  
In addition to this basic test, the survey experiment will allow me to assess the 
relative strength of the two cues in determining a citizen’s assessment of a leader, since 
the design presents respondents with leaders who represent every possible combination of 
party membership and earlier support for the war. This aspect of the design is especially 
appealing since all four possible leader types are unlikely to appear in a dataset that is 
based on an observational design. 
 Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by reviewing the main theoretical arguments 
and the findings in preceding three chapters. I also discuss new avenues for exploration in 
                                                
20 This survey was funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation (Grant Number 094964) and 
administered by Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS).  
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In the previous chapter I argued that the key to understanding the variation that 
exists in leaders’ war termination behavior lies in settlement costs, specifically, a leader’s 
culpability. If a leader believes that the act of settling before victory is achieved will 
result in him losing office, he has no incentive to terminate the war—in fact, he has every 
incentive to continue prosecuting it, even if the costs of fighting are high. This chapter 
illustrates the consequences of introducing an individual leader’s role in the conflict into 
theories of war termination.  
First, Section 2 will discuss another type of settlement cost—the adversary’s war 
aims--that most closely mirrors the definition used in existing approaches to the leader 
culpability costs I raise here. Although the primary theoretical contribution of this 
dissertation centers on leader culpability costs, discussing how the adversary’s war aims 
inform the termination decision is also instructive. It underscores the need to recognize 
the variety of sources from which settlement costs can spring, demonstrates the benefits 
of incorporating the leadership culpability settlement cost that can only affect leaders, 
and illustrates how this settlement cost can vary over the course of the war and arise 
regardless of the issue at stake.  
Section 3 will describe the leader culpability cost in greater detail. Topics will 
include what types of leaders the cost will apply to; why citizens have incentives to create 
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this cost; the mixture of culpable and non-culpable leaders we should expect to find 
within the set of history’s warring leaders and how the pressures generated by this cost 
will vary with a leader’s regime type.  
Section 4 will discuss the underlying assumptions of the leader culpability theory 
and discuss two new insights offered by the it, with an eye towards how they account for 
more of the observed variation in leader behavior than other existing approaches. 
Specifically I explain when a leader’s preferences will diverge from his citizens’, and 
why some leaders are willing to gamble for resurrection while others are not.  Section 5 
will present several testable hypotheses while Section 6 will conclude.  
 
2.0 War Aims of the Adversary 
 Framing the war aims of the adversary as a first type of settlement cost closely 
mirrors the Expected Utility-based approach that underpins many existing war 
termination theories. According to this logic, if states are fighting over a “salient” issue, 
they stand to gain a large benefit and, therefore, have much to lose if the adversary wins. 
In this context, the cost of settling is inherent in the failure to secure the benefit that 
would have come with victory.21 In some cases the state is fighting to obtain a benefit it 
does not currently have (e.g., territory), while in other wars the state may be trying to 
prevent a negative outcome from occurring (e.g., a loss of sovereignty). Either way, the 
“net” expected value of winning is positive since the state either receives a gain or avoids 
a loss.  
                                                
21 Bueno de Mesquita (1981), Bennett and Stam (1996 & 1998), Wittman (1979), Morrow (1985) and Stam 
(1996). 
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If a state’s opponent is set on annexing territory, enacting a regime change, or 
occupying the entire country, settling before the pre-war status quo is re-established will 
have negative consequences for the leader and the citizens alike. This settlement cost, in 
other words, affects both actors symmetrically.  Although the costs for the leader are 
obvious in wars where a loss of power would come at the hand of the adversary (e.g., 
wars that involve a regime change or a total loss of sovereignty), a leader should also be 
concerned about the prospect of losing territory. Depending on the size and location of 
the territory, surrendering it to an enemy could entail the loss of natural resources, a 
strategically important position (e.g., Syria’s de facto loss of the Golan Heights) or 
citizens (and the resources they provide the state in the form of labor, defense and 
taxes).22  
Citizens should also be concerned for their own welfare when the adversary has 
high war aims. Wars involving a loss of territory will force the citizens who live in the 
disputed area to be absorbed into the adversary’s jurisdiction, under circumstances where 
they are unlikely to receive a warm reception. Wars of occupation and regime change 
have also been costly for civilian populations beyond the initial brutality of the conflict 
itself as they often usher in leaders who view their new citizenry as a target for 
exploitation rather than a group worthy of protection.23  
 Because wars against an aggressive adversary entail settlement costs for leader 
and citizen, we should expect both actors to exhibit higher tolerances for the costs of 
                                                
22 Although some may question my emphasis on the value a leader assigns to maintaining the size of his 
population, scholars have often used a country’s population as a rough approximation of its current and 
potential future power. (See, for example, (Sarkees 2000) and Organski and Kugler (1980)). 
23 Some wars, of course, remove despots and replace them with leaders whose interests are more in line 
with those of the public. These wars of “liberation”, however, are the exception to the rule and are likely to 
be regarded as a violation of sovereignty by a large portion of the population. 
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fighting in these wars than in wars where the adversary is less demanding. The leader 
may have additional reasons to stay in the war (i.e., culpability costs) but in wars 
involving an aggressive adversary citizens should share his reluctance to surrender.24 
Evidence of this increased willingness to bear large costs of fighting if the face of high 
settlement costs appears in recent empirical work and case studies.  In work on civilian 
and military casualties, for instance, scholars have found that having an adversary with 
expansionist war aims is a strong and consistent predictor of the human toll a state will 
pay in any given war.25  
 A similar story exists for states fighting to avoid accepting an unconditional 
surrender, where the terms place the vanquished at the mercy of the victor, and often 
result in regime change or total occupation.  In World War Two, for example both Japan 
and Germany refused to agree to the Allies’ terms and withstood incredible costs until 
they were absolutely certain defeat was imminent.26 This idea has led some scholars to 
conclude high war aims may be counter-productive for the aggressor because the value 
the target places on the status quo (or preventing the adversary from achieving his war 
aims) will make him difficult to coerce.27  
 In short, although existing war termination scholarship has traditionally cast the 
issue at stake in the war as a benefit, in practice aggressive war aims on the party of the 
adversary function as a settlement cost. Creating these costs for the opponent by setting 
                                                
24 Pape (1996).  
25 Valentino, Huth and Croco (2006). 
26 Slantchev (2003a), Pape (1996: Chapter 8) and Klingberg (1966). 
27 Werner (1996), Filson and Werner (2002), Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003), Pape (1996) and Pillar 
(1983).  Savvy aggressors will recognize the potential for this and may choose to manipulate their opponent 
by making scaling back their demands to increase his utility for settling. Werner (1998) and Coser (1961).  
Strategies like this are reminiscent of Schelling’s (1966) discussion of “salami tactics” where an adversary 
achieves a larger goal by getting its opponent to agree to a long series of small concessions. 
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high war aims provides sufficient motivation for the opponent to stay in the war since the 
value of preventing the consequences of a loss outweighs the costs of fighting. 
 
3.0 Leader Culpability Costs 
 Leadership culpability costs, as suggested in Chapter 1, factor into the war 
termination decision in a very different way.  Three important differences exist between 
the leader culpability settlement cost and the settlement costs associated with an 
aggressive adversary. First and most importantly, they are asymmetrical in how they 
affect the two relevant actors—culpability costs only affect the leader. Second, this 
settlement cost arises regardless of the issue at stake in the war. Finally, leader 
culpability costs can change during the war (from being present to being absent) as a 
direct result of the political dynamics within the state.  All of these characteristics result 
from the fact that the citizens (or, more specifically, the selectorate) create this settlement 
cost for leaders. 28 The anticipation of domestic punishment for backing down in a war he 
involved the state in motivates the leader to stay in the conflict until a victory can be 
secured.  
 With this type of settlement cost, the act of settling (and making the outcome of 
the war certain in the eyes of the public) generates the cost. The individual settlements 
leaders agree to may vary in their consequences for the state since wars are waged for a 
variety of reasons, but citizens will always want to punish a culpable leader if he fails to 
secure a victory, regardless of the agreement’s substantive content. Citizens will, in other 
words, be as upset with a culpable leader who set out to defend a piece of territory and 
then loses it as with a culpable leader who sets out to conquer and then fails to gain one 
                                                
28 The rationality of this behavior on the part of citizens will be discussed in Section 3.2. 
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from the neighboring state. They are not necessarily upset about the failed goals 
themselves—they are more upset that the leader failed to achieve the goals he set.29 This 
is why this type of settlement cost only affects the leader—indeed, it can hardly affect the 
citizens since they inflict the cost—and why culpability costs will affect the leader’s 
utility function for the war no matter what the war is being fought over. I will discuss the 
implications of these two aspects (the omnipresence of this settlement cost for culpable 
leaders and the asymmetrical way in which culpability cost affects leaders and citizens) 
in greater detail in Section 4. 
 The third aspect—that culpability costs can change over the course of the war—
highlights why the domestic political landscape during the war is essential. Because 
culpability costs are tied to specific leaders, knowing when the leadership changes (if 
any) took place, and the circumstances surrounding the changes, is critical if we want to 
know whether culpability costs affected a particular leader. The following four 
subsections describe in greater detail the circumstances under which domestic audiences 
will hold their leaders culpable; why we should expect rational citizens to follow through 
on this settlement cost by punishing culpable leaders; why we should expect to see a mix 
of culpable and non-culpable leaders in the set of international conflicts; and how the 
effect of culpability varies across regime types. 
 
3.1 Determining Culpability 
 Citizens should be willing to assign culpability to three types of leaders. The first 
type is comprised of leaders who were in charge of the state when the war began (i.e., 
                                                
29 Of course, citizens could be upset because of the nature of the specific failure in addition to being angry 
with the leader for failing. The point is that the presence of this settlement cost is not dependent on the 
particulars of the war.  
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“first leaders”). “First leader”, importantly, is not synonymous with “initiator”. Instead, 
this group includes all initiators, leaders who join conflicts already in progress and 
leaders whose states were attacked. The defining criterion is that the leader presided over 
the state’s transition from peace to war. Although initiators and third-party joiners could, 
arguably, deserve more culpability since participation in the conflict resulted from an 
active choice, some scholars have argued that targeted leaders will acquire a similar 
burden. According to this logic, citizens will hold targeted leaders responsible for the war 
not because they chose to involve the state in it but because they failed to deter the attack 
from occurring.30 This assertion that citizens will hold all first leaders equally culpable is 
an open empirical question, and is included in the hypotheses below.   
 The second type of leader whom citizens should hold culpable is a leader who 
comes to power during the war and who is from the same ruling group as the first leader. 
The term “ruling group” is purposely vague so that it can apply to any regime type. In 
democracies, for instance, culpability will transfer from one leader to the next if they are 
from the same political party or, in the case of a parliamentary system, the same cabinet.31 
Citizens should be willing to transfer culpability along political lines because of the close 
associations they imply between political actors.32 Moreover, once the original culpable 
leader leaves office and is no longer available for punishment, his fellow party members 
                                                
30 Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995). 
31 In practice, members of a prime minister’s cabinet are often also members of the prime minister’s party, 
but coalition governments are a different case. In cases like this, the proximity of the cabinet member to the 
executive in terms of decision-making, and the prime minister’s dependence on cabinet members’ support, 
links these political actors in the minds of citizens. This link overrides any political distance (and flexibility 
regarding the course of the war) that might have otherwise accrued to the cabinet member based on partisan 
differences. There is, of course, room for variation; members of parties that are clearly in the cabinet as the 
result of a coalition bargain (i.e., cabinet members drawn from “king maker” parties such as Shas in Israel 
or the Free Democratic Party in Germany) may be able to distance themselves more from the leader than, 
say, a member of the leader’s party who is not in the cabinet. Such ideas are difficult to test in a large-N 
setting, however,  
32 This notion is especially applicable in countries with governments marked by strong party discipline 
(e.g., the United Kingdom.) 
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are the most easily recognizable substitutes. 33 This leads to a high probability that the 
pressures associated with the culpability costs will span two (or more) administrations or 
governments if the chief executive’s party does not change.34 Although these successive 
leaders do not have direct responsibility for the war, the clear ties that exist between the 
new leaders and their predecessors will lead their domestic audiences to transfer the 
blame with only minimal discounting. 
 In autocratic states a similar transfer of culpability occurs if the new leader comes 
from the former leader’s inner circle or winning coalition. Examples of this might include 
a colonel succeeding a general in a military junta, a prince succeeding his father in a 
monarchy, or leaders drawn from a one-party system (e.g., the Communist Party in the 
Soviet Union or China.) This type of political system, where power is highly centralized, 
facilitates a transfer of power from the culpable first leader to a culpable successor from 
the winning coalition since the masses are denied any input in the selection of the new 
leader.  
 Finally, the third type of leader that citizens will hold culpable is a new leader 
who publicly supported the decision to involve the state in the conflict when it began.35 In 
practice, most leaders from the same ruling group as the first leader will also fall into this 
                                                
33 Cotton (1986) provides several examples of this phenomenon from his study of American elections 
where war was a central issue.  During several American wars, legislators who were in the president’s party 
suffered in the midterm elections if the war was unpopular with the electorate. 
34 This point is key: even though the first leader “pays” the settlement cost by losing office, his successor 
can still inherit the incentives associated with culpability if the war has not ended. 
35 Politicians in this category vying for the executive position during the war may try and shift their stance 
to one of opposition if the war is going badly, but this maneuver is unlikely to succeed.   In a political 
system with even minimal competition, long-time opponents of the war will be quick to highlight this 
policy inconsistency in an effort to discredit the candidate. 
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category, but politicians outside the ruling group can support the decision as well.36 
Indeed, as some scholars have argued, we should expect this third type of culpable, new 
leader to be highly prevalent in the legislatures of democratic systems.37   
 Given the incentives (and power) held by the opposition to punish the leader for a 
bad decision, democratic executives should be very selective in the wars in which they 
choose to participate. We should only expect these leaders to choose wars they believe 
their state has a high likelihood of winning and/or that the opposition would be foolish 
(be it for practical or political reasons) not to support. This selection pools all of the 
members of legislature based on their position on the war, and makes partisan differences 
less salient.   A similar effect occurs when the democratic state is attacked. In cases like 
this, opposing retaliation would be politically risky for the opposition, regardless of the 
state’s chances of eventual victory.38  
 Not all leaders who come to power during wars, however, will inherit the 
culpability of their predecessors. Wars often bring leaders to power who are from a 
different ruling group than the first leader and/or who were against the war when it first 
began. The absence of political ties to the previous leader allows the new leader to 
distance herself from the decision that brought the state into the conflict and, 
consequently, presents her with more options regarding the future course of the war.  She 
can, for example, continue fighting if the adversary is intent on occupying the country, or 
she can suggest a plan for withdrawal if no other settlement costs exist.  
                                                
36 In practice, citizens may hold leaders drawn from this third group less culpable than members of the 
executive’s party who supported the war because of the lack of the partisan connection. I test for this 
potential rank ordering in Chapter 4.  
37 Schultz (2001).  
38 Given the high plausibility of either of these wartime scenarios, we should not expect the pool of 
culpable leaders to be homogenous in terms of political affiliation.  I return to this idea in Section 3.3. 
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3.2 The Rationality of Leader Punishment 
 The rationale behind citizens’ willingness to punish the leader appears to 
effectively create a settlement cost for leaders that compels the leader to work directly 
against the citizens’ own interests by staying in a costly war. Although such behavior 
would seem to demand irrationality on the part of the citizens, this need not be the case. 
At least two plausible reasons exist for why citizens will want to punish culpable leaders 
who lose wars, and spare non-culpable leaders who do the same: incompetence and 
concerns for the state’s international reputation.  
 Culpable leaders are more susceptible than non-culpable leaders to the brand of 
“incompetent” because citizens can be easily link them to the decisions that led to wars 
that turned out poorly.  The first place a leader’s incompetence can manifest itself in the 
eyes of citizens is in the selection of the conflict.  If a leader chooses to involve the state 
in a war in which the state is clearly outmatched and/or which goes poorly very quickly, 
opponents of the war could easily make a case that the leader lacks competence in the 
realm of foreign policy and that the leader’s incompetence risks the state’s security.  
Citizens will have incentives to punish this leader not only to prevent him from making 
the same mistake again but also to deter future leaders from behaving in a similar 
manner. Punishing non-culpable leaders for this reason is practically impossible since, by 
definition, they cannot have been responsible for the war’s onset. 
 The second way a culpable leader can reveal his incompetence (again, in the eyes 
of citizens) is in the way he prosecutes the war.   If a leader selects into a war the citizens 
initially view as a “good bet,” and goes on to eventually lose (or simply fail to win), 
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citizens will assume the leader squandered their chances of victory.39 Even if the war 
went sour because of something completely beyond the leader’s control (e.g., the loss of 
a major ally due to upheaval within the ally’s domestic political arena) citizens would 
probably not have access to this sort of micro-level knowledge, even in a society with a 
free and open press. 40  
 Even if informational limitations were not at issue, citizens do not have any 
incentive to be forgiving of leaders. Even if citizens recognize that the problem likely 
originated as a result of a command issued by a general in the field, and not the leader in 
the capital, the leader of the state presents a larger and, more importantly, a more 
symbolic and reachable target for their ire and their desire to bring the war “under new 
management.” A non-culpable leader, predictably, will have an easier time dodging 
accusations of poor war management. The political distance between the new leader and 
her predecessors means she can credibly distance themselves from the war’s initial 
phases and/or any earlier tactical decisions made by the previous leader(s) that may have 
led to the state’s poor fortunes on the battlefield.  
 The second reason citizens will be more likely to punish culpable leaders than 
non-culpable ones has to do with how the leader is perceived by the international 
audience. As others have argued, citizens will have incentive to change their national 
leader when they feel his international reputation has been damaged in some way.41  
                                                
39 Critically, the fact that the war “seemed like a good idea at the time” should not encourage the citizens to 
be more magnanimous in their treatment of the leader if the war ends poorly. Indeed, it should inspire more 
outrage.  If a state had, say, a 95% chance of winning a war at the outset and loses, citizens will likely 
assume that a loss in the face of such overwhelmingly favorable odds must have resulted from the leader’s 
severe mismanagement of the war. On the general topic of the willingness of citizens to interpret poor 
conflicts outcomes as a sign of leader incompetence see Gelpi and Greico (2001) and Wolford (2007).  
40 Indeed, Achen and Bartels (2002) demonstrate that citizens are more than willing to punish their leaders 
for “acts of God”, such as floods and shark attacks.  
41 Guisinger and Smith (2002) and  McGillivray and Smith (2000). 
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Although these discussions are typically couched in the context of international 
cooperation, where leaders damage their reputations by reneging on an agreement, the 
concept can be applied to conflict situations as well.42  In the case of a war, a leader can 
damage his reputation by backing down from his earlier war aims and/or suffering a 
humiliating defeat. Either action will call the leader’s resolve into question in the eyes of 
other national leaders, perhaps inviting more challenges in the future.  Citizens, therefore, 
should want to remove this type of leader from office and replace him with someone who 
does not have a marred record with the international audience.   
 This preference favors non-culpable leaders because of their ability to disassociate 
themselves both from the decision to go to war in the first place and from the previous 
leaders.43 Bringing a new, non-culpable leader to power is the most effective way the 
citizens can rebuild their state’s international image.  The new leader may eventually 
prove to be a poor choice, and she may damage her own reputation at a later date, but in 
the current time period, a leader without a record is far better than a leader with a 
tarnished one.  
 
3.3 Mixture of Leaders Types 
 The circumstances under which new leaders might come to power affects the 
distribution of culpability across the set of warring leaders. Because wartime leadership 
changes often occur as a result of a state’s battlefield misfortunes, one might expect the 
majority of new leaders to be non-culpable. That is, apart from the occasional leader who 
                                                
42 For example, see Tomz (2007). 
43 To test the claims that, 1) Citizens care about how their leader is perceived by the international audience 
and 2) that non-culpable leaders are seen as more preferable replacements, I have designed a second survey 
experiment that will be administered on a national sample in May 2008. The existing literature assumes the 
first claim is true and my theory implies the second one is valid, but neither claim has been evaluated yet. 
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is forced to leave office for structural reasons, such as term limits, any new leader who 
comes to power during the war will have been selected to replace a leader who managing 
the conflict poorly. This notion, however, is only partially true. As the next chapter will 
illustrate in more detail, non-culpable leaders do come to power under such 
circumstances, but a number of other scenarios are capable of bringing new culpable 
leaders to power as well, even when the war is going badly. If, for instance, the first 
leader dies naturally or is assassinated, the pre-determined successor will, more likely 
than not, share a political connection with the previous leader and the culpability costs 
will pass on.44  
 Apart from these morbid circumstances, other members of the first leader’s 
government will also have incentives to elevate a new leader who will share the first 
leader’s culpability costs. In parliamentary systems, for instance, the cabinet may force 
the prime minister to resign in the face of public dissent, and then replace him with a 
member of the same party. Sacrificing the first leader in this manner allows the party to 
avoid calling an election that they would likely lose.  It also allows them to maintain 
control of the executive while appeasing the public by removing the cause of their 
displeasure.45  
 Finally, in the case of democratic systems, the leader’s management of the 
conflict (or his party’s management) need not always be the central issue in a citizen’s 
mind, even during wartime elections. As the next chapter illustrates, leaders careers are 
                                                
44 When John Curtin of Australia died in July of 1945, for instance, Deputy Prime Minister Frank Forde, 
who was also a member of the Labor party, succeeded him and served as Acting Prime Minister until new 
elections could be held. (Elections that, coincidently, elevated another Labor Party member to the chief 
executive position: Benjamin Chifley.) Source: Author’s dataset. 
45 The British experience in the Crimean War provides an example of a “Cabinet Coup”.  After a string of 
defeats in the East, Prime Minister Aberdeen resigned in disgrace. Palmerston, who was Home Secretary at 
the time and who was a strong supporter of the war when it began, replaced him. Source: Author’s dataset. 
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often cut short by domestic issues, wholly unrelated to the war (e.g., budget concerns or 
political scandal), which create an opening for a member of the same party to take over.46 
Given the multitude of circumstances under which leaders can change, we should not 
expect any strong patterns among new leaders based on culpability.47   
 
3.4 Culpability in Different Political Systems 
 We should, however, expect patterns to emerge in terms of how culpability costs 
affect leaders from different regime types. The degree to which the culpability costs will 
factor into a leader’s war termination calculus should vary based on the vulnerability of 
his or her position, which largely varies with a state’s political structures. The presence of 
the culpability cost provides the domestic audience with the willingness to punish the 
leader, while the leader’s vulnerability provides the opportunity. I will now discuss how a 
leader’s vulnerability varies across (and sometimes within) autocratic, anocratic and 
democratic regimes.  
 
3.4.1 Autocratic Leaders 
 Of all leader types, autocratic leaders such as despots, dictators or absolute 
monarchs, are the least vulnerable to the pressures associated with culpability costs. The 
often near-absolute hold on power and the availability of strong repressive mechanisms 
make domestic dissent largely irrelevant for this leader type. The small winning 
coalitions that define autocratic systems mean that leaders need only bribe a handful of 
                                                
46The government of Japan’s Terauchi, for instance, fell in 1918 over a rice shortage in Tokyo. Source: 
Author’s dataset.  
47 Given this, the concern that any relationship between leader culpability and war outcome or between 
leader culpability and leader punishment are based on epiphenomenal processes should be minimal. I 
explore this notion more in the next chapter.  
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key supporters to maintain their hold on office.48 Members of the winning coalition, 
consequently, have very little incentive to remove the leader because doing so would end 
their own streams of private benefits. Autocratic leaders, therefore, have the ability to 
weather unfavorable outcomes, provided that losing the war does not imperial their 
ability to satisfy their winning coalition. 49   
 Room for variation exists within this leader type, however. Among autocrats, we 
should expect leaders who have held power for a long time prior to the war to be less 
susceptible to culpability costs than leaders with shorter pre-war tenures.50 Newer 
autocratic leaders will still have small winning coalitions, but, in contrast to their more 
established counterparts, they will have had less time to solidify their hold on power by 
rewarding coalition members with private benefits; the potential for revolt from within 
still exists. This vulnerability makes these leaders less likely to settle for defeats than 
more secure autocrats since losing may weaken their ability to secure support from their 
members of their winning coalition and may jeopardize their future tenure.51  
 
                                                
48 Bueno de Mesquia, et al. (2003).  
49 Some scholars have put a fair amount of theoretical weight on the fact that removal from office for 
autocratic (and anocratic) leaders is often followed by a secondary punishment (e.g., death, imprisonment, 
exile, etc). (Goemans 2000). This had led scholars to assume that these leaders will have greater incentives 
than democratic leaders not to lose a war because the worst thing that can happen to a democratic leader is 
to lose office. It is important not to make too much of this diversity. The form domestic punishment takes 
in democratic polities may be mild relative to the types of audience costs that exist in autocratic states, but 
we should not expect democratic leaders to take much solace in this fact. Democratic leaders may be trying 
to avoid losing office while autocratic leaders may be trying to avoid the firing squad, but both leaders are 
responding to the maximum punishment their relevant domestic audience is capable of delivering. 
Overlooking this fact artificially inflates the size of a non-democratic leader’s settlement costs.  It is also 
important to consider the probability that the leader will actually receive the punishment. An autocrat’s 
punishment may be many times worse than a democrat’s (say, -10 as opposed to -1), but the probability 
that he will receive that punishment is likely very small (say .02 compared to .9).  Once this probability is 
accounted for, the relative size of the punishment matters less. 
Expected Value of the Punishment = Size of the Punishment * Probability of Receiving the Punishment 
Expected Value of the Autocrat’s Punishment = -10 * 0.02 = -0.2 
Expected Value of the Democrat’s Punishment = -1 * 0.9 =  -0.9 
50 Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995). 
51 I evaluate whether any differences exist in terms of pre-war leader tenure in the next chapter.  
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3.4.2 Anocratic Leaders 
 Among the set of non-democratic leaders, leaders of anocracies are the most 
unstable since their regimes straddle the political spectrum between the autocratic and 
democratic extremes; they enjoy neither the legitimacy of democratic leaders nor the 
repressive capabilities of autocratic ones.52 Instead, anocratic leaders operate in a political 
system where they hold a fair amount of power, but the influence of the opposition 
persists. 
The combination of a viable opposition and a lack of repressive mechanisms 
guarantees that the leader will never have the near total control over his political fate. 
This means that unfortunate outcomes in international conflict can have substantial 
domestic repercussions since the opposition can capitalize on the government’s mistakes. 
The lack of an effective repressive apparatus means the anocratic leader will have a 
difficult time defending himself from those who wish to punish him.  This means the 
probability the anocratic leader will be punished is quite high, especially when compared 
to autocratic leaders.  Therefore, among non-democratic rulers, these leaders should be 
the most vulnerable to culpability costs and, as a result, should be very resistant to 
settling without a win.53 
 
3.4.3 Democratic Leaders  
 Democratic leaders are the most vulnerable of all leader types largely because 
democratic institutions intentionally permit easy sanctioning of the leader. Variation in 
domestic institutions, however, creates differentiation between even members of this 
                                                
52 See Goemans (2000) for more on the repressive advantage of autocratic leaders.  
53Ibid. 
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group.   In parliamentary systems, for instance, elections can (essentially) come at any 
time, while presidential democracies usually change their leaders according to a fixed 
election schedule.  Given that election timing in parliamentary systems is often 
endogenous to both the leader’s recent actions and the resultant public disapproval, we 
should expect prime ministers to be especially sensitive to settlement costs since citizens 
can wield the electoral check fairly easily.54 Presidents, on the other hand, often have a 
multi-year respite between elections, which means culpability costs are of more 
immediate concern in the months preceding a scheduled election.55 
We should not, however, expect presidents to be significantly more cavalier than 
prime ministers in the types of settlements they willing accept. Even though removing the 
leader in the short term may be difficult, other domestic political actors are still capable 
of making a leader “pay” the settlement costs by purposely blocking any legislation the 
executive proposes, and essentially halting his domestic agenda. This threat is especially 
credible in presidential systems where the executive’s party does not necessarily control a 
legislative majority. Because of this, the leader will be (at least somewhat) at the mercy 
of the opposition, which has the greatest incentives to punish him if the war is going 
poorly.56  
Although a president may be in a position where his personal political career is 
relatively immune from the damaging effects of settlement costs—say, a Mexican 
president who has served the maximum six year term—the long-term consequences of 
                                                
54 Smith (2003). 
55 Gaubatz (1991). Unfortunately, testing for differences between these two types of democratic systems is 
impossible given the preponderance of parliamentary democracies in the set of warring states and the 
general scarity of presidential systems. 
56 Huth and Allee (2002: 82) make a similar point in the context of territorial disputes where they argue 
that, “the risks of a military setback or the failure to achieve diplomatic gains through the use of coercive 
pressure are generally higher in the face of strong [domestic] political opposition.” 
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the culpability costs he generated give members of his party incentives to keep him from 
conceding to the adversary.  The leader’s fellow party members have an interest in 
preventing the current leader from sullying the party’s reputation by agreeing to 
unfavorable terms because of the aforementioned inability of members of the leader’s 
party (who may run for office in the future) to distance themselves credibly from the 
previous leader’s policies (and failures). 57 Therefore, although we might expect leaders 
of parliamentary democracies to be more vulnerable than leaders of presidential 
democracies, any differences are muted by the incentives culpability costs create for 
other domestic political actors.  
In general, democratic leaders will be most sensitive to the effects of culpability 
costs, and we should see evidence of this in the settlements they are willing to accept and 
their treatment in the event of a loss.  Anocratic leaders are less vulnerable to the effects 
of culpability and autocratic leaders even less so.  I present hypotheses to evaluate the 
validity of this rank ordering below.  
 
4.0 New Insights from the Theory 
 To review, the two types of settlement costs I have discussed thus far are those 
related to the war aims of the adversary and those related a leader’s personal culpability 
for the conflict.  Scholars have studied something similar to the former type of cost in 
                                                
57 This notion has its origins in the economic literature on “overlapping generations” (OLG) where scholars 
study the effect of having members with short and long time horizons within the same organization.  
(Alesina and Spear 1988 and Cremer 1986).  Recently, political scientists have posited that political parties 
also have an OLG quality to them, which leads to policy bargains between junior and senior members who 
often have different personal preferences. (McKelvey and Riezman 1992, Stokes 1999 and Simmons 2008). 
In the case of international conflict, the original culpable leader is the “senior member”, whose time 
horizon is rapidly shrinking.  The junior members are all of the members of the leader’s political party who 
are still in active leadership positions. Their continued involvement in politics (and presumed desire to 
remain involve) extends their time horizon considerably.  The junior members can enforce the bargain by 
refusing to grant the senior member support on other policies apart from the war.  
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work on the issue at stake in a war. The role of a leader’s culpability in the war 
termination decision, however, is the primary theoretical contribution of this dissertation. 
In this section I focus on two issues the new theory allows us to address more accurately: 
identifying the circumstances under which leader and citizen preferences will diverge, 
with a special emphasis on the implications for theories about democracies at war; and 
why only some leaders will have incentives to escalate their war aims in an attempt to 
gamble for resurrection.58 
 
 4.1 Diverging Preferences 
 Understanding when and why the preferences of leaders and citizens will differ 
over whether a particular war should continue requires examination of how the various 
costs of war affect the two types of actors. As Section 3 noted, culpability costs are 
asymmetrical in that they only provide motivation for leaders to stay in wars. By 
contrast, having an adversary with expansive war aims creates a symmetrical settlement 
cost that will deter both leaders and citizens from settling before achieving victory. The 
presence of settlement costs provides one explanation for why an actor will want to avoid 
termination.  
 Predicting when a divergence will occur (i.e., when one actor has motivation to 
stay in the war while the other has a motive to leave) however, requires 
acknowledgement of the role of a more traditional cost of war: casualties. Casualties are 
similar to culpability costs in that they affect leaders and citizens asymmetrically. In this 
case, citizens bear the cost entirely. A leader should be concerned about mounting 
                                                
58 Downs and Rocke (1994). 
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casualties since they are likely a sign the war is going poorly, but we should not expect 
them to figure into his utility function directly.  
 Casualties differ from culpability costs, however, in terms of when and why actors 
incur them.  Leaders only pay culpability costs at the end of the war (or, in the case of a 
leader removed during the war, at the end of their time in office), and only then if they 
fail to secure a victory. A culpable leader will thus always have a reason to stay in the 
war until victory is achieved, regardless of the adversary’s war aims or the costs to the 
citizens. The pressures created by this culpability settlement cost only disappear when a 
non-culpable leader is brought to power, and only then if the adversary does not have 
expansive war aims.    
 Citizens, on the other hand, must suffer casualties throughout the war, even if the 
state eventually wins the conflict. Consequently, a citizen’s utility function for staying in 
the war should decrease monotonically over time. High war aims on the part of the 
adversary may work to counter this, but in the absence of this kind of settlement cost a 
citizen’s utility for continuing to fight should become negative long before a culpable 
leader’s does. The combination of these characteristics means a divergence will occur 
when a culpable leader is prosecuting a costly war against an adversary with non-







Figure 2.1 Preferences of Leaders and Citizens 
 
 The diagram on the left depicts a war in which the adversary does not have high 
war aims, while the diagram on the right represents a war in which the enemy is intent on 
conquering territory, replacing the leader or occupying the state entirely.59 In both figures, 
the y-axis shows the actor’s utility and the x-axis indicates time since the war’s inception.  
The green and red lines represent a culpable and non-culpable leader’s utilities for 
continuing to prosecute the war, respectively, while the blue lines represent the citizens’ 
utility for continuing to fight in the two types of wars. The dashed vertical line represents 
the point at which a leadership change occurred (at time t). If the leadership change 
elevates a culpable leader to power, the new leader’s utility function will be identical to 
his predecessors—hence the unbroken green line. If, however, the leadership change 
                                                
59 For the purposes of this example, I assume the casualty rates are equal in the two panels. Although wars 
involving aggressive adversaries will likely be more costly on average, citizens may have a lower threshold 
for casualties in wars where their state’s territorial integrity or continued sovereignty are not at risk.   
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brings a non-culpable leader to power, the new leader’s utility function will follow the 
path indicated by the red lines. 
 Figure 2.1 illustrates at least three important points. First, the utility functions in 
the diagram on the left present the divergence in preferences of a culpable leader and his 
citizens clearly. Although citizens may initially support the war, their utility for 
continuing to fight begins to fall as time passes and casualties grow.60 The culpable 
leader’s utility for staying in the war, however, remains consistently high, regardless of 
casualties. For the purposes of this example, the leadership change coincides with the 
citizens’ utility function’s nadir. Although this suggests that the public dissent caused the 
leader’s removal, leadership changes do not necessarily have to adhere to this 
mechanism. As discussed in Section 3.4.3, structural causes (for example, term limits) 
and fixed election schedules may present citizens with opportunity to remove the leader 
earlier.  
 Second, as a comparison of both panels of the diagram demonstrates, the non-
culpable leader’s preference regarding whether to stay in the war corresponds with the 
citizens’ when she takes office and in the immediate period thereafter. The period 
between times t and q represents the window during which a non-culpable leader will try 
to end the war. After point q, the leader’s utility for staying in the war begins to increase 
as her persisted participation in the war causes her to accrue culpability costs of her own. 
The longer the non-culpable leader stays in the war after coming to office, the harder it 
                                                
60 (Gartner and Segura (1998) and Mueller (1973.) Although the line in the graph depicts a linear decrease, 
this need not be the case.  A citizen’s utility for staying in the war could follow a step function pattern, as 
she reacts to major setbacks or spikes in the casualty rate. The takeaway point is that her overall utility 
should follow a downward trend as casualties mount. Recent work (Feaver and Gelpi 2004) suggests that 
citizens respond to the probability of victory instead of casualties, and that they will be willing to stay in a 
conflict so long as the perceived likelihood of victory remains high. The figure presented here, of course, is 
too simplistic to capture a factor that could, potentially, rise and fall over the course of the war, so I assume 
the probability of victory is uncertain for citizens. 
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will be for her to disassociate herself from it, and therefore her own culpability costs will 
make ending the war without a victory harder for her.61 
 Third and finally, the comparison of the two panels illustrates how the settlement 
costs generated by an adversary with high war aims can augment or offset other costs. In 
wars where the adversary has expansive war aims, citizen and leaders will always have 
reason to want to stay in the war, and the change in leadership (even to a non-culpable 
leader) is completely inconsequential.  
 An examination of the two actors’ utility functions across the panels demonstrates 
this.  First, the citizens’ utility functions differ greatly across the two conditions. In the 
panel on the left, citizens grow weary of the war quickly since there is nothing to counter 
the costs they are paying in the form of casualties. In the panel on the right, however, the 
threat of losing territory or being completely overrun provides a countervailing pressure 
that motivates citizens to bear the costs and continue fighting.   
 An equally striking difference emerges when we compare the utility functions of 
the non-culpable leaders across the two conditions. As discussed earlier, a non-culpable 
leader’s utility for continuing the war will track with her citizens’, especially in the 
period immediately following her ascent to office. Figure 2.1 demonstrates that this 
prediction will hold regardless of the nature of the adversary’s war aims. As above, in the 
case of a non-aggressive adversary, the non-culpable leader should be willing to break 
with the previous leader’s policy and appease citizens by ending the war.   In the case of 
a war involving an aggressive adversary, however, the non-culpable leader’s utility 
                                                
61 Although it is unclear as to whether this function should be linear, it should certainly become 
increasingly positive. I will discuss reasons why a non-culpable leader might not take advantage of this 
window in Chapter 5. 
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function will continue to mirror the citizens’ but will also trace the same pattern the 
culpable leader would have followed had he remained in office.  This highlights the 
power of the adversary war aims settlement cost to trump a lack of personal culpability a 
leader may feel for a conflict.  
 Current approaches to war termination overlook this divergence because of the 
tendency to focus on the warring state as the theoretical unit of observation instead of the 
individual warring leader(s). This hinders theoretical development in two ways.  First, the 
focus on the state effectively merges the utility functions of the leader and his citizens. 
This unified utility function forces scholars to assume that the costs of war affect the two 
actors equally.  For example, scholars commonly assume that mounting casualties should 
lower a leader’s utility for continuing to fight and affect his bargaining position with the 
adversary. The assumption, however, ignores the fact that leaders and citizens are largely 
concerned with different costs. The utility functions only move in sync--and, therefore, 
the existing approach is only correct--when the state faces an aggressive adversary. 
Focusing on the warring state also traps scholars into overlooking the importance of both 
the pressures that affect individual leaders and how these pressures might change as the 
war progresses and new leaders come to power.  
 Second, Figure 2.1 also offers new insights about the dynamics between a 
democratic leader and his citizens in times of war. The conventional wisdom of the 
existing literature posits that a “declining advantage of democracy” exists:  As wars get 
longer and, presumably, more costly in terms of casualties, democratic leaders will be 
more willing to accept unfavorable outcomes to end the war quickly.62 This prediction 
should only be accurate, however, if a non-culpable leader has been elevated to power.  A 
                                                
62Bennett and Stam (1998) and Slantchev (2004). 
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culpable democratic executive will want to stay in the conflict, regardless of the length of 
time already spent at war. The presence of the viable opposition in democratic states 
compounds this incentive for the culpable leader. Since conceding to the adversary in a 
costly war will give his opponents ample ammunition, and provide them with evidence of 
his poor war management skills, the leader has every reason to continue fighting, even as 
victory grows increasingly unlikely.63  
 Although empirical support exists for the “declining advantage of democracy” 
notion, in retrospect the findings are more likely evidence of a “declining advantage of 
culpable leaders”.64  As wars get longer and become more costly to citizens, a culpable, 
democratic leader’s hold on power becomes increasingly tenuous. At the same time, the 
probability of a non-culpable leader being installed in his place, often with a specific 
mandate to end the war, increases.  
 Under the current approach, in which the warring state is the unit of observation, 
democratic leaders appear to be more wiling to settle, but the conventional wisdom omits 
a crucial step of the causal mechanism: the switch from a culpable to a non-culpable 
leader.65 Public dissent has the power to end a war for a democratic state, but only if it is 
strong enough first to remove the culpable leader from power and then to replace him 
with a non-culpable one. When a non-culpable leader assumes power, the leader-specific 
settlement costs vanish, bringing the new leader’s utility for continuing the war more in 
                                                
63As Robert Pape explains, “even when the costs of further resistance clearly outweigh any attainable 
benefits, governments tend to hold out longer than society wants because there are domestic costs to 
admitting defeat…Appeasing the enemy allows domestic political rivals to charge the ruling regime with 
incompetence, betrayal or both.” (1996: 32). 
64 I discuss why existing work has overlooked this idea and, with further investigation, actually lends 
supports this new interpretation in Chapter 3. 
65 Existing empirical practices reinforce this omission. Focusing on the warring state obscures any wartime 
leadership changes that may have taken place inside the state. See Bueno de Mesquita et. al (2003) for an 
exception. 
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line with the public’s. The new leader will be more responsive to public opinion, and will 
end the war with a higher probability than her predecessor. 
 Recognizing that democratic leaders will respond to dissent differently based on 
their personal culpability also sheds light on the variation we see in how leaders try to 
shape public opinion. Scholars have long acknowledged the powerful effect leaders can 
have on how citizens interpret major events, and they have noted that this power is 
especially pronounced for chief executive.66 In highlighting the executive’s ability to 
harness the power of the bully pulpit, however, the existing approach begs the question of 
why some democratic leaders choose not to use it.67 The theory presented here offers a 
simple answer: Culpable leaders will spend political capital willingly and freely in an 
effort to marshal support for an increasingly unpopular war, while non-culpable leaders 
will choose to save their capital for future political battles.   
 A similar pattern emerges when we examine the variation in leaders’ responses to 
sunk costs. Although scholars have posited that higher casualties will compel a leader to 
stay in the war out of a desire to avenge the fallen, the fact that not all leaders do so poses 
a quandary for the sunk costs explanation.68 The culpability argument offers an alternate 
causal story, albeit a much more self-serving one from the point of view of the leader. 
Leaders will use sunk costs arguments to motivate the public to stay in the war when 
culpability costs are a personal concern for them, and they will downplay the need for 
retribution when their utility of settling is greater than the utility for fighting.  Culpable 
                                                
66 Zaller (1992) and Feaver and Gelpi (2004). 
67 Feaver and Gelpi (2004: 135), for instance, make note of the fact that President Bill Clinton choose not to 
mobilize the public in 1993 to support the UN/US mission in Somalia, but do not offer an explanation for 
why he did so. The culpability theory offers an answer: Because the mission to take down Aideed and 
restore order to Mogadishu was initiated by the previous president, George H. W. Bush, Clinton was able to 
distance himself from the mission and draw down American troops. This allowed him to preserve his 
political capital for future endeavors instead of spending it in the first year of his administration. 
68 Ikle (1995) and Mitchell and Nicholson (1983). 
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leaders, in other words, are more likely to assert that the fallen “will not have died in 
vain” while non-culpable leaders will be quick to frame the deaths as costs or burdens 
that no more families should be forced to endure. 
 The insights from the preceding discussion underscore just some of the problems 
inherent in focusing on leaders instead of states. Concentrating on the warring state draws 
scholars’ attention to the effects of the state’s domestic institutions, and, consequently, 
places the theoretical emphasis on explaining the variation between leaders of different 
regime types.  Although this line of inquiry has highlighted the effects of the general 
differences between autocratic, anocratic and democratic regimes, the preceding 
discussion, and Figure 2.1 in particular, illustrate the dangers of pooling leaders on 
regime type and assuming the (static) domestic political structure will affect all leaders 
from that state uniformly.  
 
4.2 War Aims Revision 
 The second insight that results from the incorporation of culpability costs relates 
to when and why leaders might choose to revise their war aims.  Other scholars have 
recognized that leaders may have incentives to raise their war aims, but they have not 
addressed why the incentive to “gamble for resurrection” does not seem to affect all 
leaders. 69 Incorporating culpability costs provides an answer. Only culpable leaders will 
have reason to raise their war aims in a risky all-or-nothing push, and these pressures to 
increase the state’s war aims will be inherited by the next leader if he is also culpable.  
 The inability to explain why only some leaders will choose to expand their war 
aims stems from scholars’ tendency to limit discussions of the political consequences of a 
                                                
69 Downs and Rocke (1994). 
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leader backing down to crisis situations.70 Theories of audience costs often use specific 
threats or ultimatums that are thought to capture the public’s short-term interest.71 The 
typical example includes a leader making a threat; the public then observes the 
opponent’s immediate response and then the leader’s reaction, often over a very short 
time period (i.e., days or weeks). The primary function of audience costs in the existing 
security literature is to provide a causal mechanism for “lock in” to a crisis, and debates 
often center on how certain types of leaders might gain an edge on their adversary in this 
regard.72  
 Once both states reach lock in, however, and the question becomes one of war 
continuation instead of crisis escalation, audience costs disappear from the theoretical 
discussion.73 The arguments presented here about culpability costs suggest this omission 
is premature. A leader’s culpability certainly plays a role in crisis scenarios, but we 
should not assume that culpability ceases to matter to citizens as the war progresses. 
Indeed, as Figure 2.1 suggested, the leader’s culpability may well be more important in 
the war than in the crisis, particularly once the casualties begin to mount and citizen 
support for the war wanes. Recognizing that a leader’s culpability continues to matter as 
the war progresses allows for more refined predictions about when and why certain 
leaders will revise their war aims up and when they will choose to lower them. Culpable 
                                                
70 This tendency has the additional side effect of leading scholars to overlook the fact that the incentive to 
gamble could pass from one leader to the next. Although scholars have recognized that wartime leadership 
changes can happen and that leadership changes in general can have powerful effects on a state’s 
interactions with other countries, the possibility (and consequences) of a connection between successive 
leaders has not been appreciated. 
71 Fearon (1994), Schutz (2001a) and Tomz (2007). 
72 Eyerman and Hart (1996) and Fearon (1997). 
73 Schutlz (2001b), for instance, only has audience costs enter the model in the crisis stage; once both states 
move to war, war costs (which are purposely distinct from audience costs) become a concern. This type of 
argument focuses on the “signaling” power that audience costs play during crises and downplays the idea 
that the  “lock in” aspect can continue to be an issue for leaders as the war progresses. 
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leaders will augment their war aims not only to “increase the variance” of possible war 
outcomes, but also to make the war seem more vital to their citizens.74  
 Appreciating the powerful effects of culpability costs also presents a challenge to 
the idea that leaders can easily adjust their war aims to reflect the probability of victory 
(i.e., leaders will raise them if they think they are going to win, and lower them if they 
think they are going to lose).75 Although culpable leaders may long for the ability to 
revise the war aims downward to facilitate exit in a war that is going poorly, the 
settlement costs caused by their culpability remain constant and high, regardless of how 
the state is faring in the war. This demonstrates how culpability costs play a role beyond 
the crisis phase—Culpable leaders will have a hard time reducing their war aims because 
of the public backlash that will follow.  
 Non-culpable leaders will not share this dilemma. The political distance between 
them and the original decision to go to war affords them a much greater degree of 
flexibility regarding what to with the war aims established by the earlier leader. In 
general, non-culpable leaders should take advantage of this and revise the war aims 
downward.  Indeed, apart from wars that involve an adversary with very high war aims, 
non-culpable leaders should have very little incentive to stay in the conflict at all; the 
glory of any victory would have to be shared with the culpable leader who was in charge 
when the war began, and this sharing is not politically plausible in competitive 
democratic systems. Even if the non-culpable leader was not elected specifically to end 
                                                
74 Goemans (2000). Such efforts may be in vain, but we should not be surprised if leaders try to make the 
war seem more important than it actually is. Citizens may be more willing to bear casualties for longer if 
they think the cause is worthwhile or that “salient” issues are at stake. 
75 Ibid. 
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the war, we should still expect her to end the war as soon as it is feasible to avoid 
expending any more of the state’s resources that she could use for other purposes. 
 
5.0 Hypotheses 
 The final step in the theory-building process is specifying a set of hypotheses that 
will allow us to test the theory’s central claims.  Each of the following hypotheses falls 
into one of two categories. The first set of hypotheses will test whether leaders respond to 
the incentives associated with culpability costs in ways that the theory would predict.  If 
the ideas presented in Sections 3 and 4 are correct, we should expect culpable leaders to 
behave very differently from leaders who are relatively free of this settlement cost; the 
former should be very reluctant to agree to anything less than very favorable terms while 
the latter should be more willing to make concessions to facilitate the termination 
process. 76 The second set of hypotheses tests claims about the probability of leader 
punishment.  If the ideas presented in Sections 3 and 4 are correct, we should see 
variation in how the domestic audience treats the different types of leaders in the event of 
an unfavorable settlement. 
 
5.1 Hypotheses on War Outcomes 
 Culpability costs will compel a leader to avoid terminating a war until a favorable 
outcome is secured. The threat of domestic punishment inspires culpable leaders to 
“gamble for resurrection” and stay in a conflict, even if doing so means having their 
citizens bear more costs. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
                                                
76The fact that many first leaders will enjoy the advantages that come with being the initiator should not be 
overlooked. I control for this in the statistical models presented in the next chapter.   
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Hypothesis 1: Culpable leaders should be more likely to secure 
favorable war outcomes than non-culpable leaders. 
 
As Section 3.4 suggested, we should also expect the interaction of a state’s regime 
type and a leader’s culpability to matter. If a state’s domestic political structures 
facilitates the selectorate’s removal of the leader, the leader should be more 
responsive to the pressures generated by the settlement cost and, therefore, more 
likely to hold out for victory. In practice this means that democratic leaders 
should be most sensitive to the pressures inherent in culpability. This suggests the 
following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2:  Among culpable leaders, democratic leaders should 
be more likely to secure favorable outcomes than autocratic 
leaders. 
 
5.2 Hypotheses on Leader Punishment 
 As previous discussions demonstrated, citizens have a multitude of reasons for 
wanting to punish culpable leaders who lose, and they lack incentives to punish non-
culpable ones. Recognizing the domestic audience’s willingness to punish the culpable 
leader, however, only addresses part of the story.  
 Because we can only observe instances where the leader is punished, we need to 
specify hypotheses with the audience’s willingness and opportunity in mind.  Citizens of 
an autocratic state, for instance, may be furious with their leader, but remain relatively 
powerless in terms of sanctioning power. Their willingness to punish their leader may be 
quite high, but their opportunity to do so is minimal. The fact that the domestic audience 
must have the ability to punish the leader means that not all leaders will face the same 
likelihood of punishment. As Section 3.4 demonstrated, we should expect substantial 
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variation in terms of vulnerability across leaders from different regimes. The combination 
of regime type and responsibility suggest the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: Culpable leaders who lose are more likely to be 
removed from office because of the war than non-culpable leaders 
who lose.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Among culpable leaders who lose, democratic 
leaders should be most likely to be removed from office because of 
the war.  
 
As discussed in Section 3.1, the possibility for variation in terms of the 
probability of punishment among first leaders also exists. Although some leaders actively 
choose to participate in the war (either by initiating or joining), leaders whose states were 
attacked may possibly face a smaller probability of punishment if they eventually lose. 
Although these leaders technically had a choice regarding their participation in the 
conflict (i.e., resistance vs. immediate surrender), their citizens may be more 
understanding of the leader’s unfortunate position should the war end poorly. This 
suggests the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: Among first leaders who lose, leaders who 
voluntarily made the decision to participate in the war should be 




 The goal of this chapter was to develop a richer understanding of how culpability 
costs work in practice.  Significant progress was made on several fronts. First, after a 
brief discussion in Section 2 of how the adversary’s war aims function as a settlement 
cost, Section 3 covered a new settlement cost—leader culpability—in greater detail. This 
discussion revealed several interesting aspects of this settlement cost, including (but not 
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limited to) its asymmetrical effects on leaders and citizens, and how their salience to 
leaders should vary with regime type.  
 Section 4 built on Section 3 by fleshing out two new insights suggested by the 
inclusion of the leader culpability cost. The first insight suggested that we should not 
expect a leader’s preference for staying in the war to match his citizens in all 
circumstances, even in democracies. Instead, the utility functions of these two actors 
should only coincide if the leader is non-culpable. The second insight centered on when 
and why only some leaders will have incentives to gamble for resurrection. If the theory 
presented here is correct, only culpable leaders will have incentives to elevate their war 
aims; non-culpable leaders, by contrast, will lack this incentive and should take steps to 



















 The preceding chapters presented a theory of war termination that incorporated a 
new element into a leader’s decision-making calculus: his culpability for involving the 
state in the conflict.  The purpose of this chapter is to present and execute a research 
design capable of testing the hypotheses regarding war outcomes and leader punishment 
suggested by the theory in Chapter 2. If the theory is correct, a leader’s culpability should 
have a strong effect on the types of settlements he is willing to accept and the probability 
that the domestic audience will punish him in the event of a loss.  
In short, culpable leaders will fight longer and harder to secure favorable 
outcomes than their non-culpable counterparts since they face a higher likelihood of 
domestic punishment should they fail to achieve their objectives. This heightened 
probability of punishment stems from the ease with which the domestic audience can link 
the culpable leader to the decision to involve the state in the war. A non-culpable leader, 
by contrast, faces a much smaller probability of domestic punishment, regardless of the 
ultimate terms of settlement she achieves, because of the credible distance she can put 
between herself and the state’s participation in the conflict.  
Crucially, these differences between the leader types should hold regardless of the 
citizens’ attitude regarding the war.  Culpable leaders should continue fighting even 
amidst high costs and public dissent because the leader’s personal settlement costs 
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remain high irrespective of how the state is faring in the war. Non-culpable leaders, on 
the other hand, should be far more receptive to public opinion because their relative lack 
of personal settlement costs affords them more freedom of action in terms of the war 
outcomes they can accept. 
To illustrate the theory’s explanatory power, I first describe the dataset and the 
coding of the dependent and independent variables. Next, I present the results of tests that 
demonstrate the strong effect of leader culpability on war outcomes. I then turn to 
hypotheses regarding the effect of a leader’s culpability on his likelihood of losing office 
as a result of the war, where I find strong support in favor of the theory’s predictions.  
The final section summarizes the implications of the findings for the theory and 
remaining empirical questions that will be addressed with different methods in 
subsequent chapters.  
 
2.0 Research Design  
2.1 Hypotheses 
 In the previous chapter, I identified five testable hypotheses regarding the effect 
of a leader’s culpability on the war outcomes the leader would be willing to accept and 
his probability of being punished by the domestic audience in the event of a loss. 
Hypothesis 1: Culpable leaders should be more likely to secure favorable 
war outcomes than non-culpable leaders. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Among culpable leaders, democratic leaders should be 
more likely to secure favorable outcomes than autocratic leaders. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Culpable leaders who lose are more likely to be removed 
from office because of the war than non-culpable leaders who lose.  
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Hypothesis 4: Among culpable leaders who lose, democratic leaders 
should be most likely to be removed from office because of the war.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Among first leaders who lose, leaders who voluntarily 
made the decision to participate in the war should be more likely to be 
removed because of the war than targets. 
 
The remainder of this section will discuss the design of the dataset, how the variables 
were operationalized and how they will be employed in models of war outcome and 
leader punishment to test the theory in the most accurate way possible. 
 
2.2 The Dataset 
 The dataset used for the analyses in this chapter was built specifically for this 
dissertation, but it has roots in datasets commonly used in the general security literature.  
The population of the 257 warring states included in the analysis is taken from the 
Correlates of War Project’s list of interstate war participants.77 To determine the 
population of leaders who were in charge of these states during the conflicts, I relied 
largely on two existing of datasets of national leaders.78 Leaders were included in the new 
dataset if they were in charge of the state at any point during the war.79  The resulting 
dataset includes one observation per leader per war, for a total of 352 observations. The 
difference between the number of warring states and the number of warring leaders is a 
result of leadership changes that take place in roughly 20% of the wars. These changes 
make multiple observations for a single state in the same war possible. For example, there 
                                                
77 Sarkees (2000). One minor change was made: the Austro-Sardinian War (1848-9) was broken into two 
wars since it consisted of two distinct conflicts separated by several months of peace. 
78 “The Logic of Political Survival Datasource” Bueno de Mesquita et al. and “Archigos: A Database on 
Leaders 1875-2004” Goemans et al. (2006). Discrepancies in the start and end dates of leader tenure were 
corrected based on information in Lentz (1994) and Allen (1977).  
79 In states where two executive positions exist, a head of state and a head of government, the leader who 
possessed the authority to determine policy regarding the state’s participation in the war was included in 
the dataset. More often than not, the head of government holds these powers, but, as is the case in some 
autocracies where the head of government is essentially a puppet, it is not unheard of for the head of state 
to posses this authority.   
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are two observations for the United States’ participation in the Korean War, one for 
Truman and one for Eisenhower.  As later sections will make clear, including all leaders 
who participated in wars in the analysis is absolutely critical to test the theory in the most 
appropriate way possible and to avoid sample bias.  
 Testing the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 required coding two dependent 
variables, war outcome and leader punishment. Although these variables are common 
within the security literature, the codings used here differ from the standard approach in 
important ways. I also coded two novel independent variables: a leader’s culpability for 
the conflict and a measure of the state’s progress during the war. I will now briefly 
discuss each of the variables used in the analysis and the rationale behind the coding 
rules. 
 
2.3 Dependent Variables 
War Outcome 
Measuring the war’s outcome required devising a coding method that would 
allow me to utilize every warring state in the dataset as a separate observation.80 
Although this may seem like a straightforward need for any research design related to 
questions of war outcome, the traditional “win, lose, or draw” coding scheme prevents 
researchers from including all warring states in their analyses simultaneously.  Scholars 
must drop all but one state from each war from their analyses because including all of the 
                                                
80 Importantly, this need is unrelated to the decision to use leaders as the unit of analysis instead of states.  
As I discuss below, models that have a dependent variable of war outcome only utilize one observation per 
war (the leader who presided over the final settlement) so having multiple leaders in the larger dataset is 
not a problem. Instead, as I discuss above, the problem at issue here stems from the statistical dependence 
between the outcomes of the wars the leaders are fighting.  
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states would introduce perfect statistical dependence in the dataset in terms of the 
dependent variable.81 Table 3.1 illustrates this point using two hypothetical bilateral wars. 
Table 3.1: Statistical Dependence in War Outcomes 
Observation War Participant Opponent Outcome 
1 A Sweden Norway Win 
2 A Norway Sweden Lose 
3 B Sudan Chad Draw 
4 B Chad Sudan Draw 
 
In War A, Sweden loses to Norway; War B between Chad and Sudan ends in a draw.  
Because each state’s outcome is perfectly predicted by the outcome of its opponent—
after looking at the outcomes for Sweden and Sudan we do not have to look at the 
outcomes for Norway and Chad to know the former lost and the latter tied—including all 
four of these states in an analysis of a model of war outcome would violate the 
assumption of independence between observations. Consequently, Norway and Sudan (or 
Sweden and Chad) must be dropped from the analysis. 
Including one state from each war is suitable for some research questions, but is 
unsatisfactory for the purposes of this dissertation because would require me to drop all 
but 73 of the observations.82 To create a war outcome dependent variable that avoids 
perfect prediction and the loss of several observations, I designed a coding scheme that 
focuses on the degree to which a leader achieved the state’s original war aims instead of 
how the he fared relative to his opponent.  This resulted in the following six-point scale 
(see Table 3.2.) 
 
 
                                                
81 See, for example, Bennett and Stam (1998) and Stam (1996: 77-8). 
82 This number represents the total number of wars (as opposed to war participants) in the dataset.   
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Table 3.2: War Outcome Coding Scheme 
Value War Outcome Frequency (Percent) 
2 Total Victory 101 (39%) 
1 Partial Victory 18 (7%) 
0 Pre-war Status Quo 32 (13%) 
-1 Partial Loss 61 (24%) 
-2 Major Loss 11 (4%) 
-3 Loss of Sovereignty/Occupied 34 (13%) 
 
This scale has two primary advantages. First, and perhaps most importantly, the 
coding scheme provides a more accurate measure of a leader’s achievement.83 Under the 
new scheme, a leader who annexes a large piece of his adversary’s territory he set out to 
conquer is as successful as a leader who gains nothing but whose only goal was to 
maintain the pre-war status quo. Although the traditional coding method would likely 
treat the former as a win and the second as a draw, in reality the domestic audiences of 
both states should be pleased with their leader because he succeeded in fulfilling his 
objective. Because the theory is interested in the reaction of the domestic audience, 
recoding the variable in a manner that captures the basis on which citizens assess their 
leader is critical to testing the theory accurately. 
  From a purely empirical perspective, in addition to offering a more nuanced 
conceptualization of the different ways in which wars can end, a coding scheme based on 
the degree to which the leader achieved his state’s war aims takes a large step towards 
ameliorating the problem of perfect prediction. Although certain combinations of 
outcomes are more likely to arise than others (e.g., if a leader finds his state totally 
occupied at the end of the war, his adversary has likely achieved all of her goals) the 
                                                
83 The outcome of the war, of course, can only provide a measure of achievement for the leader who 
presides over the war’s termination. I will address the issue of measuring the achievements of leaders who 
leave during the war in subsequent sections. 
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perfect correlation between opponents is eliminated since a win for one leader does not 
necessarily imply a loss for his or her opponent.84 
This scheme was applied in the following way. I assigned leaders a 2 if they 
succeeded in securing all of their war aims without sustaining a loss of any kind.85 
Moving down the scale, leaders received a 1 if they were unsuccessful in securing the full 
set of war aims but did not suffer a loss. These partial victories are relatively rare (see 
Table 3.2), but it is important to distinguish them from the total victories since domestic 
opponents could draw attention to the war aims the leader failed to achieve. I assigned 
leaders a 0 if they did not achieve any of their war aims but also managed to avoid any 
losses. This category is most comparable to the traditional notion of a “tie” but, 
importantly, it is coded irrespective of how the leader’s opponent fared in the war.86  
Partial losses are coded as a -1 and represent outcomes in which a state gains 
nothing and is forced to make minor concessions to the adversary. Minor concessions can 
range from a policy change to reparations to a small loss of territory, either from the 
state’s homeland or colonial territory. By contrast, major concessions, which I code as -2, 
always involve the loss of a substantial amount of homeland territory. Finally, the worst 
possible outcome for a leader, represented by a -3, is to be overthrown and have his state 
annexed or otherwise occupied by the adversary.  A dichotomous version of this variable 
                                                
84 Indeed, within the dataset, leaders that preside over total victories do so over opponents who suffer a 
wide range of “losses”, from a return to the pre-war status quo to total annexation. 
85 “Loss” here is meant in the general sense (i.e., having territory annexed by the adversary, being coerced 
into changing a policy, etc). All states, by virtue of participating in the war, will, of course, suffer 
casualties.  
86 Although this coding may seem to re-introduce the statistical dependence problem since if State A wins 
nothing but also loses nothing, the same must also be true of State B, this overlooks the possibility of a 
leader fighting to maintain the pre-war status quo. In this example, if State B’s leader’s war aims were 
purely defensive, he would be coded as securing a total victory.  Multilateral wars also reduce concerns 
about perfect prediction since it possible for two allies to obtain different degrees of success against the 
same adversary.  
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is used in models of leader punishment; it takes on a value of 1 for total, major and partial 
losses and a 0 otherwise.87 
 
Domestic Punishment 
 Although the concept of leader punishment is frequently discussed in the war 
termination literature, I chose to operationalize this variable in a different way.  To 
illustrate why this change was necessary, it is helpful to examine the three ways in which 
scholars traditionally approach this concept. The first two approaches focus on the effect 
of a war’s outcome on a leader’s longevity by measuring the length of a leader’s tenure in 
office starting either from the day the war begins (Method 1) or the day the war ends 
(Method 2).88  These methods both rely on hazard models to obtain their statistical 
estimates and expect that leaders who perform poorly in international conflicts will have 
shorter post-war tenures than leaders who do well.  The third approach (Method 3) 
parallels the latter two but utilizes a dichotomous dependent variable instead to highlight 
instances of leader removal within a set time frame, usually within one year after the war 
ends.89  
 Although these methods appear to approach the notion of domestic punishment in 
a reasonable and intuitive way, they are not particularly well suited for this dissertation 
because they are only designed to incorporate one leader per war.  Method 1 focuses on 
the leader who was in charge when the war began, while Methods 2 and 3 center on the 
leader who was in charge when the war ended.  This difference would be irrelevant if the 
                                                
87 As a robustness check, I counted status quo outcomes as losses instead of wins. My results remained 
consistent. 
88 For example, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995) and Goemans and Chiozza (2004). 
89 For example, Goemans (2001), Bueno de Mesquita, et al,  (2003) and Buneo de Mesquita, Siverson and 
Woller (1992). 
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leader who started the war were always the same as the leader who ended it, but this is 
not always the case. As Table 3.3 demonstrates, although a fair number of leaders who 
start wars remain in charge for the duration of the conflict, some states witness high 
leadership volatility during times of war.  
Table 3.3: Wartime Leadership Volatility 
Position of Leader Who 
Ended the War Frequency (Percent) 
First 206 (80%) 
Second 30 (12%) 
Third 9 (4%) 
Fourth 7 (3%) 
Fifth 1 (<1%) 




Recognizing that an intra-war leadership change can bring a leader to power who 
faces a very different array of settlement costs than her predecessor reveals the sample 
bias inherent in any method that only allows for one leader per war. Sample bias arises 
because leaders who take office during wars are often systematically different from 
leaders who were in charge at the beginning of the war with respect to culpability and 
their (consequent) probability of being punished. This creates problems for the analysis, 
regardless of which leader the researcher chooses to study.  
For example, if the sample only includes leaders who were in charge when the 
war began, testing hypotheses regarding culpability becomes impossible since all of the 
leaders, by definition, are culpable. The independent variable of interest becomes a 
constant and its effect cannot be estimated.  Examining the leaders who are in charge 
when the war ends introduces a different problem, but it is one that is equally likely to 
confound attempts at statistical inference. Under this approach, the dataset contains none 
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of the leaders who were removed from power during the war and includes all the leaders 
who were put into office to replace them. This exclusion is consequential because it 
systematically eliminates from the sample all of the culpable leaders who were removed 
during the war because of poor performance.  This research design also “over samples” 
non-culpable leaders who may have been brought to office with a specific mandate to end 
the war, many of whom will be non-culpable.90 The non-random nature of the sample in 
terms of leader type is extremely problematic for a study interested in the effects of 
culpability because it means several observations that align precisely with the core 
prediction of the theory have been excluded from the analysis.  
The dataset presented here avoids problems related to sample bias by including all 
warring leaders. This is a major improvement both theoretically and methodologically 
since, as the previous chapter argued, all leaders who participate in wars are equally 
relevant to the study of culpability costs, regardless of which portion of the conflict they 
oversee.   The dependent variable representing domestic punishment was coded as a 1 if 
the leader was removed from power because of the war and a 0 otherwise. To code this 
variable I relied on a variety of general collections of leader biographies and other 
reference volumes.91 Leaders qualify for a coding of 1 if the majority of sources agreed 
their removal was a clear and direct result of the war. Although this first group is 
                                                
90 This is not to say that culpable leaders never come to power during wars—indeed, as the next section 
demonstrates, this is not uncommon. Non-culpable leaders, however, are still more likely to appear in a 
sample that only includes leaders who end wars because, unlike their more culpable counterparts, they will 
try to terminate their wars quickly to avoid domestic punishment, even if this means settling for a net loss. 
Culpable leaders, on the other hand, do not want the war to end until the state’s war aims have been 
accomplished. Because culpable leaders who come to power during wars face an identical set of settlement 
costs as their culpable predecessors, they are equally likely to continue fighting (and “select” themselves 
out of the sample of leaders who end wars) in a (vain) attempt to gamble for resurrection.  
91 While the complete list of reference materials cannot be listed here, several key volumes severed as 
excellent general references on vast majority of the leaders: Lentz (1994), Goemans et al. (2006), 
Encyclopedia Britannica (2007), Eccleshall and Walker (1998) and Bell et al. (1990).  
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overwhelmingly comprised of leaders who are removed through political means, the two 
incidences of leaders committing suicide during a war are also included since their 
untimely deaths were linked to their state’s poor performance in the war.92   
Leaders received a coding of 0 if the majority of sources agreed they left office 
for reasons other than the war, which includes a wide variety of scenarios.  First, leaders 
can leave for institutional reasons that are wholly separate from the war, such as serving 
the maximum number of terms in office or fulfilling their position as an interim, regent or 
other provisional leader.93  In these scenarios, the leadership change would have taken 
place even if the war had not occurred. Five other scenarios exist that also arise 
independently of the war but are more stochastic in nature. These include natural death, 
leaving for another high-ranking political position, sickness, retirement and assassination.  
While the first of the five is self-explanatory, the latter four are not as 
straightforward. Instances of leaders leaving the executive office to take another key 
position in government are rare, but careful investigation of the circumstances 
surrounding their transition from one post to another demonstrated that they were not 
cases of leader punishment.94 Cases in which the leader retired or resigned for health 
reasons had to be coded very carefully since both of these reasons are often given to 
provide cover for a leader who wants to escape political problems. A coding of retirement 
required evidence that the timing of the retirement was predetermined or that the leader 
                                                
92 Both of these leaders, coincidently, are from World War Two: Adolph Hitler of Germany (d. April 30, 
1945) and Alexandros Korizis of Greece (d. April 18, 1941). 
93 Sir John McEwen, for instance, served as acting prime minister of Australia for three weeks following 
the presumed drowning of Prime Minister Harold E. Holt while Australia was involved in the Vietnam 
War. He stepped down after Sir John Gorton was chosen as the replacement leader for the Liberal party. 
(Lentz, 1994, v2: 52).  
94 Both instances are from France: Charles Alexandre Dupuy, who left the office of prime minister to 
become President of the Chamber during the Franco-Thai War in 1893 and Etienne-Alexandre Millerand, 
who left the prime ministership in 1920 during the Franco-Turkish War to assume the presidency when the 
current president resigned for health reasons. (Bell, Johnson and Morris 1990: 132 & 291). 
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truly left at his or her own choosing. 95 Departures due to illness required that leader 
leaders were incapacitated or otherwise bed-ridden.96  
Instances of assassination are interesting because although they appear to be 
prime examples of leader punishment in its most extreme form, a lethal shot from a lone 
anarchist does not qualify as a political sanction from the domestic audience and thus 
receives a coding of 0 for this variable.97 Even if the trigger is pulled because the assassin 
was angered by how the leader handled an international conflict, the fact that the removal 
was not a result of a regular political process and/or did not involve any members of 
government disqualifies it from being included as a case of leader punishment.98 Finally, 
several others types of cases are coded as zeroes: leaders who lost power because their 
state was absorbed into a new political entity (e.g., the small European states that 
eventually were united under German control), leaders who remained in power for 
several years after the last war in the dataset ended (the first Gulf War, which ended in 
                                                
95 For instance, the decision of Australia’s Robert Menzies’ to leave office in 1966 during the Vietnam War 
was widely regarded as a completely voluntary decision: “When he retired from parliament (the last prime 
minister to do so while still secure in office), he dominated public life. His supremacy was such that 
contemporaries argued only over the merits of his success, and these arguments still linger in the estimates 
of biographers and historians.” (Davison, et. al., 1998 426). 
96 For example, Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, who ruled Iraq from 1968 to 1979, suffered a heart attack in 1976 
that forced him to delegate most governmental matters to his second in command, Saddam Hussein.  He 
formally resigned in 1979 and died in 1982. (Lentz (1994: 410) and Encyclopedia Britannica Online 
(2007)). 
97 I classify four cases as “questionable assassinations”, where the killing is either ordered or carried out by 
someone from within the leader’s ruling circle who may either have had personal designs on the executive 
position or more general political motives. Yahya Ibn Muhammad Ibn Hamid Al-Din, for instance, ruled 
the Yemen Arab Republic from 1911 until 1948 when he was killed by a guard in a palace revolt (Goemans  
et. al, 2006: 269) and Encyclopedia Britannica Online (2007).) None of these killings, however, were in 
response to the targeted leader’s lack of success in an international conflict.  
98 For example, Liaquat Ali Khan (who was the prime minister of Pakistan from 1947 until his death in 
1951) was killed by a fanatic who was upset with Khan’s handling of relations with India. (Lentz, 1994: 
610). 
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1991), leaders who were removed or who resigned over domestic matters, or leaders who 
were overthrown by a foreign power during a war.99  
Coding leaders based on why they were removed from office rather than when has 
three distinct advantages in terms of this project. First, and foremost, it provides the most 
accurate test of the theory possible. The theory’s main contribution centers on why 
domestic audiences remove some leaders for poor war outcomes while allowing others to 
remain in office.  It offers no predictions as to when, precisely, the punishment will be 
carried out. 
Second, from an empirical standpoint, this approach avoids the risk of conflation 
inherent in a coding scheme that identifies punished leaders based on whether they were 
removed from office within a set period of time (e.g., within one year after the war’s 
conclusion). Although most leader punishments occur fairly quickly, assuming that all 
leaders who leave shortly after the war are doing so because of their performance in the 
conflict would be erroneous. As this section has demonstrated, leaders leave power for 
many reasons, so we cannot assume that their departure is always because the domestic 
audience is unhappy with how their state fared in the most recent war.100  
The third advantage also has to do with time, but deals more with issues related to 
the political processes of different regimes. Several confounding factors may impede 
                                                
99 With regards to the latter two categories, there are several examples of leaders who are punished by the 
domestic audience shortly after the war for reasons unrelated to the conflict. Elpidio Quirino of the 
Philippines, for instance, was voted out of 156 days after the end of the Korean War because “his 
administration was tainted by widespread graft and corruption.” (Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2007). 
Although one could argue that poor performance in a war could rob the leader of political capital and make 
him more vulnerable to attacks from domestic opponents, identifying cases of this sort are beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. Instances where the leader is removed by a foreign power are dropped from the 
final analysis since members of the domestic audience are denied the opportunity to punish the leader 
themselves. 
100 Indeed, a full 27% of leaders who were not punished because of the war’s outcome leave office within a 
year of the war ending. 
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research designs that examine the length of a leader’s post-war tenure instead of the 
reason the leader was removed. For example, autocratic leaders will generally have 
longer tenures in office than democratic leaders since, by the nature of their near-absolute 
hold on domestic authority, they are harder to remove from power once they have 
solidified their winning coalition’s loyalty.101 This has the potential to inflate the effect of 
a state’s regime type, even though other factors could be equally important.102  
Although controlling for the regime type of the state addresses this concern 
somewhat, other problems exist that make this type of analysis unattractive. For instance, 
in some states, leaders can only be removed at pre-determined times (e.g., the fixed 
election cycle that exists in many presidential democracies). The fact that leaders are only 
“at risk” for a small fraction of their time in office clashes with the idea of what a hazard 
function is meant to capture.103 These different domestic structures may also allow leaders 
to stay in office even if the public is displeased with them since citizens may have to wait 
years for an opportunity to punish the leader. Focusing on whether the leader was 
removed from office because of the war circumvents these problems because time does 
not play a role in the coding decision. 
 
 
                                                
101 Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).  
102 To illustrate this point, imagine two hypothetical leaders who both end wars in 1920 with partial 
victories: one is the leader of a presidential democracy and the other is a ruler of an absolute monarchy. 
The democratic ruler serves his maximum term and leaves office in 1926 while the autocratic leader rules 
until he dies in 1952.  Both leaders enjoyed the maximum time in office allowed by their political systems 
as neither was punished, but the autocratic leader will look far more immune to the effect of the war’s 
outcome. Censoring the democratic leader’s observation does not remedy this problem. If this observation 
is censored the hazard model will not treat his departure as a failure, but it will incorporate the (far shorter) 
length of the democratic leader’s post-war tenure into the analysis. Allison (1995) and Cleves et al. (2004).   
103 These models are designed for studies in which the units under observation are exposed to risk 
continuously over the course of the study. For example, in a study of the effect of a new drug on the 
lifespan of a group of patients, the patients are always at risk of dying. The exact point at which they die 
can vary from patient to patient, but there are no periods in which dying is not possible.  
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2.4 Independent Variables 
Leader Culpability 
 The key independent variable for this study is a leader’s culpability for his state’s 
involvement in the conflict. Leaders are considered culpable if they meet one of two 
criteria: (1) they were in charge of the state when the war began (a “first leader”), or (2) 
they share a political connection with a culpable predecessor.104 For the purposes of this 
chapter’s analyses, a political connection exists if the new leader is from the same 
political party as the culpable leader, or was a member of the culpable leader’s cabinet, 
military junta, close circle of advisors or, in the case of monarchies, the culpable leader’s 
family.105 Non-culpable leaders, by contrast, are leaders who come to power during wars 
who lack such connections with the earlier, culpable leader.106  
 This variable was coded using leader biographies and reference volumes that 
detail the composition of governments throughout history.107 Of the 352 leaders in the 
dataset, 95 (27%) are new leaders who come to power at some point during the war.  Of 
these 95 new leaders, 54 (56%) are non-culpable. Finally, out of the 257 warring states in 
the dataset, non-culpable leaders are in charge of the end of their state’s participation 26 
times (10% of the total).108  
                                                
104 This predecessor is usually a first leader, but some wars can generate several consecutive, culpable 
leaders beyond the leader who was in charge when the war began. Such is the case of Japan in World War 
Two, where most of the leaders were connected to the military in some fashion.  
105 Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia (later Italy), for instance, took over for his father, Charles Albert, in the 
second phase of the Austro-Sardinian War in 1849. 
106 I address the question of whether earlier public support matters in the next chapter. 
107 Lentz (1994) and Allen (1977) were especially helpful in this regard.  
108 This number is small but predictably so since, as the theory chapter explained, we should expect most 
first leaders to be strategic in their war participation and select into those wars they think will bring quick 
and easy victories. Although this selection effect should be more powerful among democratic first leaders, 
it is reasonable to presume that no leader willingly selects into a war with the idea that things will go so 
poorly as to result in his premature removal.  There should not, in other words, be very many opportunities 
for new leaders to come to power provided everything goes according to plan for the first leader. 
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Regime Type 
This variable was coded using the Polity IV dataset, which contains information 
on the nature of a state’s domestic institutions.109  Since I am interested in how the state’s 
domestic institutions affect how the leader is treated when he leaves office, the 
information was drawn from the last year the leader was in power while the war was in 
progress. So, for example, in the two cases that comprise the participation of the United 
States in the Vietnam War, the Polity information for the observation representing 
Lyndon B. Johnson is taken from 1969 while the information for Richard Nixon comes 
from 1973. Following standard practice, I subtracted the “democracy” and “autocracy” 
scores for the state for each observation and created a scale in which -10 represents the 
most autocratic states and 10 represents the states that are most democratic. To create the 
regime type categories used in final analysis, I trichotomized the scale at the following 
points: states with a score of -10 to -5 were considered autocracies, -4 through 5 were 
considered mixed regimes and states that scored between 6 and 10 were considered 
democracies.   
 
Voluntary Participation in the War 
  As discussed in the previous chapter, the question of whether all first leaders 
should be considered equally culpable remains an open one.  Although some have argued 
that leaders whose states are attacked should be blamed by the domestic audience for 
failing to deter the adversary from striking, it is also reasonable to think that leaders who 
willingly chose to involve their states in the conflict would face a higher probability of 
domestic backlash should the conflict end poorly for the state. To test this idea I created a 
                                                
109 Marshall and Jaggers (2000). 
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variable that takes on a value of 1 if the leader either initiated or voluntarily joined the 
war and a 0 if the state was attacked.  For the purposes of this project, leaders who claim 
to be striking preemptively are still considered initiators.  This variable was coded using 
secondary sources that describe the initial military clashes that mark the beginning of the 
war.110   
 
Battlefield Advantage 
 As the discussion of the domestic punishment variable made clear, all leaders who 
participate in wars must be included in the analysis to address this dissertation’s question 
accurately. Because some leaders are removed before the war ends, a measure of how the 
state was faring at the end of the leader’s tenure during the war is required to determine if 
the state’s fortunes on the battlefield played a role in the leader’s departure from office. 
We cannot safely assume that the war’s outcome can be extrapolated back in time and 
applied to leaders who leave before the war ends since the state’s battlefield advantage 
can often shift, for better or worse, as the war progresses.  
In light of this, I constructed a variable that captures how the state was 
progressing in the war on a monthly basis. This variable took a value of 1 if the state had 
suffered a major setback during the month in question; setbacks include a significant loss 
of territory gained earlier in the war or a failure to prevent a major offensive by the 
adversary. This variable only highlights negative events that would be consequential 
enough to be considered major checks in progress. Fluctuation in the position of the 
battle lines by small amounts is certainly important over the entire length of the war, but 
                                                
110 Although many sources were used, Clodfelter (1992), Phillips and Axelrod (2004) and Brecher and 
Wilkenfeld (1997) served as excellent general sources. 
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the purpose of this variable is to capture major failures during the war. The analysis uses 
this variable for observations in which the leader leaves before the war ends, and the 
value of the war outcome variable for all cases in which the leader was in charge when 
the war ended.111  
 
2.5 Control Variables 
Adversary’s War Aims 
 The adversary’s war aims are included as a control for two reasons. First, it is 
important to account for this variable in models that aim to explain war outcomes. 
Leaders set their state’s war aims strategically and are only likely to select high war aims 
if they feel they are likely to achieve them. Leaders facing adversaries with high war 
aims, therefore, are more likely to suffer larger losses than states facing less ambitious 
opponents since high war aims are effectively a signal of the opponent’s determination to 
succeed. 112  
The second reason the adversary’s war aims need to be controlled for in the 
analyses is because of their relationship with the probability the targeted leader will be 
punished by the domestic audience. Because the adversary’s war aims proxy for how 
much the targeted country’s citizens are likely to suffer if the war is lost, citizens of the 
                                                
111 For example, there are two observations representing Britain’s participation in the Crimean War: 
“Aberdeen 1855” and “Palmerston 1856”. The first observation is assigned a 0 for this variable because in 
the month Aberdeen left office Britain was not making any gains but was also not suffering any major 
setbacks. The second observation is coded with the war’s overall outcome since Palmerston presided over 
the war’s conclusion. 
112 As a robustness check, I included a variable measuring the state’s own war aims, which I coded using a 
scheme very similar to the one presented in Table 3.4. This variable performed very poorly, only achieving 
standard levels of statistical significance when the voluntary participation variable was removed from 
Model 1. This result is not surprising; taken together, the voluntary participation variable and the variable 
representing the adversary’s war aims absorb most of the variation in war outcomes a the state’s own war 
aims might explain.  
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targeted state should be more upset with a leader who is unable to prevent an aggressive 
adversary’s victory than they would be with a leader who capitulates to an opponent with 
minimal demands.  To control for this effect, I created a variable that is based on the 
following scale.  
Table 3.4: Adversary's War Aims Coding Scheme 
Coding Adversary’s War Aim Frequency (Percent) 
1 Pre-war Status Quo 59 (23%) 
2 Policy Change 23 (9%) 
3 A Portion of an Ally’s Homeland Territory 67 (26%) 
4 A Portion of the Targeted State’s Homeland Territory 74 (29%) 
5 Regime Change of the Targeted State 13 (5%) 
6 Total Conquest of the Targeted State 21 (8%) 
 
Adversaries are considered as having “high” war aims if they received a coding of 4 or 
higher on this scale. 
 
Casualties 
 This variable captures the number of military fatalities suffered by the state and 
serves as the second proxy for the national costs citizens bear during conflicts. As with 
the adversary’s war aims variable, casualties must be controlled for because of the strong 
effect they have on the probability that the leader will be punished.113 This variable was 
coded from several sources; when possible high and low estimates were collected and 
averaged.114 In states that witnessed at least one wartime leadership transition, each 
leader’s share of the casualties was weighted to reflect his personal share of the war’s 
duration (e.g., if a leader was in charge for 75% of the war, he was allotted 75% of the 
                                                
113 Goemans (2001) and Gartner and Segura (1998).  
114 The primary sources for information on casualties were Clodfelter (1992), Valentino, et al. (2006) and 
Phillips and Axelrod (2004). If information could not be found in other sources, I relied on the figures 
provided by the Correlates of War Project.  
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casualties). This method is admittedly crude, but is the best alternative in the absence of 
reliable casualty data in smaller temporal units than the entire war (i.e., monthly or even 




 This variable counts the number of days from the day the leader took office to the 
day the war began.115 This variable is included as a control to account for the effect of 
pre-war tenure on post-war office security. Leaders with longer pre-war tenures are 
generally thought to have a more solidified hold on power and, consequently, should 
stand a better chance of retaining office in the event of a policy failure (e.g., losing a 
war).116  As such, it is a necessary control for models of leader punishment. The final 
version of this variable is logged to account for a skewed distribution. 
 
Relative Capabilities 
 This variable captures how strong an individual state is relative to its opponent(s). 
This is a necessary control for models concerning war outcome since a state with a 
significant advantage over its adversary is likely to achieve a better outcome than a states 
that is outmatched in terms of relative capabilities.  This variable is calculated as the ratio 
of the state’s capabilities over the sum of capabilities on the battlefield.117  Data on 
                                                
115 The value of this variable is zero for all leaders who come to power during the war.   
116 Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995). Because the effect of pre-war tenure is thought to vary across 
the different regime types, I include an interaction term to account for the different intercepts associated 
with democratic and autocratic states as a robustness check. My results remained consistent. 
117 The precise equation used is: (State A’s Capabilities)/(State A’s Capabilities + Capabilities of State A’s 
Opponent(s)). For this measure I only examine the effect of State A’s individual capabilities. I created an 
additional measure that assumed all of the capabilities of State A’s coalition partners (in instances of 
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national capabilities are drawn from EUGene; the composite capability (CINC) score was 
used in the final calculations.118 
 
3.0 War Outcomes 
 In the previous chapter I argued that a positive relationship should exist between a 
leader’s culpability and the probability of victory (Hypothesis 1). I test this hypothesis 
using an ordered logistic regression in which the dependent variable is war outcome; 
higher numbers on this scale are associated with more favorable outcomes (see Table 
3.2). Because I am interested in the war’s ultimate outcome, I only included the final 
observation for a state in a given war.119  The results of this analysis are presented in 
Table 3.5.120 
Table 3.5: War Outcomes and Culpability 
 Model 1 
Variable Coefficient S.E. P-value 
Culpable Leader 0.85 0.38 0.012 
Your Capabilities  1.89 0.52 0.000 
Adversary’s War Aims -1.41 0.37 0.000 
Voluntary Participant 0.21 0.33 0.263 
Democratic State 0.70 0.28 0.015 
Log Likelihood -361.11   
Probability  > χ2 0.00   
N 257   
 
                                                                                                                                            
multilateral wars) can be utilized in State A’s war effort [(Capabilities of State A’s Coalition)/(Capabilities 
of State A’s Coalition Capabilities of State A’s Opponent(s)]. Interchanging this variable with this one used 
in the final analysis did not affect the results.   
118 Bennett and Stam (2000). 
119 For example, the observations representing the United States’ participation in the Korean and Vietnam 
Wars for this equation are “Eisenhower, 1953” and “Nixon, 1973”, respectively.  The full dataset includes 
an additional observation for each of these wars, “Truman, 1953” and “Johnson, 1969”, but because these 
leaders were not in charge when the final settlements were brokered, their observations are not used in the 
estimation of models of war outcomes. Observations in Models 1-4 are clustered by war.  
120 Unless indicated otherwise, all tests are one-sided.  
 71 
 The positive and significant coefficient for the culpability variable in Model 1 
provides strong support for Hypothesis 1. Culpable leaders are more likely to achieve 
favorable outcomes than their less culpable counterparts, even in the presence of many of 
the literature’s standard predictors of victory. The marginal effects of moving from a non-
culpable leader to a culpable leader for each of the war outcomes (presented in Table A.1 
of Appendix A) confirm this result. Non-culpable leaders are always more likely to 
preside over unfavorable outcomes than culpable leaders, while culpable leaders are 
almost twice as likely to preside over total victories than non-culpable leaders (47% vs. 
28%).121  
 These findings lend credence to the idea that culpable leaders do not achieve their 
victories solely by choosing wars wisely or targeting weak opponents. The domestic 
political pressures associated with the culpability for the war also play a role because they 
motivate the leader to stay in the war, regardless of what this decision may mean in terms 
of the costs his citizens will be forced to pay.  
The difference in terms of the outcomes culpable and non-culpable leaders are 
willing to accept also supports the alternate causal story presented in the previous chapter 
for the oft-cited “declining advantage of democracy” result, in which democratic leaders 
appear more likely to accept unfavorable outcomes as wars become more costly.122  The 
extant explanation for the finding assumes that as democratic electorates grow weary 
with the mounting costs of war, their leaders will be more likely to settle for unfavorable 
outcomes to end the war and remain in the public’s good graces.   
                                                
121 Table A.1 in Appendix A presents the probabilities of the different leaders achieving each type of 
outcome, the difference between these probabilities and the 95% confidence interval surrounding the size 
of the change. In this case, the confidence interval remains on one side of zero for two outcomes: partial 
losses and total victories. This finding is not surprising given the frequency of these outcomes. 
122 Bennett and Stam (1998). 
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The findings in Table 3.5, however, suggest that this finding may be driven by the 
behavior of non-culpable leaders.  Culpable leaders should be determined in their pursuit 
of victory, even at the cost of their own citizens’ lives, while non-culpable leaders should 
be more wiling to stop short of victory and settle for less favorable outcomes. The 
existing literature’s explanation assumes the leader’s commitment to the conflict wanes 
as public dissent grows, but, as I argued in the theory chapter, this characterization only 
applies to non-culpable leaders. The “declining advantage of democracy” result is more a 
reflection of the political processes of democratic states that make it easier to bring 
leaders who will feel less pressure to continue fighting (i.e., non-culpable leaders) to 
power during wars.123  
 Interacting democracy with culpability in a single model of war outcomes 
examines the notion that democratic leaders should be particularly responsive to the 
settlement costs associated with culpability (Hypothesis 2).  
Table 3.6: Democracy, Culpability and War Outcomes 
 Model 2 
 (All Final Leaders) 
Variable Coefficient S.E. P-value 
Culpable Leader 0.52 0.39 0.094 
Your Capabilities  1.90 0.52 0.000 
Adversary’s War Aims -1.43 0.36 0.000 
Voluntary Participant 0.19 0.32 0.270 
Democratic Leader -0.01 0.55 0.494 
Democratic, Culpable Leader 0.88 0.73 0.115 
Log Likelihood -360.4   
Probability  > χ2 0.00   
N 257   
                                                
123 An examination of the original finding reinforces this argument: of the six democratic leaders who 
accept draws or losses, three are non-culpable. I arrived at this conclusion after examining the dataset used 
in Bennett and Stam (1998). The leaders who accept the two draws and a loss are: Eisenhower (US, Korean 
War), Nixon (US, Vietnam War) and Brisson (Franc, Sino-French War). Two Indian prime ministers 
accept draws with Pakistan (Nehru and Shastri) and George I of Greece accepts a loss to Turkey, but all 




Model 2 is identical to Model 1 (above) in terms of the sample on which it is estimated, 
but it includes an interaction term (“Democratic, Culpable Leader”). If culpability’s 
effect on a leader’s probability of settling for favorable outcomes differs across regime 
types, this interaction should be significant, but instead it falls just outside the traditional 
bounds of significance. The marginal effect being a culpable, democratic leader is 
positive, but the effect is not statistically distinguishable from the marginal effect of 
being a culpable, autocratic leader, which is also positive.124 This suggests that although 
the effect of culpability may be stronger in a substantive sense for democratic leaders, 
non-democratic leaders are not immune from their pressures.  
 Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.7, which are estimates of the same model on two 








                                                
124 This can be illustrated by comparing the marginal effects of culpable, autocratic and culpable, 
democratic leaders. The marginal effect of being a culpable, autocratic leader is simply the coefficient on 
“Culpable Leader” (CL) in Model 2 since this is the effect of culpability when the other component of the 
interaction term (democracy) is set at zero. As Table 3.6 demonstrates, the effect of this variable is indeed 
positive, but just barely qualifies for standard levels of significance. The marginal effect of being a 
democratic culpable leader is calculated by adding the coefficient on the culpable leader (CL) variable to 
the coefficient on the interaction term (CLD) itself: 0.52 + 0.88 = 1.4. Both effects are positive (and the 
effect of culpability appears to be larger for democratic leaders), but as the insignificant interaction term 
suggests, there is not a significant difference between them. 
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Table 3.7: Regime Type, Culpability and War Outcomes  
 Model 3 Model 4 
 (Just Democratic Leaders) (Just Autocratic Leaders) 
Variable Coefficient S.E. P-value Coefficient S.E. P-value 
Culpable Leader 1.50 0.60 0.006 0.49 0.394 0.105 
Your Capabilities  1.69 1.09 0.062 2.04 0.60 0.000 
Adversary’s War Aims -0.81 0.57 0.078 -1.53 0.45 0.000 
Voluntary Participant 0.86 0.91 0.173 0.07 0.37 0.427 
Log Likelihood -69.82   -285.90   
Probability  > χ2 0.004   0.000   
N 58   199   
 
The effect of culpability among democratic leaders is larger than the same effect among 
autocratic leaders, and while the first effect is highly significant the second just falls 
outside conventional levels of significance in a one-tailed test.125 
 These effects are also apparent in Figure 3.1, where the bars depict the change in 
the probability of securing a total victory moving from a non-culpable to culpable leader 
in all states, in non-democracies and in non-democracies.  The black lines are the 95% 
confidence around the size of the change. The fact that the confidence interval for the 
effect of culpability on democratic leaders does not cross zero (with the line in the non-
democracy subset does) increases our confidence in the notion that this effect is 
somewhat more pronounced in democracies. 
 
 
                                                
125 Table A.2 of Appendix A illustrates this result in a different way: democratic culpable leaders are twice 
as likely to preside over total victories than their non-culpable counterparts (68% vs. 34%) and less than 
half as likely to settle for any type of loss. The finding regarding total victory is not surprising given the 
frequency of this particular outcome for democratic states. (Reiter and Stam, 2002.) Culpable, autocratic 
leaders are also less likely to settle for losses and more likely to achieve total victories than non-culpable 





 Some may be concerned that the relationship between leader changes and war 
outcomes could be epiphenomenal: that is, non-culpable leaders only come to power 
when the war is going poorly and therefore have the poor outcomes forced upon them 
instead of actively choosing to settle for lower terms.  As the previous chapter discussed, 
such concerns should be minimal.  Even if all non-culpable leaders came to power 
specifically to end the war, the behavior of the culpable leaders still runs counter to the 
predictions of the extant literature. The distinction, therefore, is still very much a 
meaningful one.  
 As it happens, there is little evidence of an epiphenomenal relationship. I arrived 
at this conclusion by estimating a model where the dependent variable was a whether a 
new leader was culpable or not and the independent variables were how the state was 
faring in the month before the new leader came to power and whether his immediate 
predecessor left because of the war (see Table 3.8).  
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Table 3.8: Tests for a Possible Epiphenomenal Relationship  
 Model 5 Model 6 
Variable Coefficient S.E. P-value Coefficient S.E. P-value 
Reason for Predecessor’s Removal  0.546 0.43 0.199 - - - 
Recent Battlefield Performance - - - -0.295 0.291 0.310 
Log Likelihood -64.12   -64.43   
Probability > χ2 0.198   0.306   
N 95   95   
 
Table 3.8 Tests for a Possible Epiphenomenal Relationship (continued) 
 Model 7 
Variable Coefficient S.E. P-value 
Reason for Predecessor’s 
Removal  
0.442 0.47 0.343 
Recent Battlefield Performance -0.170 0.32 0.593 
Log Likelihood -63.98   
Probability > χ2 0.378   
N 95   
 
If the relationship were epiphenomenal, both of the independent variables should serve as 
strong predictors of the new leader’s culpability: non-culpable leaders should come to 
power when the state is faring poorly and/or follow leaders who were removed because 
of the war. Neither variable demonstrates a significant relationship with the new leader’s 
culpability in either a bivariate or multivariate specification. With these encouraging 
results, I proceed to the hypotheses related to the effect of leader culpability on the 
probability of domestic punishment.   
 
4.0 Leader Punishment 
In the previous chapter I argued that a leader’s culpability would have a positive 
relationship with his likelihood of being punished by the domestic audience in the event 
of a loss (Hypothesis 3). To test this hypothesis, I use a logistic regression model to 
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estimate the effect of the independent variables on the dichotomous dependent variable of 
leader punishment. I utilize two indicator variables for this initial test to highlight the 
effect of the difference between culpable and non-culpable losers.126 Table 3.9 presents 
the results of the test of Hypothesis 3. 
Table 3.9: Culpability and Domestic Punishment 
 Model 8 
Variable Coefficient S.E. P-value 
Culpable Loser 1.68 0.38 0.000 
Non-Culpable Loser 0.25 0.64 0.347 
Adversary’s War Aims 0.51 0.37 0.083 
Casualties (Logged) 0.33 0.07 0.000 
Pre-war Tenure (Logged) -0.18 0.05 0.000 
Constant -4.70 0.70 0.000 
Log Likelihood -110.15   
Probability  > χ2 0.00   
N 328   
 
 
 This model specification dictates that the coefficients on these variables must be 
interpreted with respect to the excluded (or baseline) category, which is comprised of the 
winners in the dataset. These results align with the theory’s predictions precisely: 
culpability has a strong, positive effect on whether a leader will be removed because of 
poor performance in a war.  Culpable leaders are more likely to be removed than winners, 
while non-culpable, losing leaders are statistically indistinguishable from winners in 
terms of their likelihood of domestic punishment.127 Comparing the marginal effect of 
moving from the baseline category (winners) to each of these loser types confirms this 
                                                
126 Because this set of models examines all leaders who participate in wars and not just the leaders who end 
them, the measure of the state’s progress in the war at the time of the leader’s removal was used for leaders 
who left during the war while the war’s outcome was applied to leaders who oversaw the war’s 
termination. (See footnote 111 for an example). For Models 8-10, observations are clustered by state and 
war (e.g., the Truman and Eisenhower observations for the Korean War share the same cluster number). 
127 A Wald Test between the coefficients for culpable losers and non-culpable losers confirms this finding 
and rejects the null hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal (one-sided p-value is 0.0156). 
 78 
finding.128  Culpable, losing leaders are more than four times as likely as winners to be 
removed from office because of the war (16% vs. 3.5%) while the difference in the 
probability of removal because of the war between non-culpable losers and winners is 
less than 1%.129 
 Hypothesis 4 explores this relationship in greater detail by testing for differences 
between culpable losers of different regime types. As the theory chapter discussed, 
democratic, culpable leaders should be more likely to be removed from power because of 
the war than their autocratic counterparts because of the political mechanisms that 
facilitate leadership change in democratic states.  I test this hypothesis with two different 
model specifications: Model 9 combines leaders of autocracies and mixed regimes into a 
“non-democratic” category, while Model 10 examines the three regime types separately.  









                                                
128 See Table A.3 in Appendix A. 
129 The confidence interval (presented in Table A.3 of Appendix A) surrounding these changes lends further 
support. The confidence interval surrounding the effect of moving from a winner to a culpable, losing 
leader is completely to the right of zero, indicating that culpability has a positive and significant effect on 
the probability of punishment for this leader type. By contrast, the confidence interval surrounding the 
effect of moving from a winner to a non-culpable loser includes zero, suggesting the possibility of no 
effect. (See Figure 3.2). 
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Table 3.10: Culpability, Regime Type and Domestic Punishment 
 Model 9 Model 10 
Variable Coefficient S.E. P-value Coefficient S.E. P-value 
Culpable, Non-Democratic 
Losers  
1.61 0.38 0.000 - - - 
Non-Culpable, Non-Democratic 
Losers 
0.25 0.77 0.372 - - - 
Culpable, Autocratic Losers - - - 1.19 0.47 0.005 
Culpable, Mixed Regime Losers - - - 2.08 0.48 0.000 
Non-Culpable, Mixed Regime 
Losers 
- - - 0.53 0.81 0.255 
Culpable, Democratic Losers 2.76 0.23 0.001 2.77 0.89 0.001 
Non-Culpable, Democratic 
Losers 
0.28 1.01 0.391 0.36 1.03 0.363 
Adversary’s War Aims 0.49 0.38 0.093 0.36 0.39 0.174 
Casualties (Logged) 0.33 0.07 0.000 0.33 0.07 0.000 
Pre-war Tenure (Logged) -0.19 0.05 0.000 -0.17 0.05 0.000 
Constant -4.77 0.71 0.000 -4.73 0.72 0.000 
Log Likelihood -109.44   -107.97   
Probability  > χ2 0.00   0.00   
N 328   328   
 
Once again, culpability exhibits a strong effect on the likelihood a losing leader 
will be punished, regardless of his or her regime type. In both models culpable, losing 
leaders are always significantly more likely than winners to lose power because of the 
war, while non-culpable, losing leaders are not different from winners in terms of the 
likelihood of punishment.130 The large difference in terms of coefficient magnitude 
between the culpable, losing leader types and non-culpable, losing leader types lends 
further support to this conclusion. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates these points graphically.  The red bars represent the size of 
the change that results from a move from a winning leader to a culpable, losing leader 
while the blue bars capture the size of the change that results from a move from a 
winning leader to a non-culpable, losing leader. As above, I present the results for all 
                                                
130 The “non-culpable, autocratic loser” category is excluded from Model 10 because it perfectly predicts 
the dependent variable; none of the leaders in this category are ever punished because of the war, which is 
precisely in line with the theory’s predictions.  
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leaders, non-democratic leaders and democratic leaders; the black lines represent the 95% 
confidence interval around the size of the effect. 
Figure 3.2 
 
The results could hardly be more striking. As the significance values from Tables 
3.9 and 3.10 predicted, the confidence intervals surrounding the effects for culpable, 
losing leaders never cross zero, no matter how the leaders are grouped, indicating that 
these effects are indeed positive. By contrast, the confidence intervals surrounding the 
effects for non-culpable, losing leaders always include zero, suggesting that there is no 
difference, in a statistical sense, between the likelihood of punishment for non-culpable 
losing leaders and winners.  
Evaluating Hypothesis 4 directly also requires testing whether the coefficients for 
the different types of culpable, losing leaders are statistically different from one another.  
In Models 9 and 10, the coefficients for the democratic, culpable losers are larger than the 
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coefficients for culpable, non-democratic losers, but we cannot be certain of a difference 
without additional analysis.131 Table 3.11 presents the results of several tests of equality 
between the coefficient for democratic, culpable losers and those of other culpable 
losers.132 A significant result indicates that the null hypothesis of equality should be 
rejected.  
Table 3.11: Tests of Coefficient Equality Between Losing Leader Types 
Coefficient Comparisons P-value 
 (one-sided) 
Model 9 Democratic, Culpable  Non-Democratic, Culpable 0.098 
Model 10 “ Autocratic, Culpable  0.041 
Model 10 “ Mixed Regime, Culpable  0.000 
 
The evidence from Table 3.11 provides strong support for Hypothesis 4. Although 
the first test is only marginally significant in a one-tailed test, the comparisons with the 
coefficients from Model 10 unequivocally reject the null assumption of equality. 
Comparing the magnitude of the changes between autocratic and democratic culpable 
losers (Tables A.4A and A.4B in Appendix A) is also instructive. Although losing, 
culpable leaders are always more likely to lose power than their non-culpable 
counterparts across regime types, the magnitude of this change for democratic, culpable 
                                                
131 The marginal effects presented in Tables A.4A and A.4B in Appendix A reflect this as well.  The effect 
of moving from winners to the non-culpable leader types is always very small and the confidence interval 
always includes zero. Moreover, the effect of moving from a winner to a culpable democratic leader is 
almost three times as large as the effect of moving from a winner to a culpable autocratic leader, as the 
larger (and highly significant) coefficient on democratic, culpable leaders in Model 9 implies. The 95% 
confidence interval includes zero for the democratic effect, but this is likely a result of the fact that the 
adversary’s war aims are held at “low” in the estimation of these marginal effects. This is the modal value 
of the variable for this sample, but holding it at zero may artificially deflate the likelihood of punishment. 
This is a common problem when calculating the marginal effects for models that contain dummy variables.  
When the adversary’s war aims are held at “high”, the marginal effects reflect the predictions of Model 9 
precisely. The confidence intervals surrounding the size of the effect of moving from winners to non-
culpable leader types always includes zero while the effect of moving from winners to culpable leaders on 
punishment is always positive and significant, regardless of regime type. Additionally, the difference in the 
size of the change created by culpable autocratic leaders versus culpable democratic leaders becomes more 
striking. I present these results in Table A.4B.  
132 The first row is based on the estimates from Model 9 and the latter two are based on Model 10. 
 82 
leaders is more than twice that of culpable, autocratic losing leaders.133 Democratic, 
culpable leaders, therefore, should be more concerned about failing to secure a favorable 
outcome than non-democratic, culpable leaders since they face a higher likelihood of 
punishment. This finding lends support to the notion that of all leaders who participate in 
wars, culpable democratic leaders should have the strongest incentives to gamble for 
resurrection.134 Non-democratic, culpable leaders will also feel this pressure, but it will 
be most pronounced in democratic states. 
 Having established that culpable leaders of any regime type are always more 
likely to be punished than non-culpable leaders, I now turn to Hypothesis 5, which 
explores a key potential difference among culpable leaders. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
although some have argued that the pressures of culpability should apply equally to all 
first leaders, regardless of whether the leader chose to join the war or was attacked135, it is 
reasonable to posit that culpable leaders whose state was the target of an attack or 
invasion will face a lower probability of domestic punishment should they lose. Although 
the domestic audience could fault them for failing to deter the adversary, the fact that war 
was forced upon the state should also play a role in the audience’s assessment of the 
leader’s wartime performance.  
 To evaluate this hypothesis, I estimated a logistic regression model on first 
leaders who either lost the war or who were removed when the war was going poorly. I 
use this subset of the data to ascertain whether leaders who chose to participate in the war 
and eventually lost face a greater risk of punishment than leaders who eventually lost the 
                                                
133 This is true regardless of the value of the adversary’s war aims variable. 
134 Downs and Rocke (1994). 
135 Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller (1992).  
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war but who had little choice in fighting. Model 11 in Table 3.12 presents the results of 
this test. 
Table 3.12: Voluntary Participation and Culpability Costs 
 Model 11 
(First Leaders) 
Model 12 
(All Culpable Leaders) 
Variable Coefficient S.E. P-value Coefficient S.E. P-value 
Voluntary Participant 1.32 0.72 0.033 0.94 0.59 0.056 
Democratic Leader 0.46 1.21 0.351 1.08 1.06 0.153 
Adversary’s War Aims 1.83 0.88 0.018 1.61 0.71 0.011 
Casualties (Logged) 0.16 0.11 0.078 0.27 0.12 0.010 
Pre-war Tenure -0.31 0.16 0.027 -0.19 0.07 0.004 
Constant -2.27 1.57 0.074 -3.85 1.23 0.001 
Log Likelihood -35.72   -43.87   
Probability  > χ2 0.015   0.00   
N 80   97   
 
As expected, of first leaders who lose, initiators and joiners are significantly more 
likely to be punished than leaders who were targeted. Figure 3.3 demonstrates this 
graphically.136  The marginal effects of moving from targets (the baseline) to voluntary 
participants (as shown by the red bars) is very large and positive, although this effect is, 
not surprisingly, more pronounced among democratic leaders. The size of the effect is 







                                                
136 The effect is nearly identical when all leaders are considered. See Table A.5 in Appendix A. 
137 The magnitude of the change is higher for autocracies, but this is likely due to the relatively high 





Comparing this finding to the same finding in Model 12 offers further insight as 
to the varying degrees of culpability.  Model 12 includes all culpable, losing leaders, even 
if they were not in charge when the war began. Interestingly, when culpable leaders who 
come to power during the war and eventually lose are introduced into the sample, the 
effect of choosing to join the war remains positive and significant. This suggests that the 
extra burden of culpability that comes with personally choosing to involve the state in the 
war transfers to the leader’s culpable successor.  Taken together, these results highlight 
important distinctions among culpable leaders; as a group, they are more likely to be 
punished than non-culpable leaders, but leaders who can be directly linked to the decision 




5.0 Implications and Remaining Questions 
 The analyses presented in this chapter provided strong support for the core 
arguments of the theory. Culpable leaders are more likely to preside over better 
outcomes, even while controlling for other factors, such as initiation and relative strength, 
which might account for victory.  This analysis also found broad support for the 
argument that culpable leaders are motivated to achieve such outcomes because of a 
greater likelihood of domestic punishment should they lose. Culpable losers are always 
more likely to be punished than non-culpable losers, and this effect is especially 
prominent in democratic states. In addition to this variation across regime types, this 
chapter also provided evidence in support of the idea that culpable leaders who initiate 
wars are more likely to be punished than culpable leaders who are attacked or culpable 
leaders who inherit a war from a predecessor who was the original aggressor.  
 These results are very encouraging, but the question of what factors determine a 
leader’s culpability in the eyes of individual citizens has yet to be addressed. This chapter 
operationalized culpability by examining political connections between leaders.  As 
Chapter 2 made clear, however, culpability costs can also stem from a leader’s position 
on the war when it first began.  If a leader who comes to power during the war has 
publicly supported the conflict in the past, she will have difficult time disassociating 
herself from a decision that has likely become unpopular with the public.  I explore the 
relative strength of these two culpability cues (political connections with the culpable 
leader and previous support for the conflict) in Chapter 4 by analyzing a survey 









 The previous chapter addressed hypotheses regarding the relationship between a 
leader’s culpability for a given conflict, the type of outcome the leader settled for, and a 
losing leader’s probability of being removed from office.  Empirical evaluation of these 
hypotheses demonstrated clear causal links between the three.  First, even after 
controlling for a range of other predictors of war outcomes, including those related to 
strategic selection (i.e., voluntary participation), culpable leaders are significantly more 
likely to preside over favorable outcomes than non-culpable leaders.  Second, culpability 
also plays a role in determining a leader’s post-war (or, frequently, wartime) fate. 
Culpable leaders are very likely to lose office when they fail to secure a victory, while 
non-culpable leaders are significantly less likely to lose power, regardless of the 
conflict’s outcome.  
 These clear differences between culpable and non-culpable leaders lend credence 
to the advantages of the theoretical innovation suggested in Chapter 2: to understand fully 
the war termination process scholars must recognize that new leaders who come to power 
during wars will often face dissimilar incentives for continuing the war than their 
predecessors did.  In Chapter 3, a simple coding rule served as a proxy for this change in 
incentives. New leaders who shared a political connection with the first leader (i.e., being 
from the same party in democratic states or the same ruling group in autocracies) were 
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assumed to inherit their predecessor’s culpability and the associated incentives to 
continue fighting until a favorable outcome could be secured.  New leaders who lacked 
this political connection, on the other hand, were thought to have a clean (or at least 
cleaner) slate domestically and, consequently, an increased incentive to terminate the 
war.  
 Although this approach represents a good first cut, the aggregated nature of the 
analysis (looking at the behaviors and fates of warring leaders) meant I could only infer 
how an individual citizen would react to a culpable leader.  This limitation is substantial 
since the reasons why citizens might be more prone to punishing certain leaders play a 
crucial role in the causal mechanism specified in Chapter 2.  
 This chapter problematizes Chapter 3’s assumption about differentiating new 
leaders based on their political affiliation to their predecessor. Do citizens transfer 
culpability for their state’s involvement in a conflict along political lines when a new 
leader comes to power? Or does culpability always pass from one leader to the next, 
regardless of political connections?  To determine when and why a new leader will 
inherit culpability for a conflict, and thus test the appropriateness of Chapter 3’s 
assumption, I designed a survey experiment in which respondents assessed the 
responsibility of a hypothetical senator for American involvement in Iraq.138   
The experiment focuses on two types of responsibility: a leader’s technical 
responsibility (i.e., did he vote for the war?) and his associational responsibility (i.e., is 
he from the same party as the leader who presided over the beginning of the war?). If the 
causal mechanisms specified in Chapter 3 are correct, leaders who are responsible by 
                                                
138 The shift in terminology from “culpable” to “responsible” is intentional. To avoid introducing bias into 
the survey as to whether the decision to invade Iraq was a wise one, “culpable” was not used in the 
treatment wording because of its negative connotation.  
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association for the conflict should be held more responsible than leaders who do not share 
a political affiliation with the war’s first leader.   The technical responsibility cue should 
also matter in the minds of citizens. As Chapter 2 argued, leaders who publicly supported 
a war will also be held culpable, even if they are from a different ruling group than the 
first leader. 
An experimental design is ideal for the purposes of this chapter because, as later 
sections will make clear, it allows all characteristics of the (fictional) senator presented in 
the treatment to remain constant except for the key manipulations of interest: his party 
and whether he supported the war in 2002. This aspect of the experiment makes three sets 
of insights possible. First, and most importantly, it sheds light on how individual citizens 
respond to leaders who express various combinations of the two types of responsibility.   
This addresses the gap in the theory’s causal chain that Chapter 3 could not, and also 
contributes significantly to our understanding about how citizens think about the 
accountability of individual leaders in a wartime setting.  
Second it allows me to assess the validity of the coding rule used in Chapter 3 by 
examining the effect of the associational responsibility cue, first in isolation and then in 
terms of how it compares in terms of magnitude to the technical responsibility cue. 
Second, since the design incorporates all four possible combinations of the two cues, I 
can also explore other characteristics of the cues, namely whether there is an additive 
effect in certain combinations of the cues as well as any interactive effect between the 
two treatments and important characteristics of the respondent.  
 This chapter proceeds in four sections.  Section 2 highlights several hypotheses 
suggested by Chapters 2 and 3 and briefly reviews how existing scholarship informs the 
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present study. Section 3 describes the experimental design and its advantages over other 
survey methods in more detail. Section 4 presents the empirical findings from the survey 
experiment, including the power of the associational responsibility cue, the existence of a 
strong additive effect when both types of responsibility are cued, and the stability of these 
effects across different subgroups of respondents. Section 5 concludes with a brief 
discussion of implications of the findings for the larger project.  
 
2.0 Hypotheses Regarding Responsibility 
 In the interest of clarity, the hypotheses will be presented in three groups; each 
group is designed to address a different aspect of how the cues work. The first set 
examines how each type works individually. That is, regardless of how the fictional 
senator voted, do respondents assign more or less responsibility to him if they know he is 
a Republican? (Or, similarly, holding party constant do they assign more responsibility to 
the senator if they know he voted for the war?) This set also includes hypotheses that 
allow me to ascertain the relative magnitude of the size of each of these individual 
treatment effects. 
The second set of hypotheses builds on the first by examining how respondents 
respond to certain combinations of the cues (e.g., the reaction of a Republican who voted 
for the war compared to a Republican who voted against it). These hypotheses allow me 
to discern whether an additive effect exists when both responsibility cues are present as 
opposed to a single cue. Finally, the third set briefly explores whether respondents react 
differently to the cues based on their own partisan leanings by interacting the different 
treatments with the respondent’s party identification. Although the second and third sets 
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of hypotheses are not as crucial to address the validity of the coding rule from Chapter 3 
as the first, they do have the potential to shed light on how citizens assess a leader’s 
responsibility more generally.  
 
2.1 Types of Responsibility  
 The purpose of this section is to determine the general effect of presenting a 
respondent with cues that highlight a leader’s associational responsibility or technical 
responsibility. These hypotheses represent the most basic and important test of the theory 
about how citizens assign responsibility to leaders and how that responsibility might be 
passed on to the leader’s successor. If the theory presented in Chapter 2 (and the coding 
rule presented in Chapter 3) is valid, the associational cue should have a strong, positive 
effect on a citizen’s evaluation of a leader’s responsibility. Although the justification 
surrounding the rule is less concerned with the effect of cuing a respondent to a leader’s 
technical responsibility, it is important to determine its effect (both individually and 
relative to the associational responsibility cue) given the comparisons of the 
combinations of cues explored in the next section.  
A leader is technically responsible for a political action if she either made the 
decision to carry out the action herself (i.e., was a first leader) or if she publicly 
supported a decision made by another leader. The survey experiment presented here 
ascribes technical responsibility to the senators who voted for the war in 2002, and the 
hypotheses are phrased to reflect this.139  Although the war, like most foreign policy 
decisions, has come to be largely associated with the Executive (President Bush), 
                                                
139 A similar rule is used for the hypotheses regarding the experimental senator’s associational 
responsibility (i.e., hypotheses are phrased in terms of Republicans and Democrats instead of senators with 
or without associational responsibility). 
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obtaining Congressional approval was not a trivial matter. The legislature’s agreement to 
authorize the war (and the funds needed to prosecute it) was necessary in both a legal and 
political sense.140 An affirmative vote on the Iraq War Authorization Bill (JR114 October 
2002), therefore, represents the highest degree of technical responsibility an individual 
senator could have in this situation. Consequently, this should lead respondents to 
attribute more responsibility to the senator when presented with this cue, regardless of 
the experimental senator’s political party. 
  
H1: Respondents who believe the statement is from a senator with 
technical responsibility will assign more responsibility to the senator than 
respondents who believe the statement is from a senator without technical 
responsibility. 
 
The second type of responsibility stems from a leader’s political affiliation. 
Because the survey experiment occurs in a democracy, the senator’s political party 
determines whether this cue is present. If the logic presented in Chapter 2 is correct, 
citizens should hold Republican senators more responsible for US involvement in Iraq, 
by virtue of sharing a partisan label with President Bush, the war’s initiator.141  
 
H2: Respondents who believe the statement is from a senator with 
associational responsibility will assign more responsibility to the senator 
than respondents who believe the statement is from a senator without 
associational responsibility.  
 
 Knowing how the two cues work individually is an important first step, but testing 
the relative size of the effects generated by each of the cues is also informative if we wish 
                                                
140 From a legal standpoint, the War Powers Act of 1973 limits the Executive’s ability to prosecute 
international conflicts for long periods of time without Congressional authorization. From a political 
perspective, as some scholars have suggested (Schultz 2001a), gaining broad legislative approval increased 
the war’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public.  
141 Because President Bush was also the leader who initiated the war in addition to being the war’s first 
leader, I cannot, with this survey, determine if the same effects would hold for a new leader who shared a 
political affiliation with any first leader, as the coding rule in Chapter 3 implies.  
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to gauge the strength of the associational cue.  Typically, the cues should be highly 
correlated with one another (i.e., a Republican senator should be more likely to support 
the war while a Democratic senator should oppose it). In democratic political systems 
with a relative lack of party discipline like the United States, however, the two will not 
always synchronize perfectly. Because divergent combinations of technical and 
associational responsibility (e.g., a Democrat who supported the war) are always possible 
and, on some issues, even probable, the relative strength of the two remains an open 
empirical question. In theory, one of three possible relationships could exist between the 
cues; party could dominate vote, vote could dominate party, or the cues could trigger 
similar responses.  
Scholars of American politics have consistently found evidence that citizens place 
a great deal of weight on a given leader’s political party membership.142 Citizens appear 
to use the leader’s partisan affiliation as a simple heuristic to predict the leader’s position 
on an issue in the absence of specific information about the of the leader’s actual 
position. Although the need for the heuristic is less pressing here since the treatment 
provides the respondent with information about how the experimental senator voted, the 
possibility exists that the associational responsibility cue will still outweigh the technical 
responsibility cue. 
H3a: Respondents who believe the statement is from a senator with 
associational responsibility will assign more responsibility to the senator 
than respondents who believe the statement is from a senator with 
technical responsibility. 
 
                                                
142 Erikson (1988), Cotton (1986), Cohen (2003), Goren (2002), Kam (2005), Malhotra and Kuo (2007). 
Skitka and Robideau (1997: 975), for instance, found that “the majority of [their experimental] subjects 
voted as a function of party label, even when candidates’ positions on the issues were not very consistent 
with their own.”  
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 Although the strength of associational cues has received broad empirical support, 
it is important not to overlook the leader’s technical responsibility. The international 
relations literature, for instance, often assumes citizens pay close attention to a leader’s 
specific decisions and actions.143 If this description of reality is accurate, citizens treat 
leaders who voted for the war differently from leaders who voted against it. Although 
many have noted Americans’ traditional apathy towards matters of foreign policy144, 
empirical evidence suggests that citizens are capable of moving beyond the simple 
partisan heuristic when evaluating leaders.145 If citizens make judgments in this even 
slightly more sophisticated manner, they will weigh the technical responsibility cue more 
heavily. 
H3b: Respondents who believe the statement is from a senator with 
technical responsibility will assign more responsibility to the senator than 
respondents who believe the statement is from a senator with 
associational responsibility. 
 
 Finally, since citizens can blame multiple leaders for a given decision, both cues 
could potentially trigger similar reactions from respondents for different reasons, with 
neither cue dominating.   In other words, if faced with a group of senators with different 
combinations of party membership and positions on the war, a respondent may be willing 
                                                
143 The audience costs literature provides the clearest example of this; scholars commonly assume citizens 
pay close attention to individual threats and declarations. (Baum 2004), Schultz (2001a and 2001b), Fearon 
(1997).  
144 Aldrich et al. (1989). 
145 Hibbing and Alford (1981), for instance, find that voters are only more likely to punish incumbents of 
the president’s party in midterm elections instead of all member of the president’s who are running for 
office. This finding suggests that citizens do not employ the partisan heuristic cue blindly. Although the 
punishment may be somewhat arbitrary since not all incumbent members of the president’s party may have 
voted the same way, citizens are at least wiling to condition their punishment based on whether the 
legislator could have voted that way. If the partisan cue completely dominated, we would expect 
incumbents and non-incumbents to have an equal likelihood of punishment. 
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to blame one leader because of his party and another leader because of his vote.146 This 
suggests the following hypothesis.  
H3c: Respondents who believe the statement is from a senator with 
associational responsibility will assign equal amounts of responsibility to 
the senator as respondents who believe the statement is from a senator 
with technical responsibility. The direction of both effects should be 
positive and their magnitudes should be similar. 
 
 
 The hypotheses presented so far can be summarized in the following table:  
 
 
Table 4.1: Summary of Hypotheses 1-3c 
Hypothesis Expectation 
H1 VT coefficient significant and positive. 
H2 RT coefficient significant and positive. 
H3a RT>VT in terms of magnitude and significance. 
H3b VT>RT in terms of magnitude and significance. 
H3c RT=VT in terms of magnitude and significance. 
VT= “Voted for War” treatment, RT= “Member of Republican Party” treatment. 
 
 
2.2 Combining the Cues 
 The second set of hypotheses examines whether certain combinations of cues 
affect respondents’ assessments of leaders in different ways. This suggests the possibility 
of an interesting additive effect among the cues. If, for instance, we have reason to 
suspect that cuing a respondent to a leader’s technical or associational responsibility 
might lead the respondent to hold the leader more responsible, assigning both cues 
simultaneously may increase a respondent’s assessment of the senator’s responsibility 
even further.  
Some may find this notion implausible since, in a practical sense, any senator who 
voted for the war is equally responsible for it as any other who voted for it, regardless of 
                                                
146 Although respondents only evaluate one type of leader, the random assignment of treatment groups 
allows me to generalize about how a given respondent would have reacted to the other leader types. 
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party membership.  We should not discount the possible additional effect of the 
associational cue without further investigation, though. Respondents who are presented 
with a Republican senator may, for instance, infer from the partisan label that the senator 
was a more enthusiastic supporter than a Democrat who voted the same way, and may 
have worked harder to make sure the bill passed.   
More generally, because both cues suggest a dichotomy in the mind of the 
respondent (e.g., a senator can either be a Republican or Democrat, voted either for the 
war or against it), we should not be surprised if cuing the respondent to one type leads 
her to compare the senator to the two, hypothetical senators with opposite characteristics. 
If, for example, a respondent were asked to assess the responsibility of a Republican 
senator who voted against the war, the relevant comparison types would be a Democratic 
senator who also voted against it and a Republican senator who voted for it. If we assume 
that an additive process is at work, we might expect this respondent to assign a middling 
degree of responsibility to the experimental senator she was presented with since he is 
less responsible than the Republican who voted for it yet more responsible (by his 
partisan affiliation) than the Democrat who voted against it. 
In the present survey experiment, the two cues create four possible combinations, 
which produce three different additive values (see Table 4.2). A 1 indicates the presence 
of the cue while a 0 signifies its absence. 
Table 4.2: Cue Combinations 





1. Republican, voted for the war 1 1 2 
2. Republican, voted against the war 1 0 1 
3. Democrat, voted for the war 0 1 1 
4. Democrat, voted against the war 0 0 0 
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As Table 4.2 illustrates, if the additive logic is correct, the Republican who voted for the 
war should be attributed the highest level of responsibility while the Democrat who voted 
against the war should receive the least.147  The remaining two senators represent the 
divergent cue combinations since both voted counter to their party’s general position. 
They each only have one cue assigned to them and should, therefore, elicit similar 
reactions from respondents. The relative ranking of the different cue combinations’ 
additive totals presented in Table 2 suggest several hypotheses. The first group speaks to 
the relationship between the treatment group with the highest presumed effect—the 
Republican who voted for the war—to the other treatments.  
H4: Respondents who believe the statement is from a Republican senator 
who voted for the war will assign more responsibility to the senator than 
respondents who believe the statement is from a Democratic senator who 
voted against the war. 
 
H5: Respondents who believe the statement is from a Republican senator 
who voted for the war will assign more responsibility to the senator than 
respondents who believe the statement is from a Republican senator who 
voted against the war. 
 
H6: Respondents who believe the statement is from a Republican senator 
who voted for the war will assign more responsibility to the senator than 
respondents who believe the statement is from a Democratic senator who 
voted for the war. 
 
 
The second set of hypotheses parallels the logic suggested by Table 2 and targets the 
relationships between the treatments with one or fewer additive cue totals.  
 
                                                
147 Table 4.2 illustrates why these hypotheses are additive and not interactive. The difference between the 
Republican who voted for the war and the Republican who did not (2-1=1) is the same as the difference 
between the Democrat who voted for and the Democrat who voted against it (1-0=1.) The addition of the 
technical responsibility cue, in other words, increases the overall responsibility of senators by the same 
amount, regardless of party. (A parallel story could be told for the associational cue.) Because we do not 
expect the presence of the technical responsibility cue to affect senators of the two parties differently, the 
hypotheses are not interactive. Appendix B illustrates this point graphically. 
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H7: Respondents who believe the statement is from a Republican senator 
who voted against the war will assign equal amounts of responsibility to 
the senator as respondents who believe the statement is from a Democratic 
senator who voted for the war. 
 
H8: Respondents who believe the statement is from a Republican senator 
who voted against the war will assign more responsibility to the senator 
than respondents who believe the statement is from a Democratic senator 
who voted against the war. 
 
H9: Respondents who believe the statement is from a Democratic senator 
who voted for the war will assign more amounts of responsibility to the 
senator as respondents who believe the statement is from a Democratic 
senator who voted against the war. 
 
 
2.3 Respondent Interactive Hypotheses 
 The third set of hypotheses explores whether respondents react differently to the 
various leader types depending on their own characteristics, such as personal party 
membership. The American political literature contains a great deal of evidence that 
citizens are less likely to blame leaders of their own political party (and, by implication, 
more likely to blame leaders of the opposing political stripe) for poor policy outcomes.148  
This implies an interactive hypothesis since we would expect the treatments to elicit 
different responses from respondents based on the respondent’s partisan affiliation. For 
example, we would expect a Democratic respondent to evaluate a Democratic senator 
who voted for the war more favorably than a Republican respondent would (and vice 
versa if a Republican senator who voted for the war was the treatment of interest.) The 
                                                
148 Malhotra and Kuo (2007). Cohen (2003: 811), for instance, found that cueing experimental subjects to 
the percent of Republicans or Democrats in Congress that supported a proposed welfare program “overrode 
policy content” in determining whether a citizen would support a policy.  Subjects would overwhelmingly 
support a policy if a majority of members of Congress of their preferred party were in favor of it. 
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effect of the associational cue, in other words, is contingent on the respondent’s party ID. 
Hypotheses 10a and 10b test this causal logic.149  
 
H10a: Republican respondents will assign more responsibility to a 
Democratic senator who voted for the war than to a Republican senator 
who voted for the war.150  
 
H10b: Democratic respondents will assign more responsibility to a 
Republican senator who voted for the war than to a Democratic senator 




3.0 Testing the Hypotheses 
 To test these hypotheses, I designed and embedded an experiment in a nationally 
representative survey. A professional survey research firm, Knowledge Networks, 
administered the experiment, using a randomly selected subset of a pre-assembled panel 
of respondents.151  More than 800 people responded over the course of June and July 
2007. Respondents were asked to evaluate the degree to which a fictional senator, John 
Harris, was responsible for American involvement in Iraq.  This section describes the 
experimental procedure in more detail to illustrate how it will enable tests of hypotheses 
about how the associational and technical responsibility cues affect respondents’ 
assessments of the different leaders.  
 
                                                
149 Although the hypotheses here focus on how respondents react to leaders who voted for the war, the 
models that actually test these hypotheses will test for any differences across all leader types.   
150 Because a majority of Republicans were strong supporters of the war when it began, this tendency to 
blame the other party may be stronger for Democrats for this particular conflict. Of all respondents, 
Republicans have the highest probability of being among the (dwindling) group that still supports the 
decision to invade Iraq. Because of this, Republicans, on average, may be less actively seeking a party to 
blame since, for them, the war was (and is) a good idea Democrats, on the other hand, (again, on average) 
should be more eager to punish a leader for the war, especially if the leader is from the Republican Party. 
Even though the vast majority of Democratic members of Congress voted for the war when it began, 
Democrats may be more willing to forgive their fellow partisans. 
151 Respondents are recruited using a random digit dialing (RDD) process to ensure the panel is as 
representative as possible.  
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3.1 Experimental Design and Procedure 
 The experiment employs a fully crossed, 2x2 design, resulting in four treatment 
groups that represent the full range of cue combinations discussed above (see Figure 
4.1.)152  
Figure 4.1: Experimental Design153 
 Previous Position on the War 
Partisan Affiliation Voted Yes Voted No 
Republican 
Treatment Group RYV: 
John Harris is a Republican 
who voted for the war in 
2002. 
Treatment Group RNV: 
John Harris is a Republican 
who voted against the war 
in 2002. 
Democrat 
Treatment Group DYV: 
John Harris is a Democrat 
who voted for the war in 
2002. 
Treatment Group DNV: 
John Harris is a Democrat 
who voted against the war 
in 2002. 
 
First, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the four treatment groups.154 
This critical step allows for the comparison of the treatment effects across groups.  
Because the respondents were assigned in a random way, we can be confident that any 
                                                
152 This design is similar to a survey experiment carried out by Kuklinski & Hurley (1994). In their study, 
all respondents were read an identical statement about affirmative action but the race and political ideology 
of the speaker varied across the different conditions. 
153 Treatment group abbreviations (e.g., “RYV”) will be used for the remainder of the chapter. 
154 In the initial survey, a control group was also included. Respondents assigned to this fifth group 
received no information about the senator’s partisan affiliation or how he voted on the war. Although this 
group is technically correct in terms of what a control group should do, further reflection led me to drop 
this group from the analysis since respondents in this group were forced to make an assessment of Senator 
Harris with no information (as opposed to neutral information) and, consequently, cannot easily be 
compared to respondents who were given information about Harris’ party and voting record. Respondents 
in the control group are most likely giving a completely random response while respondents in the other 
treatment conditions have the relevant information they would expect when asked to evaluate a leader.   In 
practice, respondents assigned to the control group reacted to their fictional senator in very similar ways to 
respondents assigned to treatment groups with divergent cue combinations, RNV and DYV (see Appendix 
C). Again, while this could be evidence of the divergent cues triggering similar degrees of confusion as a 
cue with no information about the leader, such comparisons should be interpreted with caution. More 
generally, the results of tests that included the control group mirrored the results of tests where the control 
was excluded (e.g., the RYV treatment effect was higher than the control while the DNV treatment effect 
was lower). 
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significant differences between the groups are the result of the treatments and not some 
other factor. 155    
Next, respondents were asked a short series of multiple choice questions 
regarding their position the Iraq war, their own partisan leanings and their feelings on 
whether force should be used to solve international problems.156 These respondent 
characteristics will serve as important robustness checks or interactions in the statistical 
analysis below.157 Asking respondents for this information in the pre-treatment phase 
avoids bias; asking in the post-treatment phase (i.e., after they had read the statement 
from Senator Harris regarding the war) introduced the risk of biasing their response in 
light of the information they were given about the Senator and the war.  
 After the pre-treatment questions, respondents read a statement from a senator 
about the war in Iraq. The text for Treatment Group RNV follows; italicized portions of 
the text varied across the groups accordingly: 
“Senator John Harris, a Republican who is a senior member of the Foreign 
Relations Committee and who voted against the war when it began in 2003, has 
just released the following statement: “Despite the fine efforts of our armed 
forces, careful analysis of the current situation in Iraq has led me to conclude 
that our continued presence is unlikely to achieve the goals set in 2003 and will 
likely make an already bad situation even worse. Given this assessment, it is my 
opinion that all US forces should be withdrawn from Iraq over the next three 
months.”158 
                                                
155 Statistical tests confirm that the randomization was successful. Please see Appendix D. 
156 This final question was included to gauge whether the respondent tended towards the “hawkish” or 
“dovish” end of the spectrum. All pre-test questions regarding a respondent’s party ID, and the degree to 
which they agreed with the war were based on question wording from the American National Election 
Study. Appendix E gives the precise question wording. 
157 The survey firm administering the experiment—Knowledge Networks—also provided several variables 
with basic demographic information (e.g., age, gender) about each respondent. 
158 The actual wording of the treatment speaks to when the ground invasion began (March 2003) a date 
respondents are more likely to identify as “the beginning of the war”, even though the actual vote that 
granted President Bush the freedom of action to use military force took place in October of the previous 
year. The 2002 vote, therefore, is technically a vote for or against the war that began in 2003. Although this 
particular choice is somewhat awkward (especially since so many Congressmen have come under fire for 
their vote), there is no reason to suspect respondents would have reacted to the treatments differently if 
2002 was used instead. 2003 was used, again, to coincide with the far more public invasion date and 
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Several aspects of the precise wording of the treatment are worth discussing in greater 
detail.  First, a senator is the focus of investigation because of the Senate’s influential role 
in foreign policy and because many leaders who eventually occupy the key executive 
position begin their careers as legislators at the national level.159 Second, the 
experimental senator was given the additional position on the Foreign Relations 
Committee both to lend credence to the idea that he was making an informed decision at 
the time and also to imply that he has considerable influence (insofar as a senator can) 
over foreign policy.  
Holding everything about the treatments constant except for John Harris’ party 
and position on the Iraq War ensures the manipulations of these characteristics are the 
only source of systematic variation across the treatment groups. Holding the senator’s 
name constant, obviously, necessitated the use of a fictional name. Currently (and at the 
time of the vote in 2002), nobody by the name of John Harris serves in either chamber of 
Congress.  
Although an actual senator’s name could have been used for each of the four 
treatment groups160, using a real person’s name carries a high potential of undermining 
the effect, if any, of the experimental design. If, for instance, Senator Hillary Clinton (D-
NY), was used in Treatment Group DYV, respondents may assess her based on the 
                                                                                                                                            
because a number of bills related to the funding of the war, which were also more in the public eye at the 
time, were passed soon after the war began. The second part of the statement, which suggests withdrawing 
American forces over the next three months, was included to test other hypotheses that not directly relevant 
to the issue at hand.  
159 A member of the House of Representatives, of course, is also a legislator who plays a role in foreign 
policy, but the fact that, historically speaking and in the American context, more presidents have come 
from the Senate makes a senator a more credible “next leader” than a representative.  
160 Although the vast majority of the Senate voted in favor of the war (77 to 23), 21 Democrats dissented 
along with one Republican—Senator Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island. One Independent also dissented: 
Senator Jim Jeffords of Vermont. 
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manipulations of interest the current study, but they also may evaluate her based on 
issues wholly unrelated to the matter at hand (e.g., her stances on national health care or 
teaching evolution in schools). Because the survey does not allow me to ask the 
respondent why they are making particular choices, variation in wording across the 
different treatment groups had to be minimized. 
 After reading the treatment, respondents were asked the following question: “On a 
scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning “not at all responsible” and 5 meaning “very responsible” 
where would you place Senator Harris in terms of responsibility for American 
involvement in Iraq as a whole?”161 Once this brief post-treatment phase was complete, 
the respondent was thanked for her time and debriefed of the fact that the entire statement 
she had just read and Senator Harris were both entirely fictitious.  
 
3.2 Advantages of an Experimental Design 
Before proceeding to the results section, it is important to understand the 
advantages of an experimental survey to other, more traditional survey approaches for 
answering the hypotheses presented here. Any survey that relies on a standard 
observational design will either be unable to test the full range of hypotheses or will 
introduce serious concerns regarding internal validity.  For example, conducting a panel 
survey before and after the presidential election in 2008 would not allow a researcher to 
determine the effect (if any) of the new leader’s earlier position on the war or partisan 
affiliation since the new leader will have either been for or against the war since it began 
and either a Democrat or Republican in 2002.  Because this design only allows us to 
                                                
161 To make the interpretation of the results more clear (and to bring things more in line with conventional 
practices), the responsibility assessments have been rescaled on a scale of 0-1. (See, for example, Brader 
(2006). 
 103 
observe how citizens would respond to one type of new leader (say, a Democratic leader 
who supported the war in 2002), we cannot know with certainty which process is at work 
because we lack the necessary comparison groups.  
Moving to a purely hypothetical situation in which respondents are asked about 
how they would feel about a given leader’s actions at a future date (e.g., “How would you 
feel if a Republican president who voted for the war chose to withdraw all US forces 
from Iraq in March 2009?”) would allow for the observation of responses to different 
types of leaders, but it would also put the study on questionable grounds in terms of 
validity.  Asking respondents about how they would feel about a hypothetical next 
president requires them to project what their opinion would be in a time period several 
years in the future with almost no contextual information.  The experiment design here 
alleviates these problems since it allows for variation on the earlier position and partisan 




 The hypotheses presented in Section 2 were designed to determine three things: 
the effect of a given treatment, how these treatment effects compare to one another once 
combined and, finally, how the treatment effect varies (if at all) within a subset of 
respondents. I will now discuss these three sets of findings, elaborating, where 





4.1 Treatment Effects 
 The first set of hypotheses (H1 and H2) posited that respondents who were cued 
with a senator who exhibited either associational or technical responsibility would assign 
more responsibility to that senator than respondents who were presented with a senator 
who lacked these cues. To determine the effect of cuing each type of responsibility 
separately, I pool pairs of treatment groups, first collapsing by row and then by column 
(see Figure 4.1). To ascertain the effect of associational responsibility, I compare the 
mean attribution of responsibility of all respondents who were presented with a 
Republican senator (i.e., treatment groups RYV (Republican, Voted Yes) and RNV 
(Republican, Voted No) to the mean attribution of all respondents who were presented 
with a Democratic senator (treatment groups DYV (Democrat, Voted Yes) and DNV 
(Democrat, Voted No)).   
For the purposes of the figures below, the first group (where senators are pooled 
based on party) will be referred to as RT (Republican Senator Treatment) while the 
second will be ~RT (Democratic Senator Treatment). A similar process determined the 
effect of technical responsibility: respondents who were shown a senator who voted for 
the war (treatment groups RYV and DYV) were compared with respondents who were 
cued with a senator who lacked technical responsibility (RNV and RNV). The first 
pooled group in this second set will be referred to as VT (Senator Who Voted Yes 
Treatment) while the second will be ~VT (Senator Who Voted No Treatment.) 
 Comparing the means of these pooled groups provides strong support for 
Hypotheses 1 and 2.  First, when comparing the assessments of the Senator from 
respondents cued with associational responsibility (RT) to those who were not (~RT), a 
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sizeable and significant (p<0.00) difference of eight points exists. A similar effect 
emerges comparing respondents who were cued to technical responsibility (VT) to those 
respondents who were cued the opposite way (~VT).  The responsibility assessments of 
respondents who were presented with an experimental senator who voted for the war 
were, on average, 9 percent points higher than respondents who were told the 
experimental senator did not vote for the war.162  This difference is also highly significant 




Means have been rescaled to range between 0 and 1. 
 
                                                
162 Again, means were rescaled from 0-1 for ease of interpretation. The actual means from the 1-5 scale 
presented in the question are as follows: RT: 3.07, ~RT: 2.72, VT: 3.06, and ~VT: 2.71. Although these 
means may appear relatively low, this deflation is likely a result of the treatment wording. Respondents 
were asked to evaluate the responsibility of the Senator and were given no constraints as to which other 
leader(s) the Senator might be compared to. Without such limitations, respondents likely compared the 
Senator to President Bush (who is easily the most identifiable person associated with the decision to go to 
war) and downgraded the Senator’s responsibility to a middle-range value, reserving the higher values for 
President Bush. This design element has been changed in the second version of the survey, which is set to 
go into the field in the Spring of 2008.  In the new version, respondents will be asked to assess the 
Senator’s responsibility relative to other members of Congress.   
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 These effects are mirrored in Table 4.3, which present the estimates from a 
regression of the two treatments on the degree of responsibility attributed to Senator 
Harris. Both treatment dummies (Republican and Voted for War) are positive and highly 
significant, suggesting the presence of true effect.163 As expected, the strength of these 
results holds, even in the presence of several controls that would, presumably, affect a 
respondent’s assessment.164  
Table 4.3: Treatment Effects165 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficient S.E. P-value Coefficient S.E. P-value 
Treatment       
Republican  0.335 0.084 0.000 0.300 0.079 0.000 
Voted for War 0.333 0.084 0.000 0.322 0.079 0.000 
Respondent Variables       
Republican - - - -0.456 0.089 0.000 
Hawk - - - -0.383 0.096 0.000 
Disagree with War - - - 0.294 0.091 0.001 
Male  - - - -0.151 0.080 0.059 
Age - - - -0.004 0.002 0.126 
Attention to War - - - 0.114 0.131 0.382 
Constant 2.559 0.072 0.000 2.893 0.171 0.000 
N 810   788   
 
The inclusion of the controls in Model 2 also reveals several interesting things 
about how different types of respondents behave, holding the effects of the treatments 
constant. For instance, Republican respondents assign less responsibility, on average, 
than Democratic respondents just as respondents who are more hawkish assign less 
responsibility than respondents who identify as doves. Respondents who disagreed with 
                                                
163 In results not shown here, the interaction between “Republican” and “Voted for the War” was 
insignificant, confirming the absence of an interactive effect. 
164 The models presented were estimated using OLS; the results hold under an ordered probit specification. 
This is true for all models presented in this chapter. Strictly speaking, thanks to the randomization of the 
treatment assignments, controls are not necessary. The randomization of the treatment ensures that the 
differences between groups are a result of the treatments, and not any characteristic of a particular group of 
respondents. Their main purpose here is to serve a robustness check.  
165 T-tests for all treatment variables are one-tailed for all models; all other variables are always two-tailed. 
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the decision to invade Iraq were more likely to attribute more responsibility than 
respondents who agreed with or who were neutral on the decision.  
Taken together, none of these results is particularly surprising, especially since 
the three variables are highly correlated: Republicans are both less likely to disagree with 
the war and more likely to be hawks.166 If the word “responsible” is read with a negative 
connotation, and interpreted as “to blame” or “culpable,” then it makes sense that 
Republicans and hawks would be less likely to ascribe responsibility to Senator Harris 
while people who disagree with the war, eager to point a finger, would be likely to assign 
more.  
Of the standard demographic controls, males are slightly less likely to assign 
responsibility to the senator, but this effect is only marginally significant; age appears to 
have no significant relationship with the dependent variable. Finally, turning to the war 
attention variable, the complete lack of any statistical relationship is somewhat puzzling, 
though could perhaps be a result of pooling the responses to the different senator types as 
attentive people may be more likely to ascribe blame along technical rather than 
associational lines of responsibility.167  
Moving on to Hypotheses 3a-c, testing whether one cue dominates over the other 
can be accomplished with an F-test. The similarity of the size of the effects alone 
suggests the strength of the cues two are roughly equivalent and a test of the equality of 
the treatment coefficients demonstrates that the null (“Republican Treatment” = “Voted 
                                                
166 The pair-wise correlation coefficients are all highly significant (Hawk/Republican: 0.2775, p< 0.00; 
Hawk/Disagree with War: -0.335, p< 0.00; Republican/Disagree with War: -0.4020, p< 0.00.) 
167 Interactions between the treatment groups and the respondent’s self-identified level of attention to the 
war were never significant. 
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for War Treatment”) cannot be rejected (p < 0.848).168 This supports Hypothesis 3c, 
which posited that the cues would produce an equal, positive effect in respondents’ 
assessment of Senator Harris’ responsibility for American involvement in Iraq.  In 
substantive terms, this result means that associational responsibility is as important as 
technical responsibility in the eyes of respondents in assigning blame to leaders.  
 
4.2 Comparing the Cues 
 The finding that the two types of responsibility trigger similar reactions among 
respondents, however interesting, is only the first step. Establishing the existence of the 
general treatment effect demonstrates the importance of the larger experiment, but since 
the treatment groups were pooled for Models 1 and 2, we cannot determine how citizens 
would respond to certain combinations of the two cues. Instead, we only know that the 
mean response of respondents who are cued with technically responsible senators is 
higher than respondents who are cued with technically non-responsible senators, and 
similarly with associational responsibility for those cued with Republicans when 
compared to those cued with Democrats. To determine whether senators who voted for 
the war are associated with different degrees of responsibility based on their party, (or 
that Republicans are assigned more responsibility if they voted for the war than 
Democrats who did the same), requires examining the treatment effects of the original 
four treatment groups (RYV, RNV, DYV, DNV). 
 As before, I present the treatment effects graphically (see Figure 4.3) and as 
coefficient estimates (see Table 4.4). Figure 4.3 presents the (rescaled) mean for each 
treatment group while Table 4.4 displays the coefficient estimates for the different 
                                                
168 The F-test derives from Model 2. When estimated after Model 1, the same result holds (p < 0.990). 
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treatment groups, where the baseline or excluded category is the “Democrat, Voted No” 








Table 4.4: Effects of Cue Combinations 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coefficient S.E. P-value Coefficient S.E. P-value 
Treatment       
Republican, Yes Vote 0.669 0.117 0.000 0.623 0.111 0.000 
Republican, No Vote 0.326 0.121 0.003 0.268 0.114 0.009 
Democrat, Yes Vote 0.324 0.121 0.002 0.292 0.109 0.004 
Respondent Variables       
Republican - - - -0.457 0.089 0.000 
Hawk - - - -0.386 0.097 0.000 
Disagree with War - - - 0.292 0.091 0.001 
Male  - - - -0.151 0.080 0.060 
Age - - - -0.004 0.003 0.126 
Attention to War - - - 0.114 0.131 0.384 
Constant 2.563 0.082 0.000 2.910 0.176 0.000 
N 810   788   
 
                                                
169 The non-rescaled means are as follows: RYV = 3.232, RNV= 2.889, DYV= 2.888 and DNV= 2.563. 
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Figure 4.3 and Table 4.4, as expected, tell very similar stories about the relative 
strength of the different combinations of the two responsibility cues. Given the large 
number of hypotheses, I will review them in the following groups (see Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5: Hypothesis Groups 
Group Hypothesis Expectation 
Dual-cue Dominance Hypothesis 4 RYV > DNV 
 Hypothesis 5 RYV > RNV 
 Hypothesis 6 RYV > DYV 
Single-cue 
Equivalence Hypothesis 7 RNV =  DYV  
Single-cue vs. No-cue Hypothesis 8 RNV > DNV 
 Hypothesis 9 DYV > DNV 
 
4.2.1: Dual-cue Dominance  
First, Hypotheses 4 through 6, which posited that the RYV treatment would 
produce the largest effect, each found strong support.  Beginning with Hypothesis 4, a 
simple examination of means (either in Figure 3 or Model 3) demonstrates that the RYV 
treatment elicits a much higher degree of responsibility attribution (17 percentage points) 
for Senator Harris than the DNV treatment.170 In many ways, this result is not at all 
surprising; recalling Table 4.1, the former treatment invokes both responsibility cues 
while the second raises none.  
 What is more intriguing is that Hypotheses 5 and 6, which predicted that the RYV 
treatment would produce the strongest effect when compared to other treatment groups 
that cue at least one type of responsibility (RNV for associational and DYV for 
technical), also find strong empirical support.  A simple difference of means test 
demonstrates that the 9-point difference between the RYV treatment and the other two is 
                                                
170 The p-values on the “Republican, Yes Vote” treatment in Models 3 and 4 confirm the significant 
differences between this treatment and the excluded treatment (“Democrat, No Vote”). The difference of 
means test confirm this (p<0.000). 
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highly significant. F-tests of joint coefficient equality confirm this finding, regardless of 
model specification.171  
Taken together these findings point to a strong additive effect among the cues: 
respondents appear to assign different degrees of responsibility to senators who both 
voted for the war based purely on their partisan affiliations. Indeed, looking at the 
coefficients on the treatment variables in Model 3 (and, to a slightly lesser extent, Model 
4) the effect of being presented with a senator with two responsibility cues (RYV) is 
almost exactly the sum of the two single-cue treatments (RNV and DYV). While the 
difference between the RYV treatment and the RNV treatment is somewhat less 
surprising given the total lack of a technical responsibility cue for the latter group, the 
RYV and DYV groups differ only in terms of associational responsibility. As with the 
evidence of support for Hypothesis 3c, this finding suggests that the effect of cueing a 
respondent to a senator’s political affiliation should not be underestimated.  
 
4.2.2: Single-cue Equivalence 
The power of this cue is equally evident in other comparisons.  Hypothesis 7, for 
instance, posited that the two treatment conditions that only cue one type of responsibility 
each (either associational or technical responsibility) should produce treatment effects of 
roughly equivalent sizes. Testing this hypothesis is accomplished with a simple test of 
whether the coefficients on RNV and DYV are equal.  Once again, their equivalence is 
readily apparent when depicted graphically (Figure 4.3), and the null hypothesis that the 
                                                
171 In Model 3, RYV vs. RNV (p<.005) and RYV vs. DYV (p<.003). In Model 4, RYV vs. RNV (p<.002) 
and RYV vs. DYV (p<.003). 
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two coefficients are equal cannot be rejected (p< 0.995 in Model 3 and p<0.830 in Model 
4).  
The substantive significance of this finding should not be overlooked. That 
respondents are willing to assign equal amounts of responsibility to a senator whom they 
were explicitly told did not vote for the war and a senator who clearly voted for it should 
be of interest to scholars of political behavior.  Although one would expect respondents 
to “do the best they can with the information they have”172 and assume the Republican 
senator voted for the war in the absence of a cue as to how he voted, the voting cue is not 
only present in this case but runs directly counter to the expectation the heuristic would 
have predicted. 
 The comparison of the RNV and DNV groups (Hypothesis 8) follows a similar 
pattern. In this case, the treatments differ in terms of the associational cue—the former 
has it while the later does not; technical responsibility is absent in both cases. Once again, 
as Table 4.1 and Hypothesis 8 predicted, the treatment group with the larger number of 
cues will always produce a stronger treatment effect, even when the level of technical 
responsibility is identical across the two groups (in this case, zero). The positive and 
significant coefficient on the RNV variables in Models 3 and 4 (and the significant 8-
point difference in the rescaled means of the RNV and DNV treatment groups), therefore, 
lends even more support to the strength of the associational responsibility cue. 
 
4.2.3: Single-cue vs. No-cue 
 The final comparison in this set of hypotheses examines a pair of treatments in 
which neither senator has associational responsibility, but only one has technical 
                                                
172 Malhotra and Kuo (2007:12). 
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responsibility (DYV).  As expected, the positive and significant coefficient on the DYV 
variable in Models 3 and 4 suggests a clear difference exists between this treatment effect 
and that of the excluded group (DNV).  Finally, as Figure 4.3 illustrates, the eight-point 
difference is significant in substantive terms as well, much like the difference between 
the RNV and DNV treatment groups. 
 
4.2.4: Comparing the Cues Summary 
 A comparison of the different combinations of the two responsibility cues 
confirms the expectations of Tables 4.2 and 4.4 and Hypotheses 4 through 9.  The relative 
ranking of the different treatment effects, as suggested by the hypotheses, is captured by 
the following inequality. 
Expression 4.1:  
DNV < RNV = DYV < RYV 
First, respondents who are cued with a senator who exhibits at least one type of 
responsibility will have significantly higher assessments of that senator’s role in the Iraq 
War than respondents who are cued with a senator who has none (Hypotheses 6, 8 and 9). 
The effect of the DNV treatment, in other words, is dominated by the effect of every 
other treatment group.  
Second, respondents in the two treatment groups that both focus on senators with 
only one type of responsibility (RNV and DYV) are likely to generate equal assessments 
of responsibility for the senator. The strong support for this hypothesis is striking since, 
from a technical responsibility standpoint, the RNV experimental senator is wholly non-
responsible.  Respondents, therefore, are basing their elevated assessment of his 
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responsibility as compared to the other non-technically responsible senator (DNV) solely 
on the senator’s partisan affiliation. If the partisan cue was not important, we would 
expect the RNV senator to be assessed similarly to the DNV senator and less than the 
DYV senator, yet this is not the case. 
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, the treatment effect of the RNV group 
dominates the effect of all other treatments. This suggests the presence of an additive 
effect since the treatment effect of the group with two cues was always larger than the 
treatment effect in groups with only one responsibility cue (RNV and DYV). The 
presence of this additive effect is especially interesting in the DYV/RYV comparison, as 
it suggests citizens are willing to assign different levels of responsibility to senators who 
are both technically responsible. This result, together with the finding from Hypothesis 4 
regarding the RNV>DNV relationship, offer strong support for the idea that notion that 
partisan connections act as a major conduit for political responsibility in the minds of 
citizens.  
 
4.3 Respondent Interactive Hypotheses 
The final set of hypotheses examines whether the effect of the different treatments 
varies across subsets of respondents.  In light of the strong effect of the senator’s partisan 
affiliation, the primary interactive effect of interest is between the treatments and the 
respondent’s self-identified partisan identification.173  As Hypotheses 10a and 10b 
suggested, we should expect respondents to assign more responsibility to Senator Harris 
when the respondent does not share a partisan affiliation with the experimental senator 
                                                
173 Interactions of the treatment group with the respondent’s position on the war and hawkish tendencies 
were also performed. The interactions were never significant.  
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presented to them.  The effect of the treatment on the respondent’s assessment of the 
Senator, in other words, may depend on the respondent’s own political association.  
The presence of an interactive effect can be determined by multiplying each of the 
treatments by the dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is a Republican or 
Democrat.174 As above, Model 5 presents the basic model while Model 6 is estimated 
with the standard set of controls (see Table 4.6) 
Table 4.6: Interactive Models 
 Model 5 Model 6 
 Coefficient S.E. P-Value Coefficient S.E. P-value 
Treatments       
Republican, Yes Vote 0.745 0.15 0.000 0.762 0.147 0.000 
Republican, No Vote 0.369 0.155 0.018 0.347 0.152 0.011 
Democrat, Yes Vote 0.441 0.148 0.003 0.467 0.146 0.000 
Respondent Variables       
Republican -0.513 0.159 0.001 -0.229 0.163 0.161 
RYV * Republican -0.226 0.228 0.323 -0.316 0.224 0.158 
RNV * Republican -0.153 0.236 0.517 -0.165 0.231 0.475 
DYV * Republican -0.312 0.225 0.167 -0.402 0.222 0.070 
Hawk    -0.392 0.097 0.000 
Disagree with War - - - 0.305 0.091 0.001 
Male - - - -0.15 0.08 0.061 
Age - - - -0.004 0.003 0.138 
Attention to War - - - 0.117 0.131 0.374 
Constant 2.783 0.108 0.000 2.793 0.189 0.000 
N 810   788   
 
 As the significance tests on the interaction terms indicate, a strong interactive 
effect is not evident. Joint significance tests of the set of interaction terms confirm this 
(p< 0.561 for Model 5 and p<0.286 for Model 6).  Substantively, this suggests that 
although the treatments still have strong effects on respondents’ evaluations of the 
                                                
174 Existing work suggests that all lower order terms, including tacit interactions, need to be included in 
interactive models (Braumoeller (2004) and Brambor et al. (2005)). Tacit interactions arise when two 
variables are interacted with the same modifying variable (i.e., A*C and B * C). In this case, the tacit 
interaction would be between A and B. Excluding the A*B term risks biasing the other coefficients since it 
constrains the effect of A*B to 0. This problem may concern researchers in some contexts, but is less of a 
concern here since the treatment categories are mutually exclusive—respondents can only be in one 
treatment group. Although tacit interactions technically exist in this model (e.g., RYV *RNY) the fact that 
at least one of these terms must be zero while the other is 1 means it is safe to peg this term’s effect to zero.  
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experimental senators in general, there is no evidence of systematic differences in these 
effects between respondents of different political stripes.  The effect of the treatment, in 
other words, is not contingent upon the respondent’s own political identification. 
 Despite this, Models 5 and 6 can still offer several new insights about how the 
effects of the treatments vary across respondents of different parties since the interaction 
terms allow for the isolation of the effect of one portion of the interaction term (and its 
significance) while holding the other component constant at a set value.  Figure 4.4 
illustrates this concept. In the Figure, the three treatment group variables included in 
Models 5 and 6 (RYV, RNV and DYV) are all held (separately) at 1 while the respondent 






                                                
175 Graphs of interactions between dichotomous variables (say X and Z) usually only include two lines; one 
line when X equals 1 and Z equals 0, and another for when X equals 1 and Z equals 1. Figure 4.4 
necessitates six lines since there are three different and mutually exclusive dichotomous treatment variables 
that need be interacted with “Republican respondent”. 
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Figure 4.4 depicts the marginal effect of the treatments by a respondent’s partisan 
affiliation.  As in Models 3 and 4, the effect of any treatment group must be interpreted 
relative to the excluded treatment, DNV.  With this in mind, the first pair of estimated 
marginal effects demonstrates that both Republican and Democratic respondents assign 
more responsibility to Senator Harris when they are in the RNV group then when they are 
in the DNV group. A significant difference exists between the effects of the treatments 
since neither marginal effect’s 95% confidence interval includes zero; the lack of an 
interactive effect is evidenced by the fact that the two confidence intervals overlap 
substantially. The fact the respondents behave in similar ways across party lines is not too 
surprising considering these two treatment groups represent the extreme combinations of 
the two responsibility types. 
 The results become more complex as we move to the second and third set of lines.  
In both cases, as before, the overlapping confidence intervals suggest the absence of a 
strong interactive effect. What is interesting, however, is that while Democratic 
respondents assigned to groups RNV and DYV are willing to attribute (significantly) 
more responsibility to Senator Harris than Democrats assigned to group DNV, a similar 
effect does not exist among Republican respondents.  If Republican respondents saw 
differences between the RNV senator, the DYV senator and the DNV senator the 95% 
percent confidence intervals on the RNV and DYV marginal effects would not include 
zero, yet each does and the marginal effect itself is quite small. 
 These differences in how respondents of the two parties react to the treatments, 
however, should be interpreted with caution. The aforementioned F-tests and the fact that 
all of the confidence intervals in Figure 4.4 overlap suggest that there is little support for 
 118 
Hypotheses 10a and 10b. Although the important treatment effects across groups in 
general (as evidenced by Hypotheses 1-9) still hold, no strong evidence supports a claim 
that the effect of the treatment varies with the respondent’s political affiliation. Instead, 
the effects of associational responsibility cues and technical responsibility cues appear to 
operate independently of the respondent’s own political leanings.  
 
5.0 Implications 
 The analyses presented in this chapter provide strong support for Chapter 3’s 
assumption that citizens see leaders who share a political affiliation with a conflict-
initiating leader as more responsible than leaders who lack this affiliation.  Although the 
experimental Democratic senators who voted for the war were seen as more responsible 
than Democratic senators who voted against it, Republican senators were held more 
responsible than dissenting Democrats, regardless of how they voted. The fact that 
respondents were willing to assign significantly more responsibility to the Republican 
who voted against the war based solely on his associational responsibility demonstrates 
the power of the political affiliation cue.   
That respondents were also willing to assign more responsibility to a Republican 
who voted for the war than a Democrat who also voted for the war is equally important in 
this regard. In this comparison, both senators were equally technically responsible for the 
war (insofar as a senator could be), yet respondents saw the Republican as having a 
higher degree of responsibility. Both of these findings lend support to the coding rule 
employed in the previous chapter.  Although technical responsibility certainly matters, 
the additional bump in responsibility provided by the associational responsibility cue 
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should not be overlooked or underestimated by scholars of international relations or 




























 March 20, 2008, marked the fifth anniversary of the American invasion of Iraq 
and the start of a sixth year with more than 125,000 troops deployed in the region. With 
nearly 4,000 American fatalities over 66% of the public opposing the war and nearly 
4,000 American casualties, much of the media coverage in the days leading up to the 
anniversary centered on the costs of the war.176 An op-ed piece in The Washington Post 
by economists Linda Blimes and Joseph Stiglitz threw the financial burden of the war 
into particularly sharp relief. Claiming the war “was not only the second longest in 
American history (after Vietnam) [but] also the second most costly, surpassed only by 
World War II,” the authors projected the war would eventually cost the American people 
a staggering 3 trillion dollars.177  
 Amidst such criticism, George W. Bush delivered a speech at The Pentagon to 
defend the war that had dominated his agenda for more than half of his time in office. 
The speech largely focused on the gains made since the 2007 troop surge and the 
necessity of a continued American military presence, but the president addressed the 
costs as well. Although Bush began by dismissing recent estimates of the monetary cost 
as “exaggerated,” he conceded that “no one would argue that this war has not come at a 
                                                
176“Five Years Later, Bush Says Iraq War Must Go On." CNN.com. The poll was conducted over the 
course of three days (March 14-16) in 2008. 
177 Blimes and Stiglitz (2008.) 
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high cost in lives and treasure.”178 The President continued, however, with a grim 
prediction of the consequences of succumbing to these costs—an emboldened terrorist 
movement with “an even greater determination to dominate the region and harm 
America” — and emphasized the need to press on. Bush concluded his speech by 
acknowledging the men and women who had “given their lives to the War on Terror,” 
and encouraged the public to, “honor them by making sure their sacrifice was not in 
vain.” 179 
 As noted in Chapter 1, the conventional wisdom within the security literature 
cannot account for Bush’s behavior. Nothing about Bush’s speech would strike a 
contemporary observer as particularly puzzling or out of the ordinary. That a 
democratically elected president would deliver a speech ti motivate the public to stay in 
an enormously (and unexpectedly) costly and increasingly unpopular war five years after 
he had initiated, however, it presents a strong challenge to the standard scholarly 
expectations. Instead of heeding the public’s opposition to the war and ending the war 
when costs surpassed some threshold, Bush has gone to great lengths to underscore the 
need to stay, and has made every attempt to connect it to the broader fight against 
terrorism.  
 Existing theory also falters for explaining the behavior of politicians other than 
the chief executive. As presidential hopefuls from both parties jockey for support in 
anticipation of the November election, an intriguing division has emerged. Although 
candidates need broader popular support beyond members of the party base to secure the 
requisite number of Electoral College votes, it seems that only the Democratic 
                                                
178 “President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror” (March 19, 2008.) 
179 Ibid. 
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candidates, Senators Hillary Clinton and Barak Obama, appear to be trying actively to 
capitalize a recent poll that suggests that 61% of Americans think the next president 
should remove most troops from Iraq “within a few months of taking office.”180  
 While the Democratic senators spar over which of them is better suited to lead the 
country out of the war181, the presumed Republican nominee, Senator John McCain, has 
taken a different tack, asserting that, “[I]t’s not a matter of how long we’re in Iraq, it’s 
whether we succeed or not.”182 Despite growing dissatisfaction with the Iraq war, even 
among Republicans, McCain’s commitment to the war has shown no signs of waning—a 
strategy few political scientists would predict for a man intent on capturing the nation’s 
highest office in less than five months. 
 The behaviors of President Bush and Senator McCain exemplify the two primary 
questions at the center of this dissertation. Bush’s commitment to the war speaks to the 
question of why some leaders, especially leaders of democracies, stay in wars than have 
become unexpectedly costly (or unpopular) when the chances of victory are slim.  
Likewise, Senator’s McCain’s steadfast support for a continued American presence in 
Iraq highlights the need for a better understanding of how war informs the actions of 
leaders beyond the executive.   
 These questions (and others) grew from a larger, more general question: Why do 
wars end when they do? In this dissertation I argued that answering this larger question 
required an understanding of how settlement costs factored into a leader’s war 
termination calculus. With this goal in mind, this project developed a theory about the 
                                                
180 “Poll: 71 Percent Think Iraq Spending Hurts Economy.” CNN.com. The poll was conducted over the 
course of three days (March 14-16) in 2008. 
181 “Clinton Says She Is the Only Candidate Who Can End the War.” CNN.com  
182“McCain Defends ‘100 Years in Iraq’ Statement” CNN.com.  
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role of a particular type of settlement cost—leader culpability—in international conflict. 
Chapter 2 specified the conditions under which leaders would feel the pressures 
associated with culpability and how these pressures might pass from one leader to the 
next in the same war. Following this, Chapters 3 and 4 explored two sets of observable 
implications suggested by the theory; the former focused on the effects of leader 
culpability on war outcome and leader punishment, while the latter explored how 
individual citizens assign culpability to politicians in and outside the executive office. 
 The rest of this chapter proceeds in three sections. Section 2 summarizes the goals 
and findings of the previous chapters. Following this, Section 3 reviews some of the 
major insights suggested by these findings. Finally, Section 4 concludes by identifying 
remaining unanswered questions and several next steps for theories of war termination. 
 
2.0 Goals of the Study and Findings 
 In Chapter 2, I explored how a leader’s personal culpability for a war can function 
as a settlement cost. To illustrate this settlement cost, I compared it to another factor that 
scholars commonly assume influences the war termination decision: the adversary’s war 
aims. Although both of these factors certainly figure into the choice of continuing to fight 
or capitulating the enemy, Chapter 2 identified three ways in which the two differ in the 
minds of leaders.  
 The first difference is the manner in which the two types of settlement costs affect 
leaders and citizens. An adversary with high war aims will deter leaders and citizens 
from ending the war before their enemy has been defeated; doing otherwise would almost 
certainly guarantee an unpleasant post-war status quo.  Leader culpability costs are 
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different in that they affect leaders and citizens asymmetrically; they only provide leaders 
with an incentive to stay in the war. As I discussed in Chapter 2 (and will elaborate 
below), this characteristic creates a significant divergence in the preferences of leaders 
and citizens even in democratic states and challenges a great deal of the conventional 
scholarly wisdom. 
 The second difference in the two types of settlement costs centers on when they 
arise. The war aims of the adversary will only create an incentive to stay in the war if the 
aims are expansive183 Leader culpability costs, on the other hand, will be present in every 
war, though not necessarily for every leader, regardless the adversary’s intentions. The 
independence of leader culpability costs from the issue at stake compounds the 
aforementioned preference divergence problem since it creates situations where the 
leader will want to continue fighting while the citizens will want the war to end.  
 The third and final difference between the two types of settlement costs is how 
they change over the course of a war. Although an adversary’s war aims will fluctuate 
slightly, they will rarely change from purely defensive to completely offensive, or vice 
versa. Leader culpability costs, by contrast, will vary in very predictable ways with 
changes in leadership, and identifying the means by which they change was the second 
major goal of Chapter 2.   
 I identified three ways in which leaders can become culpable in the eyes of their 
domestic audiences. The first way, which includes the bulk of the culpable leaders, is for 
a leader to be in charge of the state when the war begins. Although the possibility that 
leaders of states that were attacked would be granted some leeway by their citizens 
                                                
183 For example, the adversary is intent on conquering a large piece of territory, overthrowing the current 
regime, or taking over the country completely. 
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remains an open empirical question, I argued that, generally speaking, first leaders should 
feel the pressures associated with culpability.  
 The second and third paths to culpability apply to leaders who take power during 
the conflict. New leaders can inherit the settlement cost from their predecessor if they are 
from the same ruling group as the first leader, or if they publicly supported the war since 
its initiation.  These two conditions allow citizens to link the new leader to the original 
decision to go to war, even in minimal-information environments like autocracies, and 
they will blame him for any resulting hardship. After establishing the conditions for 
culpability, I turned to a discussion of the nature of wartime leadership changes, the 
distribution of culpability costs we should observe across the set of warring leaders, and 
how the leader’s regime type mitigates or amplifies the pressures associated with 
culpability settlement costs. 
 
2.1 Empirical Findings—Part 1 
 Chapter 2 also presented two sets of hypotheses about the theory’s observable 
implications. The first set analyzed how a leader’s culpability (or lack thereof) should 
affect his or her willingness to accept certain types of settlements. The second set 
examined how culpability affected the probability a leader would be punished in the 
event of a loss. 
 Chapter 3 tested these hypotheses using a research design that offered three 
distinct improvements over existing techniques. First, I presented a new coding of war 
outcome that allowed all states (and their leaders) to be included in the analysis 
simultaneously. Previous research designs required scholars to drop all but one state (or, 
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in case of multilateral wars, all but one coalition) to avoid problems of statistical 
dependence. My design solved this problem by coding the war outcome based on the 
degree to which a leader accomplished the state’s original war aims instead of on how the 
state fared relative to the adversary.  
 Second, my design used warring leaders as the unit of observation instead of 
warring states. This innovation constitutes a major improvement over current designs 
and, as the preceding chapters demonstrated, has substantial ramifications for how we 
interpret existing empirical work. Using warring states as the unit of observation (in both 
a theoretical and empirical sense) overlooks crucial differences between leaders and lulls 
scholars into thinking that looking at one leader per war is a safe practice.  In actuality, as 
I discussed in Chapter 3, this is not the case; no matter which leader a researcher chooses 
to focus on (the first or the last), sample bias will corrupt the findings.  
 The third improvement centered on how I coded leader punishment.  Current 
work on this topic determines post-war punishment based on whether a leader was 
removed from power within a certain period of time after the war ended.  Doing so, 
however, implicitly assumes that all leaders removed in this time period were punished 
because of the war. This assumption is unfounded. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, leaders 
leave power for a number of reasons, some of which are entirely unrelated to their state’s 
fortunes on the battlefield. In light of this, I only coded a leader as “punished” if he or she 
was removed as a direct result of the war. This new scheme not only allows for a more 
nuanced representation of political reality but also highlights the remarkable variation 
that exists in the circumstances surrounding wartime transfers of power. 
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 After assembling a new dataset designed with these improvements in mind, I 
subjected the hypotheses to a rigorous empirical analysis. I found broad support for all 
five of my hypotheses. First, with regard to war outcomes, culpable leaders are 
significantly more likely to preside over favorable outcomes than their non-culpable 
counterparts. This effect is especially pronounced in the comparison between democratic 
and autocratic leaders. Although some may suspect this result stems from the fact that all 
of the initiating leaders (and the advantages inherent in being a member of this group) are 
coded as culpable leaders, the effect of leader culpability remained strong even after 
controlling for whether a leader actively chose to involve his state in the conflict. 
 The hypotheses regarding leader punishment met with equal success. Culpable 
leaders who lost were significantly more likely to be punished than non-culpable leaders 
who presided over similar outcomes. Indeed, the probability of a non-culpable, losing 
leader being punished, regardless of regime type, was indistinguishable from that of a 
winning leader! Moreover, as with earlier hypotheses, this effect was larger for 
democratic leaders than autocratic ones, a non-surprising finding given the relative ease 
with which democratic citizens can remove their leaders.  
 Finally, I also found support for the notion that domestic audiences do not hold 
targeted leaders to the same standard as leaders who initiated wars or leaders who 
involved their state in an ongoing conflict. Targeted, losing leaders are significantly less 
likely to be punished than leaders who chose to involve their state in a war that they 
eventually lost. Taken together, these findings point to the powerful effect of a leader’s 
personal culpability on the types of outcomes she will accept and her likelihood of 
 128 
punishment if she fails to secure a settlement that approximates victory.  I will explore 
the implications of these finding further in Section 3. 
 
2.2. Empirical Findings—Part 2 
 Chapter 4 presented the second set of empirical results, about how individual 
citizens assign responsibility to different types of leaders. I designed the survey 
experiment employed in this chapter with an eye to gain insight about how citizens might 
pass responsibility for a conflict from one leader to the next. By using a fictitious U.S. 
senator (John Harris) I was able to isolate the effects of cues intended to capture two 
types of responsibility: technical responsibility for senators who voted for the war, and 
associational responsibility for senators who share partisan ties with the war’s first leader 
(i.e., Republicans.) Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups, 
asked to read a statement from the Senator and then asked to rate the Senator’s 
responsibility on a scale of 1-5. 
 The goal of this chapter was to ascertain whether citizens would assign more 
responsibility to senators when the associational responsibility cue was present. The 
experiment also allowed me to determine the effect of the technical responsibility cue and 
how combinations of the two cues might affect the respondent’s assessment. The ability 
to evaluate the cues in isolation and in combination was necessary for two reasons. First, 
based on the theory presented in Chapter 2, the associational cue alone should have an 
effect on how citizens think about leaders. The second condition for culpable leaders only 
required that the new leader be from the first leader’s ruling group; earlier support for the 
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war from this leader was not a necessary condition for the culpability to pass on. The 
experimental design permits the cleanest possible test of this idea.  
 Second, exploring how the cues work in combination allowed me to test 
hypotheses about a possible additive effect. That is, a senator associated with both cues 
would be held more responsible than a senator associated with one cue, who in turn 
would be held more responsible than senators associated with neither type of 
responsibility. Although the theory does not suggest the additive relationship explicitly, 
investigating the possibility allows for a more informed understanding of how leader 
accountability works (at least in the context of the American presidential system.) 
 The results strong confirmed the importance of the associational cue: Respondents 
assigned significantly more responsibility to the Republican senators than Democratic 
ones. Evidence of a strong additive effect was also present. Respondents assigned the 
Republican senator who voted for the war the most responsibility while the Democratic 
senator who voted against it was assigned the least. Meanwhile, respondents assigned the 
two senators representing the “divergent cue” combination middling and nearly identical 
degrees of responsibility.  
 A final set of tests, which explored the possibility of any interactive effects 
between a respondent’s political leanings and her assessment of the senator did not find 
strong support.  The differences that exist between Republican and Democratic senators 
were never significant.  Overall, however, these results confirmed the expectations 
established in Chapter 2 and lent credence to the coding rule employed in Chapter 3. 
  These findings add to our knowledge about how and why citizens hold certain 
leaders accountable. Although the literature has always assumed that citizens will want to 
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punish leaders associated with poor conflict outcomes, this dissertation examined how the 
blame for the war might pass from one leader to the next. Which leaders does the public 
consider “associated”? Answering this question represents a major theoretical and 
empirical advance. Other scholars have explored how blame for policy outcomes might 
spread from one leader to other members of his party in the same time period, but not 
how blame might be inherited when the war spans the governments of two different 
leaders. 
 
3.0 New Insights 
 The findings from this dissertation offer at least four new insights for studies of 
war termination. The first, which has implications for all types of countries, is the 
importance of appreciating that the domestic political scene of a warring state is a 
dynamic environment.  For too long scholars have black-boxed the internal politics by 
stopping at the warring state as the unit of analysis. Although some have begun to 
recognize the importance of looking one level deeper at leaders, even these scholars still 
focus on only one leader per war.184  Theories associated with these types of analyses 
limit themselves unnecessarily since they cannot include important leader-specific 
characteristics, such as culpability; their research design forces them to assume all leaders 
(at least within the same regime type) will face the same set of incentives. 
 The second insight, which stems largely from the first, is that we cannot expect a 
leader’s preferences to always align with his citizens’, even in democracies. Instead, 
these two actors will have different utility functions with very few terms in common.  
                                                
184 For examples of the former see Goemans, et al. (2006). For examples of the former see Bueno de 
Mesquita and Siverson (1995), Goemans (2001) and Goemans and Chiozza (2004). 
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The two utility functions will only move in sync if the leader is non-culpable; otherwise, 
they will diverge.  This insight challenges the conventional wisdom, which commonly 
overlooks leader-specific settlement costs, like culpability. This oversight leads scholars 
to link (at least implicitly) the utility functions of leaders and citizens and to assume the 
actors will respond to costs in similar ways. A classic example of this is the wartime 
bargaining literature where military and civilian casualties are thought to affect a leader’s 
willingness (or utility) to continue fighting even though neither cost factors enter the 
leader’s utility function directly.   
 As I discussed in Chapter 2, the physical costs of prosecuting the war should only 
affect a leader’s willingness to fight under two conditions. The first is if the losses are so 
massive that they affect the military’s ability to continue resisting the enemy. In cases 
where the “power to hurt”185 is lost, even the most culpable leader will consider 
surrender. The second, more common condition is if the leader is not culpable for the 
state’s involvement in the conflict. In cases like this, the leader has no personal reason to 
stay in the conflict, and every incentive to please her citizens. The absence of a 
culpability counter-pressure brings her preferences in line with the publics and 
encourages her to terminate the war.186 
 This pattern should hold even outside democratic systems, although a slightly 
different causal mechanism is at work. Even though a non-culpable autocratic leader is 
concerned with a much smaller winning coalition (whose members are likely insulated 
from the physical costs of war) there is little reason for her to spend resources on a 
                                                
185 Slantchev (2003a.) 
186 This notion is supported by the evidence presented in Chapter 3, but is not tested explicitly. I will 
explore this in future research with case studies, including careful analyses of the public statements issued 
by non-culpable leaders regarding when and why the war should end. 
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conflict she will likely lose. Her motivation for ending the conflict, then, stems not from a 
desire to appease the masses but rather from a desire to preserve the largest possible pool 
of resources for the agenda of her new regime. 
  The theory presented here also offers a new perspective on why and in which 
direction leaders will choose to revise their war aims. Scholars often assume leaders 
expand or lower their war aims based on the probability of victory, which they update 
over the course of the war in response to losses and gains on the battlefield. The leader 
culpability theory suggests this is not the case. Instead, leaders will revise their war aims 
in predictable ways based on their own personal role in the conflict.187 Culpable leaders 
will have very little reason to scale their war aims back. Even though doing so may make 
ending the war easier from bargaining standpoint, the public will still want to punish the 
leader for engaging the state in a war it could not win. The leader, therefore, stands to 
gain nothing by lowering the war aims since his probability of punishment will not 
decrease.  
 Culpable leaders will, however, have incentives to revise their war aims up since 
doing so may increase the salience of the conflict in the eyes of his citizens and 
encourage them to stay in the war (and to allow the leader to stay in power). These 
upward revisions may coincide with an increased probability of victory, but they can also 
be triggered by losses. As the state’s prospects in the war become more desperate, the 
                                                
187 As with the previous insight, although the evidence presented here supports this notion, more explicit 
investigation of this idea is better left to case work since quantifying the change in war aims during wars on 
a large scale would be difficult.  
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culpable leader will (perhaps in vain) try to gamble for resurrection in an attempt to 
reduce his probability of punishment.188     
 Non-culpable leaders, importantly, will not share this incentive. Instead, these 
leaders will only want to revise the war aims down, regardless of how the state is faring 
on the battlefield or the eventual probability of victory.189 These leaders stand to gain 
very little by staying in the conflict and their likelihood of being punished for backing 
down is minimal. Consequently, they will try to end the war as soon as possible upon 
coming to power.  
 The fourth insight centers on the relationship between a democratic leader and his 
citizens. The existing literature (reflecting the aforementioned tendency to meld the 
utility functions of leaders and citizens) often assumes that a “declining advantage of 
democracy” exists, where democratic leaders will grow more willing to end wars as they 
get longer and more costly for their citizens. The presumed causal mechanism behind this 
is the electoral check: a democratic leader will end a costly war to appease his public in 
return for the public allowing him to stay in office.  
 The theory presented here suggests that this causal story has been applied to 
democratic leaders too broadly. All democratic leaders will be interested in public 
opinion, but we should only expect non-culpable leaders to respond to it. Culpable, 
democratic leaders, by contrast, will often go directly against the wishes of their citizens 
                                                
188 Culpable leaders are also likely to engage in risky military strategies (e.g., massive influxes of troops, 
bold strikes into enemy territory, etc.) for similar reasons.  
189 In theory, a non-culpable leader may choose to stay in the war if the state has an overwhelming chance 
of victory, but this scenario is highly unlikely to occur in reality. If a state has a high probability of 
vanquishing its opponent, the win is likely to come quickly, and under the tenure of a culpable leader. Non-
culpable leaders, on the other hand, will often (though not always) come to power when the state has either 
been in the war or when the state is faring poorly.  
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and stay in a war longer, even when losses are high.190 Existing theory, therefore, is only 
half right. The electoral check does not motivate a leader to bow to the public’s wishes; 
instead it allows citizens to replace the leader refuses to do so with a leader who will. 
This insight suggests that anti-war protests are likely to fall on deaf ears when a culpable 
leader is in power. Protests are only likely to be effective when they either coincide with 
a leadership change that elevates a non-culpable leader (who will be more receptive to 
their demands) or if they are strong enough to bring such a leadership change about.  
 
4.0 Next Steps 
 This dissertation offered several new contributions, but still has potential for 
further development. This is especially true in the realm of case studies where more in-
depth knowledge of particular cases can allow for more refined testing of some 
hypotheses.  I briefly focus on two such opportunities here. 
 The first centers on the reaction of an actor who has not featured prominently in 
the dissertation thus far: the leader of the adversary. Although earlier sections discussed 
the importance of the adversary’s war aims, the adversary leader’s reaction to the 
culpability (or lack thereof) of the opposing leader is an intriguing question for future 
research. Wars will always start out with two culpable leaders but, as this dissertation 
demonstrated, war is often an engine of domestic political change that can bring new 
leaders into office. Such changes would presumably be of great interest to leaders of 
other combatants. How does the adversary’s leader respond when a non-culpable leader 
takes over the chief executive position in the other state? Does she capitalize on the 
                                                
190 Although instances of this should be rare since the anticipation of public dissent provides democratic 
leaders with strong incentives to avoid selecting into wars that will end in a loss they will be held culpable 
for, democratic leaders do not always choose wars wisely. 
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opportunity to end the war quickly by offering reduced terms she knows her opponent is 
likely to accept? Or does she drive for a harsher settlement since she knows her opponent 
will likely lack the political will to resist? The answer likely depends on how well 
equipped the adversary is—in both political and military terms—to continue fighting.  
 In the Korean War, for instance, the Communists appeared to be keenly aware of 
the change from Truman to Eisenhower in the United States. Indeed Eisenhower had not 
even been in office for a full year before the North Koreans and Chinese produced a new 
settlement for his consideration. Although the terms were very similar to those offered to 
Truman a few months earlier, Eisenhower accepted them and came home to a warm 
hero’s reception. 
 Is this an example of the Communists capitalizing on Eisenhower’s lack of 
culpability? Truman had withdrawn from the 1952 presidential election before the 
nominating process had even begun, but we can safely assume he knew that Democratic 
candidate would face an uphill battle because of his handling of the conflict. Eisenhower 
won the election handily over Adlai Stevenson, and control of the White House (and, 
more importantly for the Communists, control of US foreign policy) passed from a 
culpable Democrat to a non-culpable Republican. Was the timing of the new terms 
intentional to provide Eisenhower with terms he could accept more easily than Truman 
could have? Case work on this war, and others like it, may uncover interesting insights 
about how leaders respond to leadership changes that bring non-culpable adversaries to 
power. 
 The second potential avenue of exploration centers on other types of settlement 
costs that exist. The two settlement costs discussed in this dissertation—adversary war 
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aims and leader culpability costs—are certainly important, but they are surely not the 
only factors that might inspire a leader to stay in a war.  Leaders might also be deterred 
from settling without a win if the adversary is long-term rival or if the conflict is part of 
an ongoing, larger struggle. The war in Vietnam from the American point of view 
exemplifies this type of concern. Although Nixon ran on a platform of “Peace With 
Honor” in 1968 and was otherwise inculpable for entangling US forces in Southeast Asia, 
large numbers of US troops remained involved in the conflict until 1973.  
 Why did Nixon stay in so long? One answer might be the Cold War. Even though 
Americans and Soviets never engaged each other in combat directly, several “proxy 
conflicts” erupted in the four decades following World War II that many observers saw as 
part of a larger battle between the Communist East and the Capitalist West. Vietnam was 
one such conflict as was Korea. In conflicts like these, I would argue, all leaders, 
regardless of their personal culpability for the conflict would feel pressure to secure 
favorable terms since the conflict was seen as part of a larger whole. For American 
citizens, the loss of South Vietnam was not important in and of itself—what was 
important was the allowing the larger threat, the Soviet Union, to gain the geopolitical 
advantage and to spread its ideology. Because of this, any American president who 
served during the Cold War would have felt strong pressures to avoid looking “soft on 
Communism” even if it meant staying in a costly war he did not start. 191 
 A similar story could also be told for a non-culpable leader fighting a state that 
has historically been a frequent adversary (e.g., the long-standing rivalry between India 
and Pakistan based on numerous disagreements over territory.) In these cases, the lack of 
                                                
191 This notion is often referred to as the “Domino Theory” wherein the loss of one country to Communism 
would trigger a chain reaction within the region, bringing more states under the Soviet influence. 
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culpability for the leader is less relevant. Because of the high likelihood of fighting the 
same state at some point in the near future, citizens will be concerned about any leader’s 
reputation for resolve, even if he was not culpable for starting the conflict.  
 I hope to explore these ideas and more in future research with case studies to gain 
a better understanding of the intricacies behind the broader causal mechanisms I have 












































 This Appendix presents the marginal effects from the equations presented in 
Chapter 3. These tables were calculated using the SPost Stata ado file, which allowed me 
to move the independent variable of interest while holding the other variables at their 
medians (in the case of continuous variables) or modes (in the case of dichotomous 
variables) within the sample of interest to approximate a “representative” case.192 
Table A1: 
Marginal Effects for Table 3.5: War Outcomes and Culpability 











95% Confidence Interval for 
Change in Probability 
-3 0.1286 0.0591 -0.0695 -0.1479 to 0.0088 
-2 0.0515 0.0264 -0.0251 -0.0514 to 0.0012 
-1 0.3224 0.2151 -0.1073 -0.2118 to -0.0029 
0 0.1492 0.1427 -0.0065 -0.0440 to 0.0309 
1 0.0728 0.0848 0.0120 -0.0140 to 0.0381 
2 0.2755 0.4720 0.1965 0.0398 to 0.3532 
  
These values were calculated using the coefficients from Model 1.  
 
Table A2a: 
Marginal Effects for Table 3.6: Democracy, Culpability and War Outcome 











95% Confidence Interval for 
Change in Probability 
-3 0.0979 0.0262 -0.0717 -0.1576 to 0.0141 
-2 0.0410 0.0122 -0.0288 -0.0620 to 0.0045 
-1 0.2871 0.1168 -0.1703 -0.3522 to 0.0115 
0 0.1539 0.0994 -0.0544 -0.1089 to 0.0000 
1 0.0805 0.0702 -0.0102 -0.0501 to 0.0296 
2 0.3397 0.6752 0.3355 0.0498 to 0.6213 
 




                                                
192 Long and Freese (2005). 
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Table A2b: 
Marginal Effects for Table 3.6: Democracy, Culpability and War Outcome 











95% Confidence Interval for 
Change in Probability 
-3 0.0972 0.0601 -0.0371 -0.1013 to 0.0272 
-2 0.0407 0.0267 -0.0140 -0.0367 to 0.0087 
-1 0.2861 0.2175 -0.0686 -0.1732 to 0.0360 
0 0.1539 0.1443 -0.0096 -0.0333 to 0.0141 
1 0.0806 0.0854 0.0048 -0.0090 to 0.0186 
2 0.3415 0.4660 0.1245 -0.0586 to 0.3076 
 




Marginal Effects for Table 73.9 Culpability and Domestic Punishment 
Moving from Winners to Different Types of Losers193 






Interval for Change 
in Probability 
Non-Culpable 
Loser 0.0350 0.0446 0.0095 0.27 -0.0427 to 0.0618 
Culpable Loser 0.0350 0.1632 0.1282 3.66 0.0420 to 0.2144 
 

















                                                




Marginal Effects for Table 3.10: Culpability, Regime Type and Domestic Punishment 










Change Magnitude of Change 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Change 
in Probability 
Non-Culpable, 
Autocratic Leader 0.0350 0.0444 0.0094 0.27 -0.0535 to 0.0724 
Culpable, 
Autocratic Leader 0.0350 0.1536 0.1186 3.39 0.0370 to 0.2001 
Non-Culpable, 
Democratic Leader 0.0377 0.0491 0.0115 0.31 -0.0795 to 0.1025 
Culpable, 
Democratic Leader 0.0377 0.3824 0.3447 9.14 -0.0709 to 0.7603 
 
Table A4b: 
Marginal Effects for Table 3.10: Culpability, Regime Type and Domestic Punishment 










Change Magnitude of Change 
95% Confidence 

















0.0606 0.5049 0.4444 7.33 0.0274 to 0.8614 
 














Marginal Effects for Table 12: Voluntary Participation and Culpability Costs 











Change Magnitude of Change 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Change 
in Probability 
Autocratic 
Leaders 0.1842 0.4583 0.2741 1.49 -0.0282 to 0.5764 
Democratic 
Leaders 0.3415 0.6603 0.3188 0.93 0.0022 to 0.6353 
 




















 The following two figures illustrate the additive nature of the second set of 
hypotheses (and the interactive nature of the third) in Chapter 4.  First, it is helpful to 
return to the cue combinations.  
 
Table B.1: Cue Combinations 





1. Republican, voted for the war 1 1 2 
2. Republican, voted against the war 1 0 1 
3. Democrat, voted for the war 0 1 1 
4. Democrat, voted against the war 0 0 0 
 
Figure B.1 plots the additive cue totals based on the Senator’s party; the green and purple 
lines connect the points of Senators who voted the same way (yes and no, respectively). 
As the additive hypotheses would predict, the lines are parallel; the technical 
responsibility cue raises the overall responsibility assessment of both Senators by equal 
amounts, regardless of their party membership.  






























An interactive relationship, which applies to the hypotheses in the third set of Chapter 4, 
would produce a very different plot pattern. In Figure A4.1.2, I plot the responsibility 
assigned to two Senators who both voted for the war, based on the respondent’s party 
membership. The blue line represents a Democratic senator who voted for the war and 
the red line represents a Republican who voted the same way.194 














In this figure the lines are not parallel because the treatments affect Democratic and 
Republican respondents differently. Let us assume, for the moment, that respondents 
interpret “responsible” using a negative connotation and equate it with “blame”. If this is 
the case, Republican respondents, in an effort to punish Democratic leaders while 
protecting Republican ones, will assign more responsibility to the Democratic leader and 









                                                
194 I selected these two treatments for illustrative purposes only. The treatments involving Senators who 


















 Figure C.1 and Table C.1 are identical to Figure 4.3 and Table 4.4 in Chapter 4 
except the control group is now included. The control treatment is identical to the other 
treatments except for the exclusion of any information about the Senator’s party 
membership or previous vote on the Iraq War. In Table C.1, the control treatment is the 
excluded category. 
 
Figure C.1: Mean Responsibility Attribution by Condition With Control 
 
 
Table C.1: Effects of Cue Combinations  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Treatments Coefficient S.E. P-value Coefficient S.E. P-value 
RYV 0.216 0.122 0.039 0.167 0.114 0.073 
RNV -0.127 0.125 0.155 -0.184 0.118 0.059 
DYV -0.128 0.120 0.143 -0.160 0.113 0.079 
DNV -0.453 0.121 0.000 -0.457 0.113 0.000 
Respondent Variables       
Republican    -0.427 0.081 0.000 
Hawk    -0.343 0.087 0.000 
Disagree With Iraq War    0.345 0.082 0.000 
Male    -0.122 0.072 0.089 
Age    -0.005 0.002 0.021 
Attention Paid to the War    0.143 0.114 0.211 
Constant 3.017 0.089 0.000 3.343 0.162 0.000 
 N=  987   N= 965   
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 As discussed briefly in Chapter 4, respondents in the control group behave as 
expected. In both models, respondents assigned to the control treatment assign 
significantly less responsibility to their senator than respondents in the RYV condition, 
and significantly more than respondents in the DNV condition. There is no significant 
difference between the treatments with divergent cues (RNV and DYV) and the control 
group in Model 1, while in Model 2 the divergent cue treatments trigger slightly smaller 
assessments of responsibility than the control condition.  
 Although this treatment constitutes a true control since it does not cue a 
respondent to either of the two types of responsibility, it is difficult to interpret any 
results that include the control since the two treatment conditions do not have a “neutral” 
category. A Senator is either a Republican or Democrat and either voted for the war or 
voted against it. Although “Independent” and “Abstained” may seem to be suitably 
neutral for use in a control treatment, in practice both carry non-neutral connotations. 
This necessitates the use of the current control treatment wording.   
 Overall, the results are not surprising, but given that respondents in the control 
treatment are provided with no information on two central characteristics of the Senator 
that respondents in the other treatments are given, we should not read too much into any 
comparisons between the groups.  This is especially true for comparisons between the 
RNV, DYV and control groups. Members of all three treatment groups may be confused 
about how to respond, but they will be confused for different reasons Members of the 
former two treatment groups, for instance, may be confused since the Senator’s vote 
clashes with their expectation of his position based on his party membership, while 
members of the latter group may struggle with the question because they have no 
 147 
information on which to base their answer. This raises the possibility that respondents in 
the RNV and DYV groups are assigning a middling level of responsibility since the two 
cues “cancel” one another out, while respondents in the control group are choosing the 























































 Following the example set by Tomz (2007), I use major respondent characteristics 
as predictors of treatment group assignment. If the randomization worked, none of the 
respondent characteristics should be significant predictors of the respondent’s group (e.g., 
hawkish respondents should not be more likely to be assigned to Treatment RNV than 
Treatment DNV). None of the coefficients’ p-values approach .05, so we can be 
confident that the randomization process was successful and that treatment effects are the 
result of the treatments themselves and not a result of the attributes of the respondents in 
Treatment: RYV Coefficient S.E. P-value 
Republican -0.17 0.22 0.46 
Hawk -0.12 0.24 0.62 
Disagrees with Iraq War 0.14 0.23 0.54 
Male 0.23 0.20 0.25 
Age 0.01 0.01 0.34 
Attention to War 0.02 0.34 0.96 
Constant -0.38 0.42 0.37 
Treatment: RNY    
Republican -0.25 0.23 0.28 
Hawk -0.33 0.25 0.18 
Disagrees with Iraq War -0.18 0.24 0.45 
Male 0.11 0.21 0.61 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.81 
Attention to War 0.07 0.34 0.84 
Constant -0.04 0.42 0.93 
Treatment: DYV    
Republican -0.27 0.22 0.22 
Hawk -0.39 0.24 0.10 
Disagrees with Iraq War -0.25 0.23 0.28 
Male 0.24 0.20 0.24 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.60 
Attention to War -0.08 0.32 0.80 
Constant 0.16 0.40 0.69 
Excluded Category: DNV    
N=799    
Log Likelihood: -1100.47    
LR Statistic (~): 11.58    
Prob. > Χ2 : 0.8683    
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the groups. The likelihood ratio test confirms this. If all of the coefficients were 0, we 
would observe the Chi-square test statistic with a probability of 0.8683. Consequently, 










































Appendix E  
 
Treatment Wording 
Treatment RYV: “Senator John Harris, a Republican who is a senior member of the 
Foreign Relations Committee and who voted for the war when it began in 2003, has just 
released the following statement: “Despite the fine efforts of our armed forces, careful 
analysis of the current situation in Iraq has led me to conclude that our continued 
presence is unlikely to achieve the goals set in 2003 and will likely make an already bad 
situation even worse. Given this assessment, it is my opinion that all US forces should be 
withdrawn from Iraq over the next three months.” 
 
Treatment RNV: “Senator John Harris, a Republican who is a senior member of the 
Foreign Relations Committee and who voted against the war when it began in 2003, has 
just released the following statement: “Despite the fine efforts of our armed forces, 
careful analysis of the current situation in Iraq has led me to conclude that our continued 
presence is unlikely to achieve the goals set in 2003 and will likely make an already bad 
situation even worse. Given this assessment, it is my opinion that all US forces should be 
withdrawn from Iraq over the next three months.” 
 
Treatment DYV: “Senator John Harris, a Democrat who is a senior member of the 
Foreign Relations Committee and who voted for the war when it began in 2003, has just 
released the following statement: “Despite the fine efforts of our armed forces, careful 
analysis of the current situation in Iraq has led me to conclude that our continued 
presence is unlikely to achieve the goals set in 2003 and will likely make an already bad 
situation even worse. Given this assessment, it is my opinion that all US forces should be 
withdrawn from Iraq over the next three months.” 
 
Treatment DNV: “Senator John Harris, a Democrat who is a senior member of the 
Foreign Relations Committee and who voted against the war when it began in 2003, has 
just released the following statement: “Despite the fine efforts of our armed forces, 
careful analysis of the current situation in Iraq has led me to conclude that our continued 
presence is unlikely to achieve the goals set in 2003 and will likely make an already bad 
situation even worse. Given this assessment, it is my opinion that all US forces should be 
withdrawn from Iraq over the next three months.” 
 
Control Treatment: “Senator John Harris, a senior member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, has just released the following statement: “Despite the fine efforts of our 
armed forces, careful analysis of the current situation in Iraq has led me to conclude that 
our continued presence is unlikely to achieve the goals set in 2003 and will likely make 
an already bad situation even worse. Given this assessment, it is my opinion that all US 











1. Based on the proposal you just read, how do you feel about the way Senator Harris is 
handling the current war in Iraq? 
 A. Strongly approve 
 B. Approve 
 C. Neither approve nor disapprove 
 D. Disapprove 
 E. Strongly disapprove 
 F. Don’t know 
 
2.  Think about Senator Harris and the proposal you just read. In your opinion, does the 
phrase ‘He provides strong leadership” describe Senator Harris extremely well, quite 
well, not too well, or not well at all? 
 A. Extremely well 
 B. Quite well 
 C. Not too well  
 D. Not well at all  
 E. Don’t know 
 
3. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning “not at all responsible” and 5 meaning “very 
responsible” where would you place Senator Harris in terms of responsibility for 
American involvement in Iraq as a whole?  
A.  1 
B.  2 
C.  3 
D. 4 
E.  5 
F.  Don’t know 
 
4.  How much attention have you been paying to what is going on in Iraq? 
A. A good deal 
B. Some 
C. Not much 
D. Don’t know 
E. Refused 
 
5.  Do you approve or disapprove of the decision to use military force against Iraq?  
A. Strongly approve 
B. Approve 
C. Neither approve nor disapprove 
                                                
195 Question wording for all questions (except for dependent variable questions 1 and 3 and background 
question 2) is based on questions taken from the American National Election Study. Background question 1 
is based on a similar question asked in the 1970s regarding American involvement in Vietnam.  
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D. Disapprove 
E. Strongly disapprove  
 
6. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or what? 
 A. Republican  
 B. Democrat 
 C. Independent 
 D. Other 
 E. Don’t know 
 
7. 
[If Respondent considers self a Republican] 
Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican? 
A. Strong Republican 
B. Not very strong Republican 
 
[If Respondent considers self a Democrat] 
Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a very strong Democrat? 
A. Strong Democrat 
B. Not very strong Democrat 
 
[If Respondent’s party preference is Independent, Other or Don’t Know] 
Do you consider yourself closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? 
A. Closer to Republican Party 
B. Closer to Democratic Party 
 
8. Some people believe the United States should solve international problems by using 
diplomacy and other forms of international pressure and use military force only if 
absolutely necessary. Suppose we put such people at 1 on this scale. Others believe 
diplomacy and pressure often fail and the US must be ready to use military force. 
Suppose we put them at number 7. And of course others fall in positions in-between, at 
points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 
 A. 1 
 B. 2 
 C. 3 
 D. 4 
 E. 5 
 F. 6 
 G. 7 
 H. Don’t know, haven’t thought much about it 
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